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Abstract
In the first essay, I study stock price movements during the trading day and find that
retail trading activity generates excess intraday volatility. I develop a simple econometric
measure which reveals that volatility realized during the trading day is too high to be
reconciled with volatility achieved over the entire trading day. High intraday volatility
stocks temporarily outperform low intraday volatility stocks by approximately 59 basis
points over the next month. This temporary outperformance is due to retail investor price
pressure, which I identify using the detailed brokerage dataset of Barber and Odean (2000)
as well as a novel time-series dataset obtained from parsing the financial statements of
Charles Schwab and E TRADE.
The second essay considers how tax-motivated selling generates temporary distortions
in stock prices around the turn of the tax year. As investors face the trade-off between
selling a temporarily-depressed stock this year and selling next year but delaying tax im-
plications by one year, the magnitude of the stock’s price distortion is a function of its
cost basis, the capital gains tax rate, and importantly, the interest rate. Each of these com-
ponents explains variation in US stock returns as well as retail investor selling behavior
around the turn of the tax year. Similar results in the UK provide out-of-sample confirma-
tion, as tax and calendar years differ.
The third essay develops a real business cycle model with time-varying inflation risk
and optimal, but infrequent, capital structure choice. In the model, more volatile in-
flation or more procyclical inflation leads to quantitatively important increases in credit
spreads. Intuitively, this result obtains because inflation persistence generates large uncer-
tainty about the price level at long maturities and because firms cannot adjust their capital
structure immediately. Across a panel of six developed economies, credit spreads rise by
iii
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15 basis points if either inflation volatility or the inflation-stock return correlation increases
by one standard deviation. Firms counteract higher debt financing costs by adjusting their
capital structure in times of higher inflation uncertainty.
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Chapter 1
Intraday Stock Volatility and Retail
Trading Activity
1.1 Introduction
Daily highs and lows are particularly visible prices, and perhaps especially so for
the typical retail investor. When tracking stock price movements throughout the day, a
retail investor may find these extreme observations to be the most salient points in an
intraday price graph. When reading a financial newspaper, a retail investor may scan
through yesterday’s highs and lows which are often reported alongside open and close
prices. When generating stories during market hours, the financial news media may try to
identify stocks with large intraday price swings. Ultimately, whether directly or indirectly
transmitted, high and low stock prices are likely to grab the attention of retail investors
and may even guide their trading decisions. Moreover, if retail investor trading activity
were sufficiently correlated, then perhaps the collective irrational trading decisions of retail
investors could temporarily impact prices.
To illustrate these propositions, consider the case of Shanda Interactive Entertainment
(SNDA), a media stock recommended by Jim Cramer on January 3, 2006 (shown in Fig-
1
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Figure 1.1: Retail Investors and Mad Money
This figure plots intraday price movements of Shanda Interactive Entertainment (SNDA), a media company
recommended by Jim Cramer on the show Mad Money on January 3, 2006. The vertical grey lines are drawn
to separate trading days. The vertical red line marks the date Jim Cramer recommended purchasing SNDA
to his viewers.
Chapter 1: Intraday Stock Volatility and Retail Trading Activity 3
ure 1.1). At the time, Jim Cramer’s television show Mad Money had been attracting
widespread attention from retail investors. On the day after the stock recommendation,
shares of SNDA rose 5.6 percent and closed at $16.11 (versus a prior day close of $15.25).
In fact during the day, the stock reached an intraday high price of $16.53. Over the next
five days, SNDA climbed another 14% and hit a high of $18.40 but eventually came all
the way back down to its pre-recommendation price level by the end of the month.1
Closer examination of the intraday price movements in Figure 1.1 reveals that SNDA
exhibited an increase in intraday volatility following Cramer’s recommendation. A simple
way to see this is to observe how much more pronounced high and low prices appeared in
the days after the recommendation. In fact, intraday price volatility was 90% higher in the
week after the recommendation compared to the week before based on a simple econo-
metric measure to be proposed in this paper. Assuming retail investors were aggressively
purchasing SNDA on these days without any clear economic justification, one might sus-
pect that the abnormal retail trading activity generated excess intraday volatility as well as
temporary price pressure.
In this paper, I test whether abnormal intraday volatility is indeed an indication of retail
investor trading activity and hence whether the above example illustrates a more prevalent
empirical phenomenon. To do so, I propose a simple econometric measure I call the Range
Variance Ratio (RVR). RVR is defined as the ratio of variance based on high and low prices
divided by variance based on open and close prices.
There are a couple reasons why RVR and its specification may be particularly appro-
priate for this endeavor. First, RVR is a formal statistical measure, and therefore, empirical
estimates of RVR can be compared to both theoretical and simulated hypothetical values
under varying distributional assumptions. This permits identification of excess intraday
volatility, or equivalently intraday mean-reversion, relative to a counter-factual distribu-
1For comparison, the S&P 500 was up only 0.4% on the day after the stock recommendation, although it
rose 1.3% over the next five days and also come back down. The beta of SNDA to the S&P 500 using daily
returns over this window was only 1.0.
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tion.
Second, RVR distinguishes between volatility based on high and low prices in the nu-
merator and volatility based on open and close prices in the denominator. This distinction
is useful given that prices at the start and end of the day are determined by a dispropor-
tionate portion of the day’s trading volume, which tends to be more institutional in nature
particularly at the close (Cushing and Madhavan (2001)). Moreover, one might argue that
highs and lows are likely footprints of uninformed traders, such as retail investors. Intu-
itively, informed traders tend to buy at prices that are too low, whereas uninformed traders
tend to buy at prices that are too high.
I sort the cross-section of stocks by RVR on a monthly frequency and find that the
empirical distribution of RVR suggests an intraday volatility too high to be reconciled with
volatility achieved over the entire day. Hence I document an excess intraday volatility
phenomenon. Next, I find that the highest RVR quintile stocks outperform the lowest
RVR quintile stocks by a statistically significant 59 basis points over the next month. This
outperformance is only temporary, however, as it entirely reverses within three months. 2
To test whether the initial temporary outperformance of high RVR stocks is associated
with price pressure generated by retail trading activity, I conduct both time-series and
cross-sectional tests. By parsing the financial statements of Charles Schwab and E TRADE
for quarterly transaction activity, I construct a novel time-series measure of aggregate retail
trading intensity. By using this dataset along with the RVR spread portfolio returns, I
find that periods of greater retail transaction activity correspond to periods of higher first-
month RVR quintile spread returns. In addition, I find direct cross-sectional evidence that
higher RVR corresponds to greater trading activity (and in particular buying) among retail
investors using the detailed brokerage dataset of Barber and Odean (2000). Therefore,
retail investor trading not only affects current prices but future prices as well.
These findings are robust to a number of controls including trading implementation
2Barber and Odean (2008) argue that retail investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, and
thus, increases in investor attention should correspond to temporary positive price pressure.
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lags, proxies for illiquidity, and market microstructure effects. For instance, I find that
the temporary price pressure exists even within a universe of predominantly large market
capitalization stocks, as well as among the most liquid stocks. In addition, I find that
while stocks with higher RVR tend to exhibit certain characteristics (e.g., lower book-
to-market ratios, lower recent returns, and higher volatility), the stock return anomalies
associated with these characteristics do not drive the temporary price pressure findings. In
other words, the RVR portfolio returns are not driven by well-known empirical anomalies
including size, value, momentum, reversal, and volatility.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief review of
related literature. Section 1.3 describes the data and methodology. Section 1.4 establishes
the main empirical results. Section 1.5 provides a series of robustness tests. Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Variance Ratios
A closely related paper by French and Roll (1986) documents that stock prices are
more volatile when the market is open than when the market is closed. The authors test for
excess volatility during market hours by comparing multiple to single day return variances
around weekends and holidays. The authors argue that private information traded during
market hours is the most likely explanation for their finding. In this paper, I propose an
alternative variance ratio for the purpose of examining volatility within market hours. The
conclusion I reach is that excess intraday volatility is likely related to the trading behavior
of retail investors as opposed to privately informed traders.
Variance ratios have been used elsewhere in the financial econometric literature as
well. Lo and Mackinlay (1988) present a variance ratio test to examine the hypothesis that
stock prices follow a random walk. Over short horizons of one week, the authors find that
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stock returns are positively auto-correlated. Fama and French (1987) show that the slope
coefficient in a multi-period auto-regressive return regression can be written as a variance
ratio adjusted by a mean-reversion factor. For long horizon returns of three to five years,
the authors find that stock returns are negatively auto-correlated. In this paper, I find that
stock prices are excessively volatile over the intraday time interval which suggests that
returns are negatively auto-correlated over these very short horizons.3
1.2.2 Volatility Estimation
The key variable proposed in this paper builds on volatility estimators derived pre-
viously in the econometric literature. Parkinson (1980) developed a volatility estimator
using high and low prices for an underlying geometric Brownian motion with no drift.
When compared to volatility using only close prices, the Parkinson measure is theoreti-
cally about five times more efficient. One of the author’s main results is a closed-form
derivation of the moment generating function for returns based on high divided by low
prices. In a similar paper, Garman and Klass (1980) propose a closely related and even
more efficient volatility estimator which uses high, low, open, and close prices. 4
Like these papers, I am interested in estimating volatility using specific intraday prices.
However, in this paper I attempt to explain the systematic differences in these estimates
rather than determine the most efficient estimator.5 I argue that there are meaningful dif-
ferences in interpreting open and close prices versus high and low prices, given that the
latter set of prices are more likely driven by uninformed traders. My empirical results
3Heston, Korajczyk, and Sadka (2010) examine intraday stock price patterns using the TAQ database.
The authors find continuation at half-hour intervals across trading days, which they attribute to institutional
trading patterns, and they also find evidence of short-term intraday reversals.
4For both the Parkinson (1980) and Garman and Klass (1980) models, it should be noted that efficiency
is conditional on the assumed geometric Brownian motion model. However, this paper suggests that such an
assumed model is not correct.
5Nonetheless I did test whether RVR provided predictability of future volatility beyond that of realized
and implied volatilities, but I did not find this to be the case.
Chapter 1: Intraday Stock Volatility and Retail Trading Activity 7
would thus suggest that modeling intraday volatility is structurally complicated by noise
generated from retail investor trading activity. Using high-frequency data, Ait-Sahalia and
Yu (2009) decompose stock return variances into fundamental and microstructure noise
components, although these authors associate noise with illiquidity.
1.2.3 Retail Trading Activity
This paper closely relates to a recent strand of literature on retail investor trad-
ing activity and limited attention. Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) document a
positive return premium to stocks with high abnormal trading volume. They suggest that
shocks in trading volume contain information about future prices and affect the visibility
of stocks to investors. Barber and Odean (2008) find that extreme returns, also interpreted
as shocks to investor attention, lead to higher stock prices in the short-run, followed by re-
versals. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) use Google search technology to identify investor
attention directly and document that increases in search activity correspond to temporarily
higher stock prices. The key variable in this paper can be thought of as another instrument
for identifying attention-grabbing stocks or perhaps even as a mechanism for attention-
grabbing if one believes retail investor trading behavior is self-feeding.
Not only are certain stocks attention-grabbing, but they also tend to draw herd-like
retail trading activity. Kumar and Lee (2006) find retail investor trades are systematic
based on a comprehensive sample of individual trades at a large anonymous brokerage
firm between 1991 and 1996. Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009a) find that the trades of retail
investors are highly correlated and persistent. The herd-like behavior of retail investor
trades has been documented to affect market prices (Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009b). I
find corroborating evidence that stocks more actively traded by retail investors tend to
exhibit more correlated returns and generate temporary price pressure.
Barber and Odean (2000) find that the stocks individual investors buy underperform
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the stocks they sell.6 Consistent with this, I find that while stocks likely to have been
actively traded by retail investors outperform over the first month, they underperform over
the course of the year. Although these temporary mis-pricings should attract arbitrage
capital, the corresponding trading strategy would incur significant portfolio turnover and
transaction costs.
1.3 Data and Methodology
1.3.1 Data Description
The stock-level data is obtained from a few standard sources. The Center for Re-
search in Securities Prices (CRSP) stock file provides daily prices, shares outstanding,
trading volumes, and returns for all stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
exchanges. Daily open, close, high, and low prices are all available for these securities
beginning June 15, 1992. The COMPUSTAT North America annual file contains account-
ing information for most publicly traded U.S. firms. This dataset is used in conjunction
with CRSP to compute book-to-market equity ratios. Earnings announcement dates and
times are obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) dataset. Short
interest data is obtained from both Bloomberg and COMPUSTAT.
Upon merging these stock-level datasets, I apply a few filters to ensure a reasonably
liquid and investable universe of securities and thereby reduce potential market microstruc-
ture effects. First, the universe is limited to U.S. common stocks by including only stocks
with CRSP share codes 10 or 11. Second, the universe is screened for stocks listed on
NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX by identifying stocks with CRSP exchange codes 1, 2, or
3. Third, stocks with prices below $1 and below-median market capitalizations (at the
time of portfolio formation) are dropped. Overall, this amounts to 3,267 stocks per month
6As reported in Table II of Barber and Odean (2000), the average household’s annual gross (net) return
controlling for the three-factor model is approximately -1.8% (-3.7%).
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on average and 725,328 total stock-month observations over the entire sample. Note that I
consider further size and liquidity measures to constrain the universe of investable stocks
later on in the robustness results section.
1.3.2 Range Variance Ratio
For the reasons stated in the introduction, high and low intraday prices are likely
to be particularly visible to retail investors and may even guide their trading decisions. In
addition, comparing high and low prices to open and close prices can offer information
about excess volatility during the day versus volatility over the entire day. I incorporate
both of these ideas in formulating a simple econometric measure that compares intraday
volatility using high and low prices to day volatility using open and close prices. Over an
interval of τ trading days, the variance estimate based on open and close prices is:
σˆ2d =
1
τ − 1
τ∑
t=1
(dt − d¯)2 (1.1)
where dt is the log of the close price divided by the open price and d¯ is the mean day
return. Similarly, the variance estimate based on high and low prices is:
σˆ2r =
1
τ − 1
τ∑
t=1
(rt − r¯)2 (1.2)
where rt is the log of the high price divided by the low price or the log of the low price
divided by the high price (depending on whether the day return was positive or negative),
and r¯ is the mean range return. Finally, I define the Range Variance Ratio (RVR) estimate
as the ratio of these two variances:
ˆRV R =
σˆ2r
σˆ2d
(1.3)
I estimate RVR for all stocks in the sample at the end of each month using daily open,
close, high, and low prices.
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As a statistical measure, RVR can be compared to hypothetical values under vary-
ing distributional assumptions. This permits identification of excess intraday volatility,
or equivalently intraday mean-reversion, relative to a counter-factual distribution. For the
specific case that log stock prices follow a Brownian motion with no drift, the limiting dis-
tribution of high divided by low price returns can be solved analytically using the moment
generating function derived by Parkinson (1980) which is as follows:
E[hpt ] =
4√
pi
Γ(
p+ 1
2
)(1− 4
2p
)ζ(p− 1)(2σt) p2 (1.4)
where ht denotes the high divided by low price return, Γ is the Gamma function, and ζ is
the Riemann zeta function. In order to generate hypothetical distributions of RVR for more
general parameterizations, I use a Monte Carlo simulation procedure which is described
in detail in the Appendix.
Figure 1.2 plots the time-series of twelve-month moving average median RVR values
for the bottom, middle, and top quintiles. Note that the RVR values are scaled by the
corresponding values from the counterfactual distribution described in the Appendix. If the
distribution of RVR were purely random and constant over time (and of course, consistent
with the simulation’s assumptions), then the plot would show values of one over time for
each of the quintiles. But this is not the case. The top quintile of RVR stocks have always
been excessively volatile (having values above one) and increasingly so over time. The
middle and bottom quintiles have also exhibited increasing intraday volatility over time,
although these series were both below one earlier on.
1.3.3 Retail Trading Activity
I extract a novel dataset on aggregate retail investor trading activity from the 10K
and 10Q filings of Charles Schwab and E TRADE for the periods 1992-2010 and 1995-
2010, respectively. These filings were obtained from the EDGAR Online database as made
publicly available by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). For each reporting
quarter, data on the number of transactions executed within the quarter was parsed from
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Figure 1.2: Time-Series of RVR
This figure shows the distribution of scaled RVR over time. Scaled RVR is the empirical range variance ratio
divided its theoretical counterpart from a simulated Brownian motion (as described in the text). Six-month
moving averages are shown for the median values within the bottom, middle, and top quintiles.
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the accounting statements.7 Note that retail transaction activity differs from retail trading
volume, although the two are likely to be very highly correlated. At either brokerage firm,
a single transaction may correspond to one or multiple shares having been traded.8
Figure 1.3 plots the time series of quarterly transaction activity (in millions of transac-
tions per quarter) at each of the brokerage firms. The two series are very highly correlated
which suggests that aggregate retail investor trading behavior is quite systematic across
these large brokerage firms. This pattern is consistent with cross-sectional evidence that
retail investor trades tend to be correlated (Kumar and Lee, 2006 and Barber, Odean, and
Zhu, 2009a).
Individual retail investor trading activity data is from Barber and Odean (2000), which
provides a detailed description of the data. This dataset offers an in-depth view into
the trading decisions of retail investors at a large anonymous discount brokerage firm.
It records all investor trades and positions between January 1991 and December 1996,
and contains over 66,000 individuals and 1.85 million trades. Using this data, I construct
four monthly measures of stock-level buys, sells, buys plus sells, and buys minus sells as
follows:
BuyRatiot =
∑N
i=1Bi,t
SharesOutt
(1.5)
SellRatiot =
∑N
i=1 Si,t
SharesOutt
(1.6)
TotalRatiot =
∑N
i=1Bi,t +
∑N
i=1 Si,t
SharesOutt
(1.7)
NetRatiot =
∑N
i=1Bi,t −
∑N
i=1 Si,t
SharesOutt
(1.8)
whereN denotes the number of investors,Bi,t and Si,t denote the number of shares bought
7The 10Q’s provide information on quarterly transaction quantities, and the 10K’s provide annual data.
Annual quantities are converted into quarterly quantities using the preceding 10Q’s. For restated financial
statements, I use the data as first reported.
8Between 1991 and 1996, the median retail investor transaction in the Barber and Odean (2000) dataset
was about $4,988 and 217 shares.
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Figure 1.3: Transaction Activity at Charles Schwab and E TRADE
This figure shows aggregate quarterly transaction activity of individual investors at Charles Schwab and E
TRADE between January 1993 and December 2010. The data is obtained from parsing the 10K and 10Q
filings of each company. Total Broker is the sum of broker transactions at both brokerage firms.
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and sold by investor i during month t, and SharesOuti,t denotes the number of shares
outstanding for the given stock.
1.4 Empirical Results
The main findings of this paper are that stock prices are excessively volatile intra-
day, that this excess volatility corresponds to retail investor trading activity, and that this
trading activity generates temporary price pressure. I provide empirical justification for
these findings in this section.
1.4.1 Intraday Stock Volatility
As discussed earlier, RVR compares the volatility of extreme stock price move-
ments during the day to stock price movements over the entire day. And in order to estab-
lish a pattern of excess intraday volatility, empirical RVR estimates can be compared to
corresponding values from a simulated distribution. The first row of Table 1.1 summarizes
average monthly RVR values scaled by their simulated counterparts. A scaled RVR above
(below) one indicates an excessively high (low) intraday volatility. The middle quintile
value of 1.29 suggests that the median stock has exhibited excess intraday volatility over
time on average; this value is significantly different from one at the 5% significance level.9
The highest and lowest quintile ratios of 1.48 and 1.14, respectively, are also statistically
significant.
Table 1.1 also reports stock-level characteristics by RVR quintile. At the end of each
month, median stock characteristics are recorded within each RVR quintile, and the aver-
age of these monthly medians over the sample period are shown in the table. The higher
quintile RVR stocks had lower stock prices but larger market capitalizations, more trad-
9Significance levels are determined based on simulated p-values from the Monte Carlo procedure de-
scribed in the Appendix.
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ing volume, and narrower bid-ask spreads. In addition, these stocks tended to be less
volatile, higher beta, growth-oriented, under-performing, and more heavily shorted. The
higher beta with lower stock volatility pattern implies that higher RVR stocks are more
correlated. While perhaps interpretable as greater systematic risk, this result is more likely
consistent with previous findings of correlation across retail investor trades (Kumar and
Lee, 2006 and Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009a). Since some of these patterns are possibly
indicative of market microstructure effects or other empirical anomalies, these issues will
be assessed in subsequent robustness tests.
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Table 1.1: Stock Characteristics by RVR Quintile (1992 - 2010)
This table reports stock characteristics of monthly RVR quintile portfolios for the period June 1992 through
December 2010. At the end of each month, median stock characteristics are recorded within each quintile,
and the average of these monthly medians over the sample period are reported in this table. Scaled RVR
is the empirical range variance ratio divided its theoretical counterpart from a simulated Brownian motion
(as described in the text). Price is stock price in dollars, size is market capitalization in millions of dollars,
volume is millions of shares traded in a month, bid-ask spread is the average of end of day relative bid-ask
spreads, stock volatility is annualized volatility from daily returns, betas are based on daily returns versus
the CRSP value-weighted market, book-to-market is book equity divided by market equity, return(-1,-12) is
trailing twelve month return excluding the recent month, return(0,-1) is recent one-month return, and short
interest is the ratio of short interest divided by shares outstanding.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Scaled RVR 1.14 1.23 1.29 1.36 1.48
Price 22.81 22.81 22.29 21.26 18.74
Size 504 691 723 712 580
Volume 36 54 61 62 55
Bid-Ask Spread 1.3% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1%
Stock Volatility 42% 42% 41% 40% 38%
Beta 0.97 1.08 1.11 1.11 1.09
Book-to-Market 0.50 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.41
Return (-1,-12) 15.0% 16.0% 16.0% 15.7% 14.7%
Return (0,-1) 1.9% 1.6% 1.1% 0.4% -0.6%
Short Interest 1.5% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.0%
1.4.2 Price Pressure
Given that retail investors are net purchasers of attention-grabbing stocks, variables
which capture increases in retail investor attention should correspond to positive price
pressure followed by negative reversal (Barber and Odean (2008)). This implies that stocks
with high RVR should exhibit positive short-term returns, followed by subsequent negative
returns. To test these hypotheses, I run simple returns tests on portfolios of stocks formed
Chapter 1: Intraday Stock Volatility and Retail Trading Activity 17
on the basis of RVR.
Table 1.2 reports abnormal returns of monthly RVR quintile portfolios for the period
June 1992 through December 2010. Returns are first reported in excess of the risk-free
rate and then controlled for the Fama and French (1993) factors, the momentum factor
(Carhart, 1997), and a liquidity factor (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003). Results are shown
both value-weighted (Panel A) and equal-weighted (Panel B).
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Table 1.2: Abnormal Returns (1992 - 2010)
This table reports abnormal returns of monthly RVR quintile portfolios for the period June 1992 through
December 2010. At the end of each month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of RVR
computed over that month. The ranked stocks are then assigned to one of five quintile portfolios, which are
constructed either value-weighted (Panel A) or equal-weighted (Panel B). Excess returns are simply monthly
returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. 3-factor alphas correspond to alphas from the Fama
and French (1993) model. 4-factor alphas incrementally control for the momentum factor following Carhart
(1997). 5-factor alphas further control for the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Returns and
alphas are shown in monthly percent, with t-statistics shown below in brackets.
Panel A: Value-weighted returns
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Excess return 0.30 0.40 0.44 0.71 0.76 0.46
[0.9] [1.3] [1.4] [2.3] [2.5] [2.2]
3-factor alpha -0.31 -0.15 -0.08 0.22 0.24 0.54
-[2.1] -[2.0] -[1.1] [2.7] [2.4] [2.6]
4-factor alpha -0.26 -0.17 -0.10 0.19 0.24 0.50
-[1.7] -[2.2] -[1.5] [2.4] [2.4] [2.4]
5-factor alpha -0.19 -0.15 -0.08 0.18 0.23 0.42
-[1.2] -[1.9] -[1.2] [2.1] [2.3] [2.0]
Panel B: Equal-weighted returns
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Excess return 0.53 0.63 0.76 0.84 0.99 0.46
[1.6] [1.6] [1.9] [2.0] [2.3] [2.2]
3-factor alpha -0.32 -0.21 -0.07 0.03 0.20 0.52
-[3.7] -[3.1] -[1.0] [0.4] [1.7] [3.7]
4-factor alpha -0.26 -0.15 0.00 0.12 0.33 0.59
-[3.1] -[2.3] [0.1] [1.7] [3.1] [4.2]
5-factor alpha -0.25 -0.15 0.01 0.11 0.32 0.57
-[3.0] -[2.3] [0.1] [1.5] [2.9] [4.0]
Chapter 1: Intraday Stock Volatility and Retail Trading Activity 19
Going down the rows for both the value-weighted and equal-weighted panels shows
a monotonic relationship of returns increasing in RVR. In Panel A, we can observe that
the highest quintile returns are statistically significant with t-statistics ranging between
2.3 and 2.5. These returns in fact drive the long-short portfolio quintile spread returns
shown in the last column, which range from a 42 to 54 basis point monthly alpha with
t-statistics between 2.0 and 2.6. Note that while the bottom quintile portfolio risk-adjusted
returns are negative, they are not always statistically significant. However, the short side
does contribute significantly to the quintile spread returns for the equal-weighted results
in Panel B. Decile portfolio results hold similarly and are shown in Table 4.1.
It is important to determine whether these abnormal returns persist or reverse in sub-
sequent months. The former would suggest that RVR reflects either a cross-sectional mis-
pricing or a risk premium, whereas the latter would be consistent with temporary price
pressure. Table 1.3 examines this issue by looking at cumulative average abnormal returns
over the subsequent twelve months for each of the equal-weighted quintile portfolios. Re-
call that the quintile spread four-factor alpha was 59 basis points in the first month follow-
ing portfolio formation. Over the next three months, this spread falls by 63 basis points
as shown in the table. While not shown the cumulative abnormal return including the first
month ceases to be significant by this point as the abnormal return has entirely reversed.
Over the course of the next nine months, the spread falls another 76 basis points (or about
8 basis points per month) but this is not statistically significant. Note that alphas across
rows are not directly comparable. For instance, the first-month alpha was 59 basis points,
whereas the next twelve-month average monthly alpha is only -12 basis points (that is, 139
basis points divided by 12 months).
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Table 1.3: Reversal in Abnormal Returns (1992 - 2010)
This table reports average cumulative abnormal returns over the subsequent m months (i.e., from t+1 to
t+m+1) for equal-weighted quintile portfolios formed monthly on RVR for the period June 1992 through
December 2010. Abnormal returns are calculated based on the four-factor model of Carhart (1997). Alphas
are shown in cumulative m-month percentage terms, with t-statistics shown below in brackets using Newey-
West standard errors with m lags.
Month Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
1 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.04
[0.6] [0.0] [0.1] [0.2] [0.0] -[0.3]
2 0.18 -0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.22
[1.2] -[0.5] [0.2] [0.0] -[0.3] -[1.0]
3 0.41 0.00 0.07 -0.17 -0.22 -0.63
[1.7] [0.0] [0.5] -[1.1] -[1.0] -[1.8]
6 0.56 -0.04 -0.12 -0.36 -0.64 -1.21
[1.2] -[0.1] -[0.5] -[1.3] -[1.6] -[1.7]
9 0.66 -0.05 -0.05 -0.58 -0.77 -1.43
[1.1] -[0.2] -[0.1] -[1.6] -[1.4] -[1.7]
12 0.69 -0.09 0.07 -0.53 -0.70 -1.39
[1.1] -[0.2] [0.1] -[1.1] -[0.9] -[1.4]
1.4.3 Time-series of Retail Trading Activity
I propose both time-series and cross-sectional tests to assess whether RVR is re-
lated to retail investor trading activity. In the time-series, I examine whether RVR is associ-
ated with aggregate transaction activity at two large retail brokerage firms, Charles Schwab
and E TRADE. I first take quarterly retail transaction activity for each of these brokerage
firms and divide it by quarterly CRSP stock volume aggregated across all stocks. I then
normalize this measure by its sample mean and standard deviation. When retail trading
activity is a larger (smaller) proportion of stock market volume, this normalized measure
should be higher (lower).
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In Table 1.4, I regress quarterly RVR returns onto this normalized retail transaction
activity measure (labeled Retail in the table), as well as the four-factor model components.
A positive slope coefficient on Retail would indicate that high RVR returns, or temporary
cross-sectional price pressure, is associated with greater retail trading. This is what we
find in the second row of the table, which reports that the Retail coefficients are positive
for Schwab, E TRADE, and Combined, with t-statistics ranging from 1.91 to 2.07.
Table 1.4: Retail Trading Activity in the Time-Series (1993 - 2010)
This table reports quarterly time-series regressions of RVR quintile spread returns onto proxies for retail
trading activity for the period January 1993 through December 2010. The Schwab and E TRADE columns
indicate that the Retail variable corresponds to quarterly transaction activity at that brokerage firm divided
by total quarterly CRSP volume across all stocks, normalized by its sample mean and standard deviation.
Retail transactions per quarter were obtained by parsing each firm’s 10K’s and 10Q’s. The Column column’s
Retail variable reflects the sum of quarterly transaction activity at both Schwab and E TRADE. Coefficients
are reported, with t-statistics shown below in brackets.
Schwab E TRADE Combined
Intercept 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
[2.30] [1.95] [2.25]
Retail 0.01 0.02 0.01
[2.07] [1.91] [1.95]
RMRF -0.01 0.02 0.02
-[0.14] [0.20] [0.17]
SMB -0.06 -0.11 -0.09
-[0.49] -[0.83] -[0.82]
HML -0.16 -0.19 -0.17
-[1.34] -[1.43] -[1.40]
UMD -0.06 -0.04 -0.04
-[0.71] -[0.49] -[0.47]
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.00
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1.4.4 Cross-section of Retail Trading Activity
To test whether RVR can be linked to retail trading activity in the cross-section of
stocks, I use actual retail investor trades from the Barber and Odean (2000) dataset for the
period 1992 and 1996. As discussed in the data section, I constructed four variables which
reflect aggregate retail investor buying, selling, both buying and selling, and net buying
of a given stock within a given month. If RVR is indeed related to retail investor trading
activity, then stocks with higher RVR values should be associated with both greater buying
as well as greater selling activity.
In Table 1.5, I show regressions of each of these retail trading measures onto stock-
level characteristics, including size, book-to-market, momentum over the past month and
year, and RVR. The first, second, third, and fourth columns in the table correspond to
buys, sells, both (i.e., buys plus sells), and net (i.e., buys minus sells), respectively. The
regressions indicate that retail trading is concentrated among smaller market capitalization,
growth-oriented stocks, with higher recent returns, and importantly higher range variance
ratios. As shown in the bottom row, RVR is statistically significant for buys, sells, both,
and net, providing strong evidence that RVR is related to stock-level retail trading. The
fact that RVR reflects retail investor buying more so than selling is consistent with the
finding in Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009) that buying is more concentrated in fewer stocks
than selling.
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Table 1.5: Retail Trading Activity in the Cross-Section (1992 - 1996)
This table reports monthly panel regressions of retail investor buys and sells onto stock-level characteristics
for the period June 1992 through December 1996. Buys and sells are the sum of monthly buying and selling
across all retail investors at a large brokerage firm using the data of Barber and Odean (2000). Columns 1,
2, 3, and 4 report regressions of buys, sells, buys plus sells, and buys minus sells, respectively, each divided
by shares outstanding. Coefficients are reported, with t-statistics shown below in brackets. Standard errors
are clustered both by month and by stock.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.39 0.38 0.77 0.01
[21.2] [22.3] [22.3] [1.7]
Log Size -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.00
-[59.8] -[61.6] -[69.4] -[3.4]
Log BM -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
-[2.7] -[1.6] -[2.3] -[1.7]
Ret (-12,-1) 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.00
[15.1] [17.1] [17.3] -[1.4]
Ret (-1,0) 0.08 0.14 0.22 -0.06
[6.8] [11.9] [10.1] -[7.3]
RVR 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.01
[4.3] [3.9] [4.1] [2.5]
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.00
1.5 Robustness Tests
1.5.1 Lags and Exchange Effects
In this section, I test the robustness of the price pressure findings to trading imple-
mentation assumptions. I first consider the effects of trading delays by incorporating lags
of up to two full days. In addition, I measure price pressure effects separately across both
the NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges. One might suspect that there exist relevant structural
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differences across these exchanges such as in the behavior of intraday volatility among
Nasdaq stocks during the tech bubble.
Table 1.6 provides empirical tests which report the sensitivity of the main results to
trading implementation lags and specific exchange effects. The base case row contains the
simple equal-weighted RVR spread portfolio, which as shown before earns a significant 59
basis point four-factor alpha within the first month. The subsequent rows show abnormal
returns for the same portfolio but constructed with a lag. Incorporating lags of one and two
days yield long-short quintile alphas of 59 and 65 basis points, respectively, each with t-
statistics above 4. These significant alphas thus suggest that the main results are unaffected
by the immediacy of the trading strategy.
The bottom rows of Table 1.6 investigate whether the RVR spread returns are related
to an exchange-specific phenomenon. Upon forming quintile portfolios on RVR within
universes of just NYSE and just Nasdaq listed stocks, I find statistically significant alphas
of 44 and 64 basis points, respectively. This slightly stronger alpha among Nasdaq stocks
seems likely to be related to more active trading of technology stocks by retail investors
during the tech bubble.
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Table 1.6: Robustness to Lags and Exchange Effects (1992 - 2010)
This table reports the robustness of RVR quintile spread abnormal returns to trading lags and exchange
effects for the period June 1992 through December 2010. Abnormal returns are calculated based on the
four-factor model of Carhart (1997). The Base Case row corresponds to monthly rebalanced equal-weighted
quintile portfolios. The Lag 1 day and Lag 2 day rows impose 1 and 2 day trading implementation lags,
respectively. The NYSE Only and Nasdaq Only rows form portfolios on just NYSE and Nasdaq stocks,
respectively. Alphas are shown in monthly percent, with t-statistics shown below in brackets.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Base Case -0.26 -0.15 0.00 0.12 0.33 0.59
-[3.1] -[2.3] [0.1] [1.7] [3.1] [4.2]
Lag 1 day -0.23 -0.12 0.00 0.14 0.36 0.59
-[1.6] -[0.9] [0.0] [1.0] [2.2] [4.0]
Lag 2 days -0.37 -0.19 -0.15 -0.01 0.29 0.65
-[2.1] -[1.1] -[1.0] [0.0] [1.7] [4.5]
NYSE Only -0.19 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.25 0.44
-[1.6] [0.7] [1.1] [1.8] [2.4] [3.7]
Nasdaq Only -0.31 -0.23 -0.07 0.17 0.32 0.64
-[3.1] -[2.7] -[0.7] [1.3] [2.1] [3.9]
1.5.2 Liquidity and Market Microstructure
The universe of firms included in the sample was originally screened with stan-
dard filters to exclude very small and illiquid stocks. However, liquidity and market mi-
crostructure effects are still reasonable concerns since the universe filtering procedure was
certainly not comprehensive. To see whether these issues are related to or perhaps even
generate the temporary price pressure observed in higher RVR stocks, I estimate RVR
quintile spread returns while conditioning on various stock-level proxies for liquidity and
market microstructure.
Table 1.7 reports abnormal quintile returns of RVR portfolios formed within terciles
of size, volume, turnover, bid-ask spread, and illiquidity. This procedure provides a more
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specific universe filter in examining the significance of the RVR returns. All returns shown
are adjusted for the four-factor model, and the rightmost column in each panel contains
the significance of quintile long-short portfolios. As shown in Panel A, the one-month
quintile spread return is 56 basis points for the smallest third of stocks, 70 basis points
for the middle third, and 58 basis points for the largest third, all of which are statistically
significant. Hence, these results suggest that short-term retail price pressure exists even
within a universe of very large market capitalization stocks.
The same holds true in Panels B through E of Table 1.7. That is, the RVR spread
return is not concentrated in illiquid stocks based on a few different measures of liquidity.
For instance, among stocks with the lowest trading volume as shown in Panel B, the RVR
spread alpha remains a significant 51 basis points. Even among stocks with the widest
bid-ask spreads, the RVR long-short alpha is a significant 55 basis points. The same holds
true for stocks with the largest price impact of trades as proxied for by Amihud (2002)
ILLIQ measure.
Table 1.7: Robustness to Liquidity and Microstructure Variables (1992 - 2010)
This table reports the robustness of RVR quintile spread abnormal returns to liquidity and microstructure
variables for the period June 1992 through December 2010. Abnormal returns are calculated based on the
four-factor model of Carhart (1997). In each of the panels below, equal-weighted quintile portfolios are
formed on RVR within terciles of the specified stock-level variables. Size is simply market capitalization,
volume is total dollar trading volume over the past month, bid-ask spread is based on end of day averages
over the past month, and ILLIQ is the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity. Alphas are shown in monthly
percent, with t-statistics shown below in brackets.
Panel A: Size
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Lower -0.23 -0.21 0.05 0.23 0.33 0.56
-[2.0] -[2.1] [0.4] [1.9] [1.9] [2.9]
Middle -0.27 -0.17 -0.02 0.09 0.43 0.70
-[2.3] -[1.8] -[0.2] [0.8] [3.4] [4.3]
Upper -0.25 -0.17 -0.04 0.11 0.33 0.58
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Table 1.7 (Continued)
-[2.3] -[2.2] -[0.6] [1.4] [3.6] [3.9]
Panel B: Volume
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Lower -0.27 -0.14 -0.13 0.18 0.24 0.51
-[2.3] -[1.2] -[1.1] [1.5] [1.6] [3.1]
Middle -0.23 -0.06 0.05 0.13 0.51 0.74
-[2.0] -[0.5] [0.5] [1.2] [3.5] [4.1]
Upper -0.27 -0.23 -0.01 0.06 0.36 0.64
-[2.4] -[2.2] -[0.1] [0.6] [3.2] [3.8]
Panel C: Turnover
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Lower -0.17 -0.08 0.03 0.07 0.23 0.39
-[1.4] -[0.7] [0.2] [0.6] [2.1] [3.5]
Middle -0.18 -0.04 -0.04 0.11 0.26 0.44
-[1.5] -[0.4] -[0.4] [1.2] [2.5] [3.5]
Upper -0.17 -0.19 -0.16 0.06 0.42 0.59
-[1.1] -[1.2] -[1.1] [0.4] [2.6] [3.0]
Panel D: Bid-Ask Spread
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Lower -0.13 0.01 0.05 0.18 0.44 0.57
-[1.3] [0.1] [0.4] [1.6] [3.3] [4.0]
Middle -0.24 -0.14 0.09 0.17 0.34 0.58
-[2.1] -[1.4] [0.9] [1.5] [2.6] [3.3]
Upper -0.31 -0.32 -0.14 0.06 0.24 0.55
-[2.5] -[2.4] -[1.0] [0.4] [1.5] [3.1]
Panel E: ILLIQ
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Lower -0.10 -0.01 0.08 0.18 0.36 0.46
-[1.0] -[0.1] [1.0] [2.2] [3.8] [3.8]
Middle -0.20 -0.09 -0.03 0.16 0.48 0.68
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-[1.7] -[0.8] -[0.4] [1.5] [4.1] [4.4]
Upper -0.32 -0.50 -0.10 0.07 0.23 0.55
-[3.1] -[4.7] -[0.8] [0.5] [1.3] [2.8]
1.5.3 Relation to Other Anomalies
I next examine whether RVR spread returns are related to other anomalies doc-
umented in the literature. One might suspect that the temporary abnormal RVR returns
are associated with or caused by factors driving other known anomalies. For instance,
the stock-level characteristics shown in Table 1.1 suggested that stocks with higher RVRs
tended to be less volatile stocks with poorer recent performance. To measure the sen-
sitivity of RVR returns to other anomalies, I consider two approaches. First, I measure
RVR spread portfolio returns within terciles of stock-level variables corresponding to dif-
ferent anomalies. Second, I measure returns for portfolios sorted on the residual of RVR
to stock-level variables instead of on RVR itself.
Table 1.8 reports four-factor model alphas and t-statistics for RVR spread portfo-
lios formed within terciles of several stock-level characteristics associated with empirical
anomalies. In Panel A, I find that quintile spread portfolio returns are significant across
value through growth stocks. However, the returns are perhaps more significant for value
stocks (89 basis points) than for growth stocks (46 basis points). Panels B and C also
show significant spread returns across stocks based on their exposures to the momentum
and reversal anomalies identified based on past twelve-month returns (excluding the recent
month) and past one-month returns, respectively. Nonetheless, spread returns are larger
for stocks with poor performance both over the past year and over the recent one month.
Panel D reports significant RVR spread returns across low, medium, and high volatility
stocks. The effect appears to be stronger among higher volatility stocks (72 basis points)
than lower volatility stocks (24 basis points), although both are statistically significant.
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Table 1.8: Relation to Other Anomalies (1992 - 2010)
This table reports the relation of RVR quintile spread abnormal returns to other anomalies for the period
June 1992 through December 2010. Abnormal returns are calculated based on the four-factor model Carhart
(1997). In each of the panels, equal-weighted quintile portfolios are formed on RVR within terciles of the
specified stock-level variables. Value is book-to-market, momentum is past twelve-month return (excluding
the last month), reversal is past one-month return, and volatility is daily return volatility over the past month.
Alphas are shown in monthly percent, with t-statistics shown below in brackets.
Panel A: Value
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Lower -0.43 -0.57 -0.29 -0.13 0.03 0.46
-[4.0] -[5.0] -[2.8] -[1.2] [0.3] [2.9]
Middle -0.33 -0.17 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.55
-[3.1] -[1.7] [0.5] [0.7] [1.9] [4.0]
Upper -0.07 0.17 0.28 0.48 0.81 0.89
-[0.7] [1.6] [2.8] [3.9] [5.9] [5.2]
Panel B: Momentum
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Lower -0.28 -0.03 0.13 0.49 0.71 0.98
-[2.3] -[0.2] [1.1] [3.5] [4.7] [5.9]
Middle -0.07 -0.12 -0.02 0.11 0.16 0.23
-[0.6] -[1.1] -[0.2] [1.2] [1.6] [2.0]
Upper -0.21 -0.15 -0.09 0.06 0.25 0.46
-[2.2] -[1.4] -[0.8] [0.6] [2.0] [2.9]
Panel C: Reversal
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Lower -0.26 -0.12 -0.10 0.25 0.47 0.73
-[1.5] -[0.6] -[0.5] [1.2] [2.1] [3.9]
Middle -0.06 -0.07 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.30
-[0.6] -[0.8] [1.4] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4]
Upper -0.37 -0.17 -0.11 0.03 0.14 0.51
-[2.8] -[1.0] -[0.7] [0.2] [0.9] [3.2]
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Panel D: Volatility
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Lower 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.26 0.40 0.24
[1.4] [1.8] [1.4] [2.3] [3.3] [2.8]
Middle -0.07 0.08 0.11 0.27 0.34 0.41
-[0.6] [0.8] [1.1] [2.9] [3.1] [2.8]
Upper -0.62 -0.64 -0.35 -0.18 0.10 0.72
-[4.6] -[4.6] -[2.2] -[1.1] [0.5] [3.3]
Next, I look at the performance of portfolios formed on residual RVR instead of just
RVR in Table 4.2. First, I regress RVR onto several variables including log size, log book-
to-market, past twelve-month return (excluding the recent month), past one-month return,
stock return volatility, and turnover as follows:
RV Ri,t =
F∑
f=1
βfXf,i,t + i,t (1.9)
where Xf,i,t denotes the stock i value corresponding to factor f (e.g., log size). Then,
I form monthly equal-weighted quintile portfolios on the residuals i,t and compute the
time-series of their returns. Value-weighted portfolio results are shown in Panel A, and
equal-weighted results are shown in Panel B. The final two rows in Panel B report four
and five factor alphas of 41 and 43 basis points, respectively. While these alphas are
slightly lower than the 59 and 57 basis point equivalents from Table 1.2, they are each
statistically significant with t-statistics well above 3. The cumulative returns for the RVR
and residual RVR quintile spread portfolios are shown in Figure 4.1.
Overall, these results suggest that while stocks with higher RVR tend to have certain
characteristics which resemble other known anomalies (e.g., momentum or volatility), the
abnormal returns associated with the RVR variable are distinct from these other anoma-
lies. The returns cannot be explained away by either the universe of stocks chosen or the
orthogonal component of RVR.
Chapter 1: Intraday Stock Volatility and Retail Trading Activity 31
1.6 Conclusion
This paper finds that stock prices demonstrate excess intraday volatility, that this
excess volatility is generated by retail investor trading activity, and finally that this trading
activity generates short-term price pressure in stock returns. Importantly, all of these find-
ings are attained using a simple econometric measure which compares volatility based on
high and low prices to volatility based on open and close prices.
The findings presented in this paper suggest other interesting avenues for further re-
search. One could use RVR to examine intraday volatility in other markets or asset classes.
For instance, one might consider investigating the Taiwanese stock market since it consists
of heavy retail trading activity, with a large proportion of day traders in particular. Or per-
haps one might study certain commodities markets that contain significant amounts of
uninformed trading.
An interesting pattern identified in this paper is that excess intraday stock volatility has
been steadily increasing over time. A possible explanation for this pattern perhaps relates
to the growth in high-frequency trading. Given their comparative advantages in terms of
technology and execution, one could imagine that this group of traders consistently capi-
talizes on trades at intraday high and low prices. The important question then is whether
such traders engage in systematic strategies to effectively inflate intraday volatility which
could translate into greater trading profits.
Chapter 2
How Tax and Interest Rates Drive Stock
Returns at the Turn of the Tax Year
2.1 Introduction
Previous research has argued that a tax-motivated seller should sell losers early and
hold on to winners under the assumption that tax-selling behavior does not create distor-
tions in market prices (Constantinides (1983, 1984)). However, recent research has argued
that such tax-selling behavior at the turn of the year does generate seasonality in the cross-
section of stock returns, whose magnitude depends on the level of the capital gains tax rate
(in particular, Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004)). We
build on these results and show that (because interest rates determine the present value of
the tax gain/loss) the impact of tax-motivated selling also depends on the level of interest
rates. In the presence of downward sloping demand curves for stocks and limits to arbi-
trage, both interest rates and capital gains tax rates drive the extent to which past losers
trade at a temporary low price at the end of the year.
Our framework suggests that the magnitude of the January rebound return because of
tax-loss selling at the end of the year should vary both in the cross-section and in the time-
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series. The cross-section of average January returns should vary with a stock’s capital
gains overhang, defined as the ratio of the cumulative gain since the stock’s purchase to
its current price.1 For a given level of capital gains overhang, time-series variation in the
January rebound return should depend on macroeconomic variables: the capital gains tax
rate (which determines the magnitude of the tax payment or credit) and the interest rate
(which drives the personal benefit/cost of delaying that tax payment/credit). In particular,
we link the interest-rate component of this time-series variation to the one-year interest
rate since the decision to delay the sale of the stock from the last trading day of December
to the first trading day of January results in the delay of any tax benefit/cost by one year.
Rather than file and receive the tax credit in early January, the investor must wait a year to
capture the tax savings.
In summary, while previous literature has shown that variation in capital gains tax rates
appears to forecast variation in the degree of selling pressure for loser stocks, we argue that
variation in interest rates is at least as important.2 We first provide an exact formulation
for the way these two rates drive the stock return seasonal caused by tax-motivated selling.
We then show that this formulation does a good job describing relevant aspects of the data.
The following example clarifies the intuition behind our idea. Suppose a taxable in-
vestor in the 30% tax bracket bought a stock at $100 several years ago. The stock has
declined in value since this purchase and is currently trading at $4. Selling the stock at
$4 on the last trading day of December would generate a capital loss of $96 and offer a
tax deduction of $28.80 (30%*$96). Thus, proceeds total $32.80: $28.80 from the tax
deduction and $4 from the stock sale.
1The terminology capital gains overhang is standard in this literature (see for example Grinblatt and Han
(2005)).
2In our formulation, the tax-selling premium is the amount of January rebound return for a unit spread in
capital gains overhang and is a function of interest rates and tax rates. Variation in this premium is primarily
due to interest rates. If one were to fix interest rates at their average level over the sample, only allowing tax
rates to vary, the resulting variation in the tax-selling premium is roughly one-third of the variation in the
premium we document.
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Alternatively, the investor could wait to sell the stock on the first trading day in January.
The decision to wait provides January sales proceeds of $4 (ignoring the small discounting
across the turn of the year), but now the tax benefit will not occur until one year later and
thus must be discounted by the one-year rate relevant to this investor, here assumed to be
5%. The total present value of the proceeds from waiting until January now equals $31.43:
$4 due to the sale and $27.43 due to the present value of the tax benefit (30%*$96/1.05).
Waiting to sell the stock on the first trading day in January results in a loss of $1.37 in
present value due to the deferral of the tax savings by one year. This analysis makes
it clear that the investor would be willing to sell the stock below the $4 fair value in
December, but only to a certain limit.
Assuming that the beginning-of-January price remains at the fair value of $4, what
December price, P , would make the investor indifferent between selling in December
versus January? To be indifferent, the proceeds of the sale at the end of the year, P -
30%*(P -$100), must equal the present value of the proceeds from selling the stock at the
beginning of next year $4-30%*($4-$100)/1.05. By equating these two values, one finds
that the stock can sell as low as $2.04 implying a $1.96 discount relative to its fair value.
This lower bound limits the extent to which price pressure can drive the stock price down
in December and thus limits the magnitude of the January rebound. This lower bound
depends on interest rates and capital gains tax rates in addition to the level of the capital
loss. Below $2.04, the investor delays selling the stock, at $2.04 the investor is indifferent,
and anywhere above $2.04 the investor is better off selling now rather than waiting. In
Section 2.1 we derive an explicit formula based on this example. The formula shows a
stock’s January rebound return depends on that stock’s December capital gains overhang
as well as interest and tax rates.
The example above highlights the importance of interest rates in the decision process.
Suppose that the interest rate in the previous example were zero. Since there would be no
benefit for accelerating the tax benefit to occur this year rather than the next, the solution
for P is clearly $4. More generally, at very low interest rates, a rational tax-motivated
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seller tolerates very little mispricing.
We take these predictions to the data. We create a proxy for a stock’s capital gains
overhang following the methodology of Grinblatt and Han (2005). Specifically, we use
past volume to weight past prices in order to create a proxy for a stock’s tax basis and
therefore the capital gains overhang of the marginal seller of the stock. Just as the ex-
ample above suggests, we show that the ability of this variable to describe cross-sectional
variation in average returns at the turn of the year is a function of interest rates and tax
rates, which we dub the tax-selling premium. This predictability is robust to including
controls for various firm characteristics (size, book-to-market, trading volume, and past
return patterns) in our regression analysis.
We carefully explore the nature of this documented cross-sectional and time-series
variation in expected returns to show that it is consistent with our economic explanation.
We find that the majority of the effect occurs in the days surrounding the turn of the year,
but this effect is also present on a smaller scale during the entire month of December and
even earlier. Though we primarily analyze U.S. data, we also find similar time-series and
cross-sectional variation in expected returns in U.K. data during the turn of that country’s
tax year.3 As the U.K. tax year ends in April, we argue that these international results pro-
vide strong evidence that our U.S. findings are consistent with a tax-selling explanation.4
Moreover, we document that this phenomenon shows up in the trading volume of in-
dividual investors. We examine the trading behavior of individual investors using two
different methods. First, using the TAQ database, we find that stocks with low capital
gains overhang have more selling pressure at the turn of the year than stocks with high
capital gains overhang and that this imbalance varies as a function of our tax-selling pre-
mium. Our second method directly measures investors’ propensity to sell using the actual
3Reinganum and Shapiro (1987) show that after the introduction of capital gains taxes in the U.K., the
difference in April returns between winners and losers becomes significantly greater than zero, consistent
with a tax-loss selling story. Our empirical contribution is to show that this premium varies with the interest
rate as predicted by our formulation.
4We thank the editor, Cam Harvey, for this suggestion.
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trades from the large discount brokerage studied in Odean (1998). We show that not only
are investors more likely to harvest capital losses before the turn of the year but also this
tendency to accelerate the realization of capital losses is much stronger in the years where
interest rates and tax rates are high.
Since these firm-level findings make us confident that the tax-based pricing model is
a useful description of average returns at the turn of the year, we then examine the way
that tax-based cross-sectional and time-series variation in expected returns affects standard
monthly performance attribution regressions. We first show that tax-loss selling effects are
also present at the aggregate level. Specifically, we document that the return on the market
portfolio in January has a similar predictable component that is a function of interest rates,
tax rates, and the market’s capital gains overhang. Since this is the case, one might
expect that measures of risk can be driven by cross-sectional variation in the covariance
of firm-level and market capital gains overhang. We confirm that our tax-selling variables
drive the alpha and market beta of a long-short overhang portfolio. Moreover, similar
predictable patterns can be found in the Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors.
These findings have important implications for researchers examining economic stories
describing time-variation in the risks and returns of these factors.5
In short, our empirical results are consistent with the view that tax-motivated selling
in the presence of downward-sloping demand curves results in stock return seasonality (a
turn-of-the-tax-year effect) where the extent of the resulting price pressure depends on the
level of interest rates and capital gains tax rates. Consequently, our results have a practical
implication for those trying to exploit the January effect, as we show that the magnitude
of the anomaly should and does vary over time. In years when capital gains overhang
is limited, capital gains tax rates are low, and interest rates are also low, one should not
expect a large January effect.
5For example, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) forecast
returns on momentum strategies with variables that are clearly related to the variables our tax-based approach
suggests.
Chapter 2: How Tax and Interest Rates Drive Stock Returns at the Turn of the Tax Year 37
This time variation has a related implication. Note that some market commentators
have argued that savvy investors must have eliminated the January effect since recent re-
turns to strategies exploiting that phenomenon have been low. However, as interest rates
have also been quite low in recent data, we provide an alternative explanation for this re-
cent poor performance. In fact, we show that the time-series variation in the tax-selling
premium that we document is not subsumed by the inclusion of a time trend.
Nevertheless, as is the case with other financial anomalies, it is always difficult to
explain the reason this inefficiency has not been arbitraged away. We suggest a few ex-
planations for the limits to arbitrage in this case. First, unlike the value and momentum
anomalies, the return pattern discussed here cannot be exploited on a regular basis but at
most only once a year during the turn of the tax year. Hence, arbitrageurs may be reluctant
to allocate a significant fraction of their risk capital to exploit this return pattern. Second,
most arbitrageurs may not be aware of the time variation in the profitability of the January
effect that our analysis documents. Finally, these effects should be stronger in stocks
where there are many taxable investors. Presumably, the market for these stocks may be
less efficient.
One can also question the reasons investors do not trade earlier in the year to try to
avoid the clumping that appears to occur. We argue that investors may naturally display
inattention to this decision because it is costly to observe and process information.6 This
argument is consistent with a growing recent literature that has used investor inattention to
understand patterns in financial markets. Reis (2006) develops a model of optimal inatten-
tion for a consumer who faces a cost of observing additive income, such as labor income.
Gabaix and Laibson (2002) model the cost of observing the stock market as a utility cost.
Huang and Liu (2007) apply the concept of rational inattention to study the optimal port-
folio decision of an investor who can obtain costly noisy signals about a state variable
governing the expected growth rate of stock prices. Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007)
6Stokey (2009) presents an extensive analysis of the issues related to inaction and infrequent adjustment
that occur in stochastic control models with fixed costs.
Chapter 2: How Tax and Interest Rates Drive Stock Returns at the Turn of the Tax Year 38
study optimal inattention to the stock market in the context of Merton’s (1971) model and
the presence of information and transaction costs. Though modeling the dynamic nature
of the problem we study is beyond the scope of this paper, these papers suggest that inat-
tention might play an important role in such an analysis.7 Anecdotally many investors do
seem to make portfolio decisions infrequently.8 Moreover, our empirical results are con-
sistent with the clumping of tax-motivated trades occurring and generating price impact.
Finally, our work also relates to a growing empirical literature documenting price pres-
sure in asset markets, a phenomenon initially suggested by Scholes (1972). Mitchell, Pul-
vino, and Stafford (2004) document price pressure subsequent to merger announcements
and show that the trades of hedge funds appear to move prices away from fundamentals.
Coval and Stafford (2007) document that extreme mutual fund flows result in forced trad-
ing that temporarily moves prices away from fundamental values.9 These price pressure
findings are not restricted to equity markets; Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad (2010) and
Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) document price pressure in the bond and convert-
ible bond markets respectively. In fact, the 2010 American Finance Association presi-
dential address of Darrell Duffie (Duffie (2010)) uses the aforementioned assumption of
investor inattention to model exactly these types of price pressure effects.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 briefly summarizes the most relevant
recent literature and shows why both tax and interest rates should explain seasonal patterns
in returns. Section 2.2 describes the data and the construction of our main variables.
7Intuitively, one is adding additional costs (the cost of observing and processing information, i.e. paying
attention) and benefits (avoiding the clumping of trades near the turn of the tax year) to the dynamic problem
studied in Constantinides (1984). It seems plausible that reasonable calibrations of the more complicated
version of Constantinides exist where investors are reluctant to incur both transaction and attention costs
until the end of the tax year draws near.
8Both Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) and Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus and Yamaguchi (2006) provide striking
evidence that investors’ portfolio adjustments are far from frequent.
9Recent papers have explored some implications of the results of Coval and Stafford (2007). Lou
(2009) shows that flow-driven demand shocks more generally affect prices than just in the extreme fire-sale
situations of Coval and Stafford. Anton and Polk (2010) show that stocks that are relatively more connected
by common institutional ownership covary more together, generating a cross-reversal effect.
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Section 2.3 analyzes the empirical implications for the cross-section and time-series of
U.S. and U.K. stock returns, U.S. trading volume, and actual individual investor trading
behavior, as well as the implications for performance attribution. Section 2.4 provides the
conclusions.
2.2 The Setting
A large previous literature has examined the turn-of-the-year effect in stock returns
resulting from tax-motivated selling.10 Recent empirical work by Klein (2001a, 2001b),
Grinblatt and Han (2005), Frazzini (2006), and Jin (2006) has more carefully examined
this effect by studying the direct empirical links between a proxy for a stock’s tax basis
and patterns in returns. All of these papers relate measures of capital gains or losses to
subsequent stock returns. Like these papers, our work exploits cross-sectional variation in
a proxy for capital gains overhang; however, we also model and test a specific prediction
about the magnitude of the effect for a given level of overhang.
A few researchers have also exploited time-series variation when testing the general
predictions of a tax-based explanation for the turn-of-the-year effect. Most prominently,
Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) study the way variation in the turn-of-the-year effect can
be linked to changes in capital gains tax rates/regimes. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004)
investigate the extent to which tax-loss selling drives the profits on technical trading strate-
10The tax-selling hypothesis has been directly considered as an explanation for stock return seasonal-
ity by Wachtel (1942), Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Branch (1977), Dyl (1977), Roll (1983), Reinganum
(1983), Chan (1986), Schultz (1985), Jones, Pearce and Wilson (1987), Reinganum and Shapiro (1987),
Sims (1995), Reese (1998), Poterba and Weisbenner (2001), Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004), and Ivkovic´,
Poterba and Weisbenner (2004).
Dammon, Dunn and Spatt (1989) study the valuation of tax options when short and long term capital gains
tax rates differ. Bossaerts and Dammon (1994) study the option value to time the realization of capital gains
and losses and Dammon and Spatt (1996) consider transaction costs and long and short term capital gains
tax rates. Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2001) build a dynamic consumption and portfolio decision model in
the presence of capital gains taxes and short-sale restrictions. Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2004) examine
optimal asset allocation and location between taxable and tax-deferred accounts.
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gies based on past return patterns. They find that trading profits are only statistically sig-
nificant during high tax regimes.11 The key contributions of our paper are to argue that
interesting variation should also come from the interest rate channel and to provide empir-
ical evidence that this channel is important.
Thus, the objective of this section is to build a measure that relates the maximum
price distortion in December (or the turn-of-the-year effect) to all the relevant factors in
a simple setting: the marginal seller’s personal tax rate, the personal interest rate, and the
capital gain/loss. We take the point of view of a marginal tax-motivated seller at the end
of December.12 The seller is a rational investor, implying that his expectations of the price
in January are unbiased. This investor evaluates the benefit of selling his holdings at the
end of December (time t) at a distorted price in order to receive the tax benefit associated
with realizing capital losses one year earlier (the current tax year instead of the following
one).
For the sake of simplicity, assume the investor can sell stock i in January (time t +
1) at the true value of Pi,t+1 with no uncertainty. Under the assumption of downward
sloping demand curves, tax-motivated selling will result in price pressure in December.
Consequently, the investor must determine the lowest price at which he would be willing
to sell the stock in December. To be clear, the investor solves for the December price Pi,t
that makes him indifferent between selling in either December or January and takes all
other inputs as given. The reference price, RPi, the price originally paid for the stock,
determines the investor’s cost basis for the purpose of taxation. The two other important
parameters of this tax-loss harvesting decision are the capital gains tax rate, τt, and the
one-year discount factor, Bt = 11+rt , that accounts for the time-value of money as well
11A recent paper by Sialm (2007) studies dividend taxes and stock returns more generally to show that
before-tax returns are higher for those stocks that have higher effective tax rates.
12The arguments in this section are made for a loser stock; however, a similar rationale applies to winner
stocks as well.
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as the creditworthiness of the investor through an interest rate, rt.13 This discount factor
takes into account the present value cost of the tax consequences of selling in January
rather than December.
We emphasize that a one-year discount factor is appropriate despite the fact that there
is only a one-day difference between trading days in our framework.14 The reason for
using a one-year discount factor is that delaying the sale by one day has the impact of
delaying the tax benefit by one year. Therefore in our framework, the magnitude of the
January rebound in stock returns depends on the one-year time value of the tax benefit.
Note that for simplicity, we do not have a subscript i on τ or r since we are assuming the
same tax and interest rate for all stocks at time t.
We equate the after tax proceeds of the sale in December and January:
[Proceeds in December] = [Proceeds in January]
Pi,t − τt(Pi,t −RPi) = Pi,t+1 − τt(Pi,t+1 −RPi)Bt. (2.1)
This equation can be rearranged into
−τt(Pi,t −RPi)(1−Bt) = (Pi,t+1 − Pi,t) (1−Btτt) . (2.2)
The equation above highlights the condition that makes the marginal seller indifferent. The
equation says that the present-value loss of delaying the tax-credit must be compensated
by the after-tax January rebound. For the sake of concreteness, we return to the example
given in the introduction. At the temporarily low price of $2.04, the investor can generate
tax savings this year equal to -30%*($2.04-100) = $29.39 by harvesting the capital loss
now. At an interest rate of 5%, delaying the harvest of this tax loss by one day results in
13There are several complications of the tax code that are not considered in our analysis. For example,
there is a cap on the size of the capital loss deduction one can make against personal income in any one year.
Also, typically short-term capital gains are taxed at a higher rate than long-term capital gains. Moreover,
the ability to implement a short-the-box strategy has changed over the time period we study. Finally, there
are of course portfolio aspects of the decision. We ignore these complications for the sake of simplicity.
14Note that we ignore the one-trading-day discount effect on the sale proceeds for the sake of simplicity.
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a present value loss of $29.39*(1 - 1/1.05) = $1.40, as the investor must wait one year to
receive the tax credit. This dollar amount is the value of the left-hand side of equation (2).
However, this delay allows the investor to capture the January price rebound of ($4-$2.04)
= $1.96 which results in an after-tax gain of $1.96*(1-30%/$1.05) = $1.40, as the tax on
the realized capital gain is paid in one-year’s time.
Dividing by Pt and rearranging gives the stock’s January rebound in units of return as
Pi,t+1 − Pi,t
Pi,t
= −τt (1−Bt)
(1−Btτt)
Pi,t −RPi
Pi,t
. (2.3)
This equation shows that the stock’s January rebound (the return from December to Jan-
uary) is a function of the capital gains tax rate, the level of the interest rate, and the capital
gains overhang of the stock, gi,t =
Pi,t−RPi
Pi,t
. We further define γt ≡ τt
(
1−Bt
1−Btτt
)
in order
to write the stock’s tax-selling rebound in January as
January rebound = −γtgi,t (2.4)
We dub γt the tax-selling premium. Under our assumptions, this equation applies for
all stocks. The capital gains overhang, gi,t, is different for every stock, driving the cross-
sectional variation in the effect, but the tax-selling premium, γt, is the same for all stocks,
driving the time-series variation in the effect. Our description has focused on the case
where the marginal investor in the stock has a negative capital gains overhang, and thus a
positive January rebound return. Nevertheless, a similar rationale applies to stocks where
the marginal investor has a positive capital gains overhang. A tax-motivated investor sells
a winner stock this year rather than next year only if Pi,t is so (temporarily) high that it
compensates the investor for the present value loss of paying taxes this year rather than
next year.
Our subsequent analysis exploits cross-sectional variation in gi,t and time-series varia-
tion in γt to explain return patterns in December and January. In particular, we measure the
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extent to which temporary price pressure occurs in December and dissipates in January.15
We emphasize that the interest rate channel that our novel formulation identifies gener-
ates significantly more variation in the predicted magnitude of the effect than the tax rate
channel (in fact, more than twice as much). The predicted value of γ, based on realized
values of the two rates in question, varies from 8 to 660 basis points over the sample. This
variation is primarily due to interest rates. If one were to fix interest rates at their average
level over the sample, only allowing tax rates to vary, the resulting variation in γ is much
smaller (97 to 338 basis points), roughly one-third of the variation in γ seen in the sample
we study.
2.3 Data and Methodology
In this section, we provide a description of the data and methodology used for our
empirical tests. We first describe the raw data sources. We then explain the way we
compute our two key explanatory variables, the capital gains overhang, g, and the tax-
selling premium, γ, and then describe the various control variables we employ.
2.3.1 Data Description
The raw U.S. firm-level data come from five different databases. The first of these, the
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) stock file, provides daily prices, shares
outstanding, trading volumes, and returns for all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed
stocks. The second database, the Compustat North America annual file, contains the rel-
evant accounting information for most publicly traded U.S. stocks. The third database is
the Trade and Quote (TAQ) trade-level data, which is used to compute the selling pressure
15The mispricing we investigate in December is equal to the mispricing in January in terms of dollars.
However, when measured in returns, the alpha in December is not exactly equal to the alpha in January
because the base price on which the return occurs is different. Our empirical work takes this difference into
account. However, our description of the intuition ignores this difference for simplicity.
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variable. The fourth database contains the trades and positions of individual investors
from a large discount brokerage, described in Odean (1998).16
We measure the log book-to-market equity ratio (denoting the transformed quantity
by BM in contrast to simple book-to-market by BE/ME) as of the end of June in year
t. We measure BE for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − 1, and ME (market
value of equity) at the end of June of year t. Following Fama and French, we define BE
as stockholders’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes (Compustat data item 74) and
investment tax credit (data item 208) (if available), plus post-retirement benefit liabilities
(data item 330) (if available), minus the book value of preferred stock.17 We require each
firm-year observation to have a valid past BE/ME ratio that must be positive in value.
Moreover, in order to eliminate likely data errors, we censor the BE/ME variables of
these firms to the range (.01,100) by adjusting the book value. To avoid influential obser-
vations created by the log transform, we first shrink the BE/ME towards one by defining
BM ≡ log[(.9BE + .1ME)/ME].
As mentioned in the paper, we examine individual trading behavior using two data
sources. First, we follow Lee and Ready (1991) and Hvidkjaer (2005) to form a selling
pressure variable from the 1993-2005 TAQ dataset. Buy versus sell trades are identified
in terms of their relation to the midpoint of the bid-ask spread. We classify trades as
individual or institutional based on trade size, identifying individual trades as those trades
under a $10,000 cutoff. We define selling pressure (Sell) as the ratio of sell trades to
all trades for that classification. Second, we analyze individual investor trades using the
16We generously thank Terry Odean for providing the database.
17Depending on availability, we use redemption (data item 56), liquidation (data item 10), or par value
(data item 130) (in that order) for the book value of preferred stock. We calculate stockholders’ equity
used in the above formula as follows. We prefer the stockholders’ equity number reported by Moody’s, or
Compustat (data item 216). If neither one is available, we measure stockholders’ equity as the book value of
common equity (data item 60) plus the book value of preferred stock. (Note that the preferred stock is added
at this stage, because it is later subtracted in the book equity formula.) If common equity is not available,
we compute stockholders’ equity as the book value of assets (data item 6) minus total liabilities (data item
181), all from Compustat.
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Odean dataset, which contains the 1.27 million transactions of retail clients of a US based
brokerage from 1991 until 1996. We identify purchase and sell orders at the firm-level
using cusip codes.
The raw U.K. firm-level data come from the Compustat Global database. We obtain
daily prices, shares outstanding, trading volumes, and returns from the Security Data ta-
bles. We obtain accounting information from the Fundamentals Annual tables in order
to construct log book-to-market equity (BM ) and book-to-market (BE/ME) ratios as
defined for the U.S.
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2.3.2 Tax-selling Premium
In theory, γ should be a function of the marginal investor’s capital gains tax rate and
interest rate. Our implementation computes the U.S. version of γ using the one-year Fama-
Bliss interest rate and the maximum capital gains tax rate each year, available from the
Internal Revenue Service website.18 The U.K. version of γ is computed using the Bank
of England base rate and the maximum capital gains tax rate each year, available from the
HM Revenue & Customs website.
Although the appropriate interest rate depends on the credit worthiness of the marginal
investor, we find that different interest rates imply similar variation in the U.S. version
of γ. In the analysis that follows, we use the one-year Fama-Bliss interest rate primarily
because this proxy has a long time-series. Section 2 of the online Appendix documents
that using other interest-rate proxies that include an explicit credit component, such as the
rates on auto and personal loans, generates very similar variation in γ over most of the
common sample period.
2.3.3 Capital Gains Overhang
In theory, the relevant capital gains overhang, gi,t, is that of the marginal seller, but
this value obviously cannot be identified. Therefore, we use the capital gains overhang
variable proposed by Grinblatt and Han (2005). They define capital gains overhang as
the percentage deviation of a proxy for the stock’s current reference price, RPi,t, from the
current price, Pi,t, where the proxy for a stock’s current reference price is estimated using
a turnover-weighted sum of end-of-week prices over the past 260 weeks, where TOi,t is
the turnover of stock i in week t. Specifically, we measure TOi,t as the sum of daily
trading volume relative to shares outstanding. Suppressing the subscript i for readability,
18By using the rates that were applied for each year t in question, we ignore the possibility that investors
may anticipate that capital gains tax rates may change.
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the relevant equations are
gt =
Pt −RPt
Pt
(2.5)
with RPt = φ−1
260∑
n=0
V̂t,t−nPt−n (2.6)
where V̂t,t−n = TOt−n
[
n−1∏
τ=1
(1− TOt−n+τ )
]
(2.7)
and φ =
260∑
n=0
V̂t,t−n (2.8)
Therefore, the weights, V̂t,t−n /φ, given to each past price, Pt−n, can be interpreted as
the probability that the marginal seller bought the stock at that price, where V̂t,t−n is a
function of the past turnover from t − n to t − 1. Hence this probability is also equal to
the probability that the reference price is equal to the price at t − n. Averaging over all
possible reference prices yields the estimated cost basis.
The capital gains overhang measure has the following intuitive interpretation. If a
stock had relatively high turnover exactly one year ago, but volume has been very low
ever since, then the current shareholders are more likely to have bought the stock a year
ago. Consequently, the price one year ago is a good proxy for the marginal investor’s
purchase price. Conversely, if that stock instead had relatively high turnover in the most
recent month, then last month’s price is a good proxy for the marginal investor’s purchase
price. Note that we compute g for each firm using price and volume data from the CRSP
database for U.S. firms and the Compustat Global database for U.K. firms.
2.3.4 Control Variables
We conduct cross-sectional regressions using both returns and selling pressure as de-
pendent variables. The returns-based regressions consist primarily of daily firm-level re-
turns, which are obtained from the CRSP database for U.S. firms and from Compustat
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Global for U.K. firms. The selling-pressure regressions, used for analyzing investor be-
havior, are also conducted at the daily frequency. We compute selling pressure, Sell,
defined as the ratio of sell trades to all trades, following Lee and Ready (1991) and Hvid-
kjaer (2005) using the TAQ database. We further compute versions of selling pressure for
small (SellS) and large (SellL) trades. Following Lee and Ready (1991), we set the cutoff
point separating a large trade from a small trade at $10,000.
The key variables in our regression are a firm’s capital gains overhang and the tax-
selling premium. However, in most of the specifications, we also include other standard
control variables. We include the book-to-market equity ratio (BM ) in the regressions in
order to capture the well-known value effect in the cross-section of average stock returns
(Fama and French (1992)). We control for size (ME) given the evidence in Fama and
French (1992) that size plays some role in describing the cross-section of average returns.
We control for past returns over the last three years and trading volume as in Grinblatt
and Han (2005), since our capital gains variable uses both as inputs. In particular, we
decompose returns over the last three years into the one-month return, r−1:0; the one-year
return (excluding the past one-month return), r−12:−1; and the three-year return (excluding
the past one-year return), r−36:−12. We calculate two measures of volume. The first is the
average monthly turnover, V , from the past 12 months. The second is monthly turnover,
TURN , which is simply the sum of daily turnover for the month in question. For both
volume measures, note that we divide Nasdaq volume by two in an attempt to minimize
the double counting of trades on that exchange.
2.3.5 Descriptive Statistics of Overhang Portfolios
Though our analysis uses firm-level regressions, we first look at the characteristics of
portfolios sorted on g to summarize how g varies in the cross-section and is related to other
variables used in the finance literature to forecast cross-sectional variation in stock returns.
Table 2.1 reports equal-weight average characteristics for portfolios formed monthly
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on capital gains overhang. We choose equal-weight to correspond to our firm-level regres-
sions which weight stocks equally. By definition, past returns are correlated with stocks’
capital gains overhang.19 Nevertheless, it is interesting to see the extent to which there is
spread in past returns over different horizons because of the capital gains overhang sort
and the way that translates into characteristics that are indirectly driven by past returns,
SIZE and BM . We find that high overhang stocks are typically large value momentum
stocks while low overhang stocks are typically small growth losers. This tendency does
not have to be true for every single stock (in fact, our stock-level regressions hope to sep-
arate these two sources of independent variation), but it is the case at the level of quintile
portfolios. Note that seasonal effects have been documented in the average returns associ-
ated with many of these variables. By suggesting that previous analyses merely identified
a tax-selling seasonal that varies through time, our framework provides an alternative ex-
planation.
19One possible concern is that variation in overhang is simply variation in momentum. In their Table
2.1 Panel B, Grinblatt and Han (2005) study the cross-sectional determinants of the capital gains overhang
and show that about 59% of the cross-sectional variation in the capital gains variable can be explained by
differences in past returns (over the past month, past year, and past three years), past turnover (over the past
month, past year, and past three years), and firm size. Given that more than 40% of the variation remains
unexplained and that all seven variables are each very significant, it is not just returns over the past year
that are driving cross-sectional variation in overhang. Indeed, the thesis of Grinblatt and Han (2005) is that
overhang clearly and reliably drives out r−12:−1 in cross-sectional regressions forecasting returns.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports various characteristics of capital-gains-overhang-sorted quintile portfolios formed each
month. These portfolios are equal-weight portfolios. We compute capital gains overhang, g, as in Grinblatt
and Han (2005). The characteristics include a decomposition of returns over the last three years into the one-
month return, r−1:−0; the one-year return (excluding the past one-month return), r−12:−1; and the three-year
return (excluding the past one-year return), r−12:−36. Market capitalization, ME, and the book-to-market
equity ratio, BM , are computed as in Fama and French (1992). BM is the previous fiscal year’s ending
book value divided by the corresponding year’s December market value. ME is the latest end-of-June
market value in thousands. We also report the average monthly turnover, V , from the past 12 months as
well as the monthly turnover, TURN , the sum of daily turnover within the past month. For both volume
measures, we divide Nasdaq volume by two in an attempt to make volume numbers comparable across
exchanges. We compute Sell as the fraction of seller-initiated trades relative to all trades for both small (S)
and large (L) trades. The cut-off delimiting a small versus a large trade is $10,000, as in Lee and Ready
(1991). The sample starts in February of 1954 and ends in December 2008.
Panel A: December
g r−1:0 r−12:−1 r−36:−12 ME BM V TURN SellS SellL
H 0.28 0.043 0.512 0.717 1856 0.66 0.043 0.047 0.51 0.52
4 0.09 0.023 0.251 0.494 2015 0.78 0.054 0.052 0.52 0.51
3 -0.07 0.011 0.124 0.391 1546 0.87 0.057 0.054 0.53 0.52
2 -0.33 0.000 0.000 0.294 887 0.97 0.055 0.055 0.56 0.54
L -1.90 -0.021 -0.198 0.065 190 1.29 0.044 0.053 0.61 0.57
Panel B: January
g r−1:0 r−12:−1 r−36:−12 ME BM V TURN SellS SellL
H 0.30 0.054 0.544 0.741 1719 0.68 0.039 0.052 0.51 0.52
4 0.11 0.042 0.264 0.505 1955 0.79 0.050 0.058 0.52 0.51
3 -0.03 0.040 0.133 0.402 1529 0.87 0.053 0.058 0.52 0.51
2 -0.27 0.048 0.016 0.318 936 0.97 0.054 0.057 0.52 0.51
L -1.70 0.082 -0.170 0.085 195 1.27 0.043 0.043 0.54 0.54
Panel C: February-November
g r−1:0 r−12:−1 r−36:−12 ME BM V TURN SellS SellL
H 0.29 0.040 0.527 0.681 1672 0.69 0.040 0.050 0.51 0.52
4 0.12 0.018 0.266 0.461 1972 0.80 0.051 0.055 0.51 0.51
3 -0.02 0.008 0.132 0.369 1660 0.87 0.054 0.055 0.52 0.51
2 -0.24 0.000 0.008 0.287 956 0.96 0.054 0.052 0.53 0.52
L -1.48 -0.008 -0.189 0.065 198 1.23 0.044 0.040 0.55 0.55
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Also of particular interest is the fact that though there is no pattern in average monthly
turnover over the past year, there is a pattern in the most recent monthly volume. Stocks
with a low g experience relatively high turnover in December, while stocks with a high
g experience relatively high turnover in January. Even stronger patterns can be seen in
our selling pressure variable Sell. Stocks with a low cost basis relative to price are being
sold by both small (SellS) and large (SellL) investors in December. These patterns are
consistent with optimal tax-selling behavior in the context we consider here.
2.4 Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis consists of three parts. First, we consider the ability of the prod-
uct of g and γ to forecast cross-sectional and time-series variation in stock returns. Second,
we examine the implications for trading volume and the trading behavior of individual
investors. Finally, we analyze the consequences for aggregate returns and performance
attribution.
2.4.1 Cross-sectional and Time-series Variation in Firm-level Returns
In this subsection, we focus on the analysis of the cross-sectional and time-series vari-
ation in firm-level returns. In particular, we show that the product of the tax-selling pre-
mium (γ, a function of capital gains rates and interest rates) and a stock’s capital gains
overhang (g) forecasts firm-level returns around the turn of the tax year. We first examine
U.S. data and then turn to the U.K., where the tax and calendar year end do not coincide.
In these regressions, we first cross-sectionally demean all firm-level data.
U.S. Return Regressions
Since our hypothesis has both cross-sectional and time-series implications, in Table
2.2 we estimate pooled regressions examining whether the interaction between γ and g
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forecasts either weekly or daily returns. Panels A and B of Table 2.2 report the main result;
the remaining Panel estimates our benchmark specification over different subsamples for
robustness.
We first estimate a regression forecasting weekly returns using the product of γ and g,
as well as interacting that variable with nine dummy variables, eight for the four December
and four January weeks and one for the rest of the year, February through November,
ri,t = a1γt−1gi,t−1FN (2.9)
+a2γt−1gi,t−1D1 + a3γt−1gi,t−1D2 + a4γt−1gi,t−1D3 + a5γt−1gi,t−1D4
+a6γt−1gi,t−1J1 + a7γt−1gi,t−1J2 + a8γt−1gi,t−1J3 + a9γt−1gi,t−1J4 + εi,t
Standard errors are robust to cross-sectional correlation using the method of Rogers
(1983, 1993).20 The first regression in Panel A shows that the effect of γ ∗ g is statistically
significant in December and January using weekly dummies. The results are consistent
with December momentum in stock returns which is explained by γ ∗ g and a subsequent
reversal around the turn-of-the-year. Interestingly, the reversal seems to start during the
last week of December.
The remaining regressions in Panel A add standard controls to the specification in
equation (2.9). These controls include ME, BM , and g. These variables control for the
well-known size, value, and momentum patterns in the cross-section of returns. We use g
to control for momentum given Grinblatt and Han’s finding that g subsumes simple price
momentum’s ability to describe the cross-section of average returns; however, note that
we do include controls for past returns in subsequent regressions. We also interact ME
with a dummy variable for January. Finally, we split the interaction, γ ∗ g ∗ FN , into
γ ∗ g ∗ FebJun and γ ∗ g ∗ JulNov.
20See Petersen (2009) for a careful study of the appropriateness of Rogers’ (1983, 1993) estimator in
various contexts.
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These controls have little impact on our findings as the turn-of-the-year effect remains
strong. However, the last week rebound becomes smaller and statistically insignificant.
In all cases, we find that most of the January reversal occurs in the first week of January.
We find that the ability of γ ∗ g to predict returns in February through November occurs
entirely in the second-half of the year. This result is consistent with the potential clumping
of tax-loss harvesting investors trades being partially anticipated by the market.
In Panel B of Table 2.2, we re-estimate our benchmark regression over different sub-
periods. Consistent with our hypothesis, γ ∗ g has the expected effect around the turn-of-
the-year in all sub-periods.
Table 2.2: Pooled Return Regression Estimates (1954-2008)
We report the results from pooled regressions of day or week t stock returns on t − 1 characteristics.
Characteristics are measured on a weekly basis for conciseness. All firm-specific variables, defined in
Table 2.1, are cross-sectionally demeaned, and when appropriate, interacted with our proposed tax-selling
premium variable, γt = τt
(
1−Bt
1−Btτt
)
, a function of capital gains tax rates (τt) and interest rates (rt =
1
Bt
− 1) as derived in Section 2.1, and with dummy variables for different periods of the year. The dummy
variables are FN , D(W ), and J(W ) for February-November, December, and January respectively and
refer to the month of the return being predicted, with W indicating the week of the particular month in
question. T-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to cross-correlation in the residuals using the clustered
standard errors of Rogers (1983, 1993). We also consider a case where we split the dummy variable FN
into two halves: FebJun and JulNov. The sample starts in February of 1954 and ends in December
2008. Panel A presents weekly regressions of returns on weekly interactions of weekly dummies, g and γ,
also including g, ME and BM as controls. Panel B shows sub-sample analysis of the first regression in
Panel B. The regressions correspond to the sub-periods 1963-2008, 1954-2008, 1980-2008, and 1993-2008
respectively.
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
γ ∗ g ∗ FN -0.035 -0.024 0.056 0.054
(-3.91) (-2.63) (2.68) (2.60)
γ ∗ g ∗D1 0.135 0.126 0.207 0.205 0.204
(1.71) (1.57) (2.50) (2.49) (2.48)
γ ∗ g ∗D2 0.155 0.127 0.208 0.206 0.202
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Table 2.2 (Continued)
(3.08) (2.02) (3.21) (3.19) (3.06)
γ ∗ g ∗D3 0.216 0.219 0.299 0.298 0.294
(4.51) (4.04) (4.97) (4.96) (4.90)
γ ∗ g ∗D4 -0.134 -0.159 -0.079 -0.081 -0.076
(-2.27) (-2.50) (-1.20) (-1.22) (-1.15)
γ ∗ g ∗ J1 -1.000 -1.009 -0.927 -0.913 -0.914
(-5.08) (-5.38) (-5.02) (-4.98) (-4.99)
γ ∗ g ∗ J2 -0.391 -0.383 -0.301 -0.286 -0.286
(-3.05) (-2.79) (-2.27) (-2.17) (-2.19)
γ ∗ g ∗ J3 -0.271 -0.244 -0.162 -0.146 -0.149
(-2.73) (-3.07) (-2.00) (-1.85) (-1.87)
γ ∗ g ∗ J4 -0.312 -0.300 -0.219 -0.203 -0.199
(-4.81) (-4.17) (-2.89) (-2.70) (-2.66)
γ ∗ g ∗ FebJun 0.015
(0.62)
γ ∗ g ∗ JulNov 0.086
(4.13)
g -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-4.01) (-4.01) (-4.00)
ln(ME) -0.020 -0.012 -0.009 -0.011
(-3.11) (-1.87) (-1.34) (-1.65)
ln(BM) 0.057 0.049 0.049 0.022
(3.13) (2.68) (2.68) (1.60)
ln(ME) ∗ J -0.044 -0.045
(-8.95) (-8.94)
Panel B
1963-2008 1954-1980 1980-2008 1993-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γ*g*FN 0.008 0.002 0.002 -0.049
(2.14) (0.32) (0.34) (-4.24)
γ*g*D1 0.036 0.043 0.021 0.034
(2.26) (2.69) (1.14) (1.00)
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Table 2.2 (Continued)
γ*g*D2 0.029 0.047 0.006 -0.002
(1.42) (3.91) (0.27) (-0.08)
γ*g*D3 0.055 0.025 0.065 0.169
(4.68) (2.77) (3.36) (2.07)
γ*g*D4 0.045 0.040 0.036 0.064
(4.46) (3.04) (2.59) (1.42)
γ*g*J1 -0.169 -0.201 -0.165 -0.516
(-5.02) (-6.67) (-3.30) (-15.01)
γ*g*J2 -0.037 -0.046 -0.042 -0.201
(-2.33) (-3.38) (-1.70) (-2.00)
γ*g*J3 -0.021 -0.042 -0.020 -0.142
(-1.61) (-2.49) (-1.24) (-3.58)
γ*g*J4 -0.037 -0.076 -0.028 -0.111
(-2.48) (-3.24) (-1.84) (-3.64)
γ*g*XE -0.124 -0.109 -0.139 -0.192
(-6.63) (-4.09) (-5.28) (-2.39)
γ*g*NYE -0.262 -0.320 -0.222 -0.845
(-3.84) (-8.45) (-2.33) (-3.80)
g -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(-7.57) (-0.94) (-6.32) (-1.75)
ln(ME) -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.017
(-5.31) (-3.48) (-4.68) (-6.74)
ln(BM) 0.013 -0.002 0.016 0.003
(3.34) (-0.40) (3.21) (1.29)
ln(ME)*J -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.006
(-8.67) (-7.11) (-6.38) (-3.94)
Table 2.3 estimates a daily version of the fourth regression in Panel A in order to shed
more light on the effect seen during the last week of December. We continue to use weekly
dummy variables to facilitate comparison with the weekly return regressions, but we also
add dummies for the business day before December 25th (XE dummy) and the business
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day before New Year’s Day (NYE dummy). After including these XE and NYE dummies,
the last week of December exhibits a positive slope on the interaction γ ∗ g. This result
is consistent with tax-loss harvesting by taxable investors throughout the last week of the
year, but with savvy investors purchasing temporarily depressed stocks on the last working
days of the year.
Table 2.3: Daily Pooled Return Regression Estimates (1954-2008)
This table reports daily return regressions using weekly variables for conciseness and direct comparison
with Table 2.2 Panel A. We expand the set of interactions to also include dummies for the business day
before Christmas (XE) and the business day before New Year’s Day (NY E). Regression (2) accounts for
a possible trend in the effect of g on returns. Regression (3) considers the possibility that the trend depends
on the month, week, or day of the year. Regression (4) analyzes whether the interactive effect of γ can be
explained simply through interactions with its components, interest rates (r) or capital gains tax rates (τ )
individually. Regression (5) considers an alternative set of controls using the same variables as in Grinblatt
and Han (2005), also defined in Table 2.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
interact dummies replace γ
with both with both
γ ∗ g g ∗ trend r τ
γ ∗ g ∗ FN 0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -1.5E-05 0.115 -0.004 0.006
(1.95) (-0.66) (-0.50) (-2.86) (4.58) (-1.81) (1.72)
γ ∗ g ∗D1 0.036 0.025 0.021 7.6E-06 0.059 -0.015 0.040
(2.24) (1.58) (1.19) (0.48) (0.42) (-2.53) (2.46)
γ ∗ g ∗D2 0.028 0.017 0.021 -2.9E-05 0.173 -0.008 0.038
(1.39) (0.87) (1.08) (-2.25) (0.93) (-2.95) (2.43)
γ ∗ g ∗D3 0.055 0.044 0.030 4.9E-05 0.105 -0.005 0.057
(4.64) (3.49) (3.14) (2.24) (0.46) (-1.73) (5.49)
γ ∗ g ∗D4 0.044 0.033 0.033 -1.2E-05 0.352 -0.007 0.048
(4.41) (3.28) (3.42) (-0.84) (2.46) (-1.58) (4.11)
γ ∗ g ∗ J1 -0.173 -0.184 -0.174 -5.3E-05 -0.181 -0.004 -0.171
(-5.04) (-5.13) (-5.33) (-1.15) (-0.45) (-0.69) (-4.89)
γ ∗ g ∗ J2 -0.039 -0.050 -0.039 -6.0E-05 0.063 -0.011 -0.044
Chapter 2: How Tax and Interest Rates Drive Stock Returns at the Turn of the Tax Year 57
Table 2.3 (Continued)
(-2.43) (-2.90) (-2.63) (-1.55) (0.33) (-1.44) (-2.84)
γ ∗ g ∗ J3 -0.023 -0.034 -0.035 -9.6E-06 0.020 0.000 -0.032
(-1.71) (-2.35) (-2.60) (-0.41) (0.13) (0.24) (-1.91)
γ ∗ g ∗ J4 -0.038 -0.048 -0.052 4.1E-06 0.068 -0.007 -0.056
(-2.56) (-3.15) (-3.26) (0.21) (0.30) (-5.45) (-3.78)
γ ∗ g ∗XE -0.126 -0.126 -0.122 -4.8E-06 -0.507 0.007 -0.133
(-6.61) (-6.61) (-6.29) (-0.14) (-1.61) (2.09) (-6.98)
γ ∗ g ∗NY E -0.263 -0.263 -0.235 -1.2E-04 -0.895 -0.008 -0.277
(-3.85) (-3.85) (-3.30) (-1.96) (-1.25) (-8.61) (-4.48)
g -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.001
(-7.52) (-2.48) (-2.71) (-4.55) (-8.34)
g ∗ trend -1.6E-05
(-2.85)
ln(ME) -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 0.000
(-5.22) (-5.53) (-5.92) (-0.20)
ln(BM) 0.009 0.011 0.005 -0.003
(2.50) (3.17) (1.69) (-1.21)
ln(ME) ∗ J -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 0.001
(-8.86) (-8.87) (-8.81) (0.41)
r−1:0 -0.003
(-6.02)
r−12:−1 0.000
(4.46)
r−36:−12 0.000
(-2.00)
V -0.001
(-3.03)
ln(ME) -0.007
(-5.72)
Overall, Tables 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that tax-motivated selling, captured by the inter-
action of γ ∗ g, can explain the cross-section of firm level returns during the turn of the
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year. We test for the joint significance of December weekly coefficients for both tables,
finding that December coefficients are always jointly significant at the 1% level, with the
exception of the second regression in Table 2.2 Panel A, where the December coefficients
are significant at the 5% level. January coefficients are jointly statistically significant at
the 1% level for all regressions in both tables.21
We consider regression (1) in Table 2.3 to be our benchmark specification. The re-
maining regressions in Table 2.3 use this specification to test alternative hypotheses as well
as document the robustness of our findings to different subsamples.
One alternative hypothesis is that γ is simply capturing a downward trend in the capital
gains overhang effect, instead of the joint effect of interest rates and capital gains tax rates
as specified in the formulation we derived. As a consequence, regression (2) in Table 2.3
interacts a linear time trend (trend) with g. We find a negative and statistically significant
coefficient on trend ∗ g, which is consistent with a decreasing effect of g. However, this
interaction does not subsume the γ ∗ g effect in December and January as coefficients
remain roughly the same in magnitude and statistical significance. Regression (3) in
considers the possibility that the interaction between g and the linear time trend differs as
a function of the week of the year. This more flexible trend specification still does not
subsume the γ ∗ g effect as coefficients and t-statistics associated with γ ∗ g remain strong
in the weeks around the turn of the year.
Another alternative hypothesis is that it is really only one component of γ (either the
interest rate or the capital gains tax rate) that is providing the forecasting power. Hence,
we test whether interest rates (r) or tax rates (τ ) are individually important in explaining
the time-series variation in the capital gains overhang effect. Regression (4) in Table 2.3
shows that neither τ nor r in isolation interacts with g in a consistent fashion, providing
additional support for our claim that γ is the correct conditioning variable.
21The test for (J1 + J2 + J3 + J4) + (D1 + D2 + D3 + D4) = 0 yields an F-statistic of 3.85 with
a p-value of 0.0499. Thus, we just reject the hypothesis that the sum of December and January coefficients
are equal.
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In order to test the robustness of our results, we also estimate a regression with the
same specification as in Grinblatt and Han (2005) in regression (5). In this regression we
measure the seasonal pattern in our suggested variable, γ ∗g, while controlling for patterns
in average returns related to the one-month return, r−1:0, the one-year return r−12:−1, the
three-year return r−36:−12, the average monthly turnover V over the past 12 months, and
SIZE.22
ri,t = a1γt−1gi,t−1FN (2.10)
+a2γt−1gi,t−1D1 + a3γt−1gi,t−1D2 + a4γt−1gi,t−1D3 + a5γt−1gi,t−1D4
+a6γt−1gi,t−1J1 + a7γt−1gi,t−1J2 + a8γt−1gi,t−1J3 + a9γt−1gi,t−1J4
+a10gi,t−1 + a11ri,−1:0 + a12ri,−12:−1 + a13ri,−36:−12
+a14V i,t−1 + a15 lnMEi,t−1 + εi,t
Again we find that the product of γ and g predicts returns in a manner consistent with
our hypothesis.23
U.K. Return Regressions
The fact that the turn-of-the-tax-year coincides with the turn-of-the-calendar-year in
the U.S. has resulted in a long debate as to whether tax-motivated trading or window dress-
ing is causing the turn-of-the-year effect. Researchers have argued that window dressing
could explain similar return patterns as fund managers sell losers and buy winners at the
end of the reporting period to make their year-end portfolios look strong. Our approach
22Grinblatt and Han (2005) use a slightly different measure of size than Fama and French (1992). For
consistency’s sake, we use the appropriate definition in the corresponding specification. However, we ignore
the minor difference between these two definitions of size when describing the results.
23We have re-estimated these equations using different tax rates, including both the average maximum tax
rate and the average federal marginal tax rate from the NBER’s TAXSIM dataset [see Feenberg and Coutts
(1993)]. Our conclusions remain qualitatively the same. We report results using the maximum capital gains
tax rate as that tax rate is available over the longest time period.
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helps distinguish between these two hypotheses as there does not seem to be any obvious
reason that the magnitude of the window dressing effect would be related to time-series
variation in γ.24 Nevertheless, we take this concern seriously and turn to international
data for further insight.
We test the same hypothesis with international data, choosing the U.K. because its tax
year does not coincide with the calendar year. Specifically, the tax year in the U.K. begins
on the 6th of April and ends on the 5th of April of the next calendar year. As a result,
the U.K. provides a clean setup to test these two plausible hypotheses. Any seasonality
in the U.K. stock market around the turn-of-the-tax-year would be strong evidence for
tax-motivated trading causing seasonality in stock returns.
We are not the first to use U.K. data to test the tax-selling hypothesis. In particu-
lar, Reinganum and Shapiro (1987) show that after the introduction of capital gains taxes
in the U.K., the difference in April returns between winners and losers becomes signifi-
cantly greater than zero, consistent with a tax-loss selling story. Our primary empirical
contribution is to show that this premium varies with the interest rate as predicted by our
formulation.25
The results using U.K. data provide further evidence of tax-motivated trading, as Table
2.4 shows results similar to Table 2.3. Seasonality in U.K. returns indeed occurs at the
turn-of-the-tax-year and varies as a function of our tax-selling premium. All coefficients
are positive in March and negative in April. Coefficients are jointly statistically significant
at the 1% level in both March and April.
24Other researchers have examined tax-motivated price pressure stories that occur at times other than the
turn of the year to rule out alternative explanations such as window dressing. See, for example, Guenther
and Willenborg (1999), Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003), and Dai, Maydew, Shackelford and Zhang
(forthcoming).
25Other differences include the fact that Reinganum and Shapiro (1987) examine only monthly stock
returns and use an arguably cruder proxy for a stock’s capital gains overhang. In contrast, we use daily
returns and measure capital gains overhang as in Grinblatt and Han (2005).
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Table 2.4: Pooled Return Regression Estimates (1954-2008)
We report the results from pooled regressions of day t stock returns on t − 1 characteristics using U.K.
data. Characteristics are measured on a weekly basis for conciseness. All firm-specific variables, defined in
Table 2.1 but computed with U.K. data, are cross-sectionally demeaned, and when appropriate, interacted
with our proposed tax-selling premium variable γ, defined in Table 2.2 but computed with U.K. data, along
with monthly or weekly dummy variables. The dummy variables are RoY and UK(X) for the rest of the
tax year and specific weeks of the tax year respectively, withX representing the week of the tax year. Since
the end of the tax year in the U.K. is the 5th of April, we define these weeks in relation to the end of the
tax year. Therefore, the last week of the year is in effect the last 5 days before the end of the tax year,
including days in April and March potentially. T-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to cross-correlation in
the residuals using the clustered standard errors of Rogers (1983, 1993). The sample starts in January 1996
and ends in December 2008.
(1) (2)
γ ∗ g ∗RoY 0.032 0.041
(1.58) (1.71)
γ ∗ g ∗ UK49 0.131 0.142
(2.02) (2.14)
γ ∗ g ∗ UK50 0.176 0.187
(2.30) (2.38)
γ ∗ g ∗ UK51 0.058 0.068
(0.40) (0.47)
γ ∗ g ∗ UK52 0.050 0.061
(0.61) (0.72)
γ ∗ g ∗ UK1 -0.124 -0.112
(-1.41) (-1.28)
γ ∗ g ∗ UK2 -0.231 -0.221
(-2.47) (-2.33)
γ ∗ g ∗ UK3 -0.223 -0.212
(-2.34) (-2.20)
γ ∗ g ∗ UK4 -0.079 -0.067
(-1.44) (-1.19)
ln(ME) 0.000
(1.71)
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Table 2.4 (Continued)
ln(BM) 0.045
(1.50)
r−1:0 0.000
(0.07)
r−12:−1 0.001
(1.18)
r−36:−12 -0.001
(-2.69)
2.4.2 Cross-sectional and Time-series Variation in Trading Behavior
The time-series and cross-sectional patterns we have found in firm-level returns are
consistent with tax-motivated selling pressure. In this section, we examine further impli-
cations of that explanation, particularly the way our suggested variables explain seller-
initiated volume and the behavior of individual investors. First, we examine all trading
volume at the turn of the year. Unlike previous research, we exploit a long panel of trad-
ing data, namely the TAQ database, and categorize all trades over the 1993-2005 period
as small or large, buy or sell.26 Second, we also examine trading patterns by studying
the actual trades of individual investors, obtained from Odean’s dataset, to confirm that
these investors harvest (defer) capital losses (gains) based on the level of our tax-selling
premium.
Seller-initiated Trading Volume
We build on the results of the previous subsection to test our framework’s ability to ex-
plain time-series and cross-sectional variation in seller-initiated trades as a whole as well
26In contrast, Sias and Starks (1997) use TAQ data from only December 1990 and January 1991 to exam-
ine a similar question.
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as in small and large trade subsets. We examine these subsets as previous research has ar-
gued that small trades are primarily from individuals while large trades are primarily from
institutions. We would expect negative overhang stocks to have high selling pressure in
December followed by low selling pressure in January. Similarly, we expect the opposite
effect in the case of positive overhang stocks.
In Table 2.5, we forecast the level of selling pressure (Sell, SellS , SellL) in Panel A
and the first difference of those variables in Panel B. Throughout the Table, we use the
same independent variables as Table 2.2 Panel B regression (5). Specifically, we estimate
Selli,t = a1γt−1gi,t−1FN (2.11)
+a2γt−1gi,t−1D1 + a3γt−1gi,t−1D2 + a4γt−1gi,t−1D3 + a5γt−1gi,t−1D4
+a6γt−1gi,t−1J1 + a7γt−1gi,t−1J2 + a8γt−1gi,t−1J3 + a9γt−1gi,t−1J4
+a10gi,t−1 + a11ri,−1:0 + a12ri,−12:−1 + a13ri,−36:−12
+a14V i,t−1 + a15 lnMEi,t−1 + εi,t
in Panel A and
Selli,t − Selli,t−1 = a1γt−1gi,t−1FN (2.12)
+a2γt−1gi,t−1D1 + a3γt−1gi,t−1D2 + a4γt−1gi,t−1D3 + a5γt−1gi,t−1D4
+a6γt−1gi,t−1J1 + a7γt−1gi,t−1J2 + a8γt−1gi,t−1J3 + a9γt−1gi,t−1J4
+a10gi,t−1 + a11ri,−1:0 + a12ri,−12:−1 + a13ri,−36:−12
+a14V i,t−1 + a15 lnMEi,t−1 + εi,t
in Panel B. Note that we expect both Selli,t and Selli,t−Selli,t−1 to move in the opposite
direction of the predicted return; and, therefore, we now expect a positive (negative) slope
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in January (December) on our tax-selling variable. As in the return regressions, all firm-
level variables are cross-sectionally demeaned. Standard errors are robust to simultaneous
correlation both across firms and across years (Thompson, 2011).
We do find that both returns and selling pressure exhibit similar seasonality, as selling
pressure results are consistent with the return regressions shown in Table 2.2. Panel A
in Table 2.5 reports the results from regressions forecasting the level of selling pressure.
We find that December slopes on γ ∗ g are all negative and highly statistically significant,
indicating taxable investors are selling negative overhang stocks and holding on to positive
overhang stocks in December. As expected, January exhibits the opposite pattern.
For example, in the last week of December, the coefficient on γ ∗ g is -1.893 with a
t-statistic in excess of 11. Then, in the case of a negative overhang stock, selling pressure
reverses into buying pressure after the turn of the year as slopes on γ ∗ g turn positive in
January. Specifically, we find a reversal in selling pressure in the first week of January
with a statistically-significant coefficient of 1.718. These results are economically quite
large, at least when compared to the coefficient on γ ∗ g of -0.001 throughout February
and November. We also find that the coefficients associated with the business days before
Christmas and New Year’s Day are consistent with the corresponding coefficient estimates
of the return regressions.
Table 2.5: Pooled Selling Pressure Regression Estimates (1954-2008)
We report the results from pooled regressions of the day t change in (or level of) selling pressure (for either
small or large sized trades) on t − 1 characteristics. Characteristics are measured on a weekly basis for
conciseness. Panel A reports results with the level of selling pressure, while Panel B shows results with
the change in that level. In both cases, we split the sample into small and large trades. All firm-specific
variables, defined in Table 2.1, are cross-sectionally demeaned, and when appropriate, then interacted with
our tax-selling premium variable, γ, and with dummy variables corresponding to different periods of the
year. These dummy variables as well as γ are defined in Table 2.2. T-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to
simultaneous correlation both across firms and across years based on the method developed by Thompson
(2011). The sample starts in February of 1993 and ends in January 2005.
Panel A Panel B
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Table 2.5 (Continued)
all small large all small large
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
γ ∗ g ∗ FN -0.001 -0.080 -0.799 -0.020 -0.027 -0.013
(-0.01) (-0.48) (-3.98) (-1.29) (-1.6) (-0.44)
γ ∗ g ∗D1 -0.946 -1.165 -1.201 -0.126 -0.146 0.015
(-4.67) (-4.75) (-4.26) (-1.42) (-2.02) (0.12)
γ ∗ g ∗D2 -0.965 -1.304 -1.151 -0.040 -0.081 0.002
(-6.93) (-5.8) (-7.11) (-0.77) (-1.7) (0.02)
γ ∗ g ∗D3 -1.380 -1.608 -1.859 -0.141 -0.142 -0.225
(-8.88) (-7.52) (-10.54) (-1.97) (-1.96) (-1.5)
γ ∗ g ∗D4 -1.893 -1.965 -2.241 -0.176 -0.079 -0.233
(-11.18) (-9.36) (-9.84) (-3.03) (-1.71) (-1.5)
γ ∗ g ∗ J1 1.718 1.650 1.035 0.487 0.421 0.242
(4.18) (3.96) (2.72) (3.27) (2.73) (2.15)
γ ∗ g ∗ J2 0.966 0.875 0.055 -0.089 -0.045 -0.181
(5.93) (5.4) (0.37) (-1.17) (-0.59) (-2.98)
γ ∗ g ∗ J3 0.747 0.713 -0.250 0.107 0.048 0.214
(4.5) (3.67) (-1.16) (3.37) (1.56) (3.95)
γ ∗ g ∗ J4 0.587 0.543 -0.194 0.066 0.080 0.148
(3.86) (2.66) (-0.81) (1.14) (1.54) (1.59)
γ ∗ g ∗XE 0.390 0.207 1.173 0.090 0.006 0.954
(2.6) (1.71) (4.29) (0.46) (0.04) (4.01)
γ ∗ g ∗NY E 0.230 0.593 0.198 0.521 0.675 0.660
(1.51) (4.22) (0.74) (4.2) (4.71) (1.5)
g -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.88) (-2.4) (3.69) (-0.41) (-0.72) (-0.89)
r−1:0 -0.008 0.003 -0.010 0.012 0.011 0.012
(-3.95) (1.03) (-4.78) (7.2) (8.32) (7.49)
r−12:−1 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.61) (-2.29) (-0.16) (1.54) (2.14) (2.26)
r−36:−12 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.16) (-2.84) (1.58) (0.4) (-0.05) (-0.32)
V -0.060 -0.018 -0.071 0.000 0.001 -0.001
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(-4.55) (-1.65) (-7.61) (0.7) (0.93) (-1.17)
ln(ME) -1.666 -1.410 -1.495 0.031 0.029 0.012
(-13.33) (-10.48) (-12.32) (6.91) (8.53) (1.66)
The analysis in Section 2.1 indicates that we should expect γ ∗ g to forecast the level
of selling pressure. Nevertheless, we find that results remain statistically significant even
when we forecast changes in selling pressure. In this case, we are analyzing whether
the change in selling pressure of low/negative capital gains overhang stocks increases as
we approach the end of the year. Panel B shows that this increase indeed occurs, as
coefficients in December are all negative. The selling pressure of low overhang stocks
increases over the course of December (negative coefficients), but suddenly declines in
the first week of January (positive coefficient). Note that the slope on the NYE dummy
interaction is positive and highly statistically significant, implying a large change in selling
pressure just before the turn of the year.
In both panels we also split the data into small and large trades. We do this as past
research (Lee and Ready (1991) and others) has associated small trades with buying by
individual investors and large trades with buying by institutional investors. We find the
reversal in selling pressure to be strong and more statistically significant in the case of
small trades, but present for both subsets. Though the results for small and large trades
are very similar, the January slopes in Panel A seem to be slightly higher for small trades.
Interestingly, the savvy buying pressure in the last week of the year seems to come from
institutional investors on Christmas Eve and from individual investors on New Year’s Eve.
Past research has looked for similar links between returns and selling pressure. Ritter
(1988) finds that individual investors who are customers at Merrill Lynch place more sell
orders in December than in January. While this finding is consistent with tax selling, a
limitation is that it focuses only on a small subgroup of investors. Sias and Starks (1997)
show that individuals sell stocks at the end of the year. This evidence is consistent with
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tax-motivated selling, but they find the individuals also sell past one-year winners in De-
cember. They view this result as inconsistent with tax selling, but to the extent that return
momentum is a poor proxy for capital gains overhang, it may be difficult to draw conclu-
sions about tax-motivated selling from their results. Another limitation of Sias and Starks
(1997) is that they use TAQ data from only December 1990 and January 1991.
Actual Individual Trades
We examine trading patterns by studying the actual trades of individual investors to
confirm that these investors harvest (defer) capital losses (gains) based on the level of our
tax-selling variables. In particular, Figure 2.1 reports the results of what is essentially a
difference-in-difference test of the trading implications of equation (1). That figure shows
the difference in the propensity to realize capital gains/losses in December compared to
January, for different levels of γ. In particular, we split the sample into above-median and
below-median γ.
We process all of the trades in the Odean dataset in the following way. We follow
each stock in the database from the time it was purchased until the time it was eventually
sold. We keep track of the close for that stock at the end of each day in between the pur-
chase date and the eventual sell date, using every closing price to calculate an unrealized
capital gain/loss. For each of eleven evenly-spaced bins ranging from -100% to > 100%,
these unrealized gains and losses are then compared to observed realized gains and losses
to measure a tendency for investors to sell as a function of capital gain/loss. Then for
each bin, we subtract the January propensity to sell from the December propensity to sell.
These turn-of-the-year differences to sell are plotted separately for high γ years and low γ
years. The average value of γ for the high γ years subset is 0.040, while the average value
of γ for the low γ years subset is 0.022.
There are two strong conclusions to draw from the figure. First, investors tend to ac-
celerate the realization of capital losses in December (compared to January). Second, this
tendency is much higher in those years when γ is higher. Together these two facts confirm
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Figure 2.1: Tax-Selling Propensity
This figure shows the propensity of taxable investor to sell winners and losers at the turn of the year using
the dataset studied in Odean (1998). For each stock in the dataset, we calculate a unrealized capital gain/loss
from the time the investor purchased the stock until it was eventually sold. For each of eleven evenly-spaced
bins ranging from -100% to > 100%, we compare these unrealized gains and losses to observed gains and
losses. We then plot the difference in the percentage of realized gains and losses in December versus January,
where the percentage is averaged over each return bucket. The data is split into years that are predicted to
have either a low or a high tax-selling propensity for the market portfolio, −γ ∗ g(M), as discussed in the
paper. The solid-dotted line represents the December propensity minus the January propensity for the years
where the tax-selling propensity is predicted to be low and the solid line represents the December propensity
minus the January propensity for the years where the tax-selling propensity is predicted to be high.
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the central prediction of our conjecture: investors’ propensity to sell at the turn of the year
depends on the product of the capital gains overhang, g, and the tax-selling premium, γ,
which is a function of the interest and tax rate environment. Our framework also suggests
that investors may delay realizing capital gains in high γ years. However, because of
the non-linear relation between capital gains and capital gain overhang, a relatively large
capital gain results in a relatively small amount of overhang. Consequently, one would
not expect variation in γ to generate much variation in selling probabilities for stocks with
unrealized capital gains, and it does not.
2.4.3 Implications for Performance Attribution
Our analysis has tried to measure the firm-specific and aggregate variables that drive
cross-sectional and time-series patterns in average returns at the turn of the year. To do
so, we have used a particular measure of firm-specific capital gains overhang and have
controlled for other well-known patterns in the cross-section such as a stock’s size, its
book-to-market equity ratio, and its return momentum that are known to be correlated
with our particular measure of a firm’s capital gains overhang.
However, given this correlation, a natural complementary question to ask is the follow-
ing: To what extent can the tax-selling effect drive market beta and the abnormal return as-
sociated with bets on the size, book-to-market, and momentum characteristics? To answer
these questions, we first document the extent to which the market return can be forecast
by our tax-selling variables. We then estimate conditional CAPM time-series regressions
pricing the three Fama-French/Carhart non-market factors.
First, we test whether tax-motivated selling can explain aggregate returns in January.
To do so, we measure gM , the value-weighted average of firm-level measures of g. Table
2.6 shows that γ ∗ gM does predict market returns in January in all of the specifications we
consider. This effect is both statistically and economically significant. Specifically, based
on the specification of Table 2.6 regression 1, a one standard deviation increase in the joint
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product of γ∗gM results in a decrease in the equity premium of approximately one percent.
We also report the results of specifications that control for the independent effect of γ or
gM . Note that we find a statistically significant relationship despite the inclusion of the
aggregate book-to-market variable in these regressions.
Table 2.6: Aggregate Time-Series Regression Estimates (1954-2008)
We report the results from monthly regressions forecasting the excess return on the market portfolio with
our tax-selling premium variable, γ, defined in Table 2.2 and the value-weight average, gM , of the firm-
level capital gains overhang, g, defined in Table 2.1. We also include in these regression the value-weight
average, BMM , of the firm-level book-to-market ratio, BM , also defined in Table 2.1. The sample starts in
February of 1954 and ends in December 2008.
γ ∗ gM gM γ BMM R2
FN D J FN D J FN D F
0.426 1.406 -3.742 0.771 0.012
(0.63) (0.86) (-2.04) (1.64)
-1.304 -2.155 -7.359 0.052 0.104 0.098 0.804 0.025
(-1.20) (-0.76) (-2.16) (2.18) (1.66) (1.38) (1.71)
0.612 1.012 -5.550 -0.438 -0.169 0.255 1.283 0.031
(0.89) (0.60) (-2.81) (-2.93) (-0.60) (0.86) (2.50)
As we find that market returns are indeed affected by tax-selling behavior, we estimate
conditional CAPM time-series regressions that include γ ∗ g as a conditioning variable.
In these regressions, we analyze the three Fama-French/Carhart non-market factors. We
choose these three factors because of their widespread use in academic research. In par-
ticular, these factors represent more reasonable implementations of strategies based on
size, book-to-market, or momentum characteristics than the strategies implicit in our ear-
lier cross-sectional regression tests. For comparability, we create a zero-cost overhang
factor that is formed in a similar way to the momentum factor of Carhart. Specifically,
each month we sort all NYSE stocks on our overhang measure and calculate 20th and 80th
percentile breakpoints. We then buy all NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks that are below
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the NYSE 20th percentile and sell all NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks that are above the
NYSE 80th percentile. The positions in the long and short sides are value-weight. Thus,
we will be able to show both the extent to which a tax-selling premium is a component of
the premiums on these well-known factors as well as the nature of the tax-selling premium
on value-weight positions based on a traditional sorting approach.
Figure 2.2 plots the January return on the TAX factor for each of the years of the sample
against an OLS forecast of the expected January return on the TAX factor using the product
of the tax-selling premium and the factor’s capital gains overhang, γ∗gTAX . As detailed in
the figure’s legend, the regression coefficient in that regression is -1.99 with an associated
t-statistic of -3.52. That regression’s adjusted R2 is 17.7%. These statistics and this
figure confirm that there is a time-series relation between the January return on TAX and
our predicted January rebound return as well as documents that the average January return
on TAX is positive.27 Moreover, these results confirm that the general conclusion from the
firm-level regression analysis is robust to weighting firms by market capitalization.
The specification of our conditional CAPM regression follows from two of our results.
Specifically, we have shown that 1) there is time-series and seasonal variation around the
turn of the year in the cross-sectional premium for the capital gains overhang variable and
2) this variation can be observed at the market level as well. The first finding indicates
that our conditional CAPM regression should have the intercept be a function of the trad-
ing strategy’s forecasted December dislocation and January rebound. That premium, of
course, will depend on the trading strategy’s beginning-of-period capital gains overhang,
the tax-selling premium which depends on the beginning-of-period tax and interest rates,
and the particular month in question, as we derived in Section 2.1. Not only do we al-
27One could arguably attribute the large positive realized return (35%) on the TAX factor in January
2001 to to the large negative return to a momentum strategy (-24%) in January as the tech boom subsided.
Regardless, the 2001 observation is not influential. In fact the t-statistic and R2 increase to -4.72 and
29.08% respectively when that observation is dropped from the sample.
Note that the relation in Figure 2.2 continues to be statistically significant if one instead predicts CAPM-
adjusted returns instead of raw returns as in the figure. If one imposes a regression coefficient of -1, the
resulting intercept is statistically insignificant from zero under either benchmarking approach.
Chapter 2: How Tax and Interest Rates Drive Stock Returns at the Turn of the Tax Year 72
Figure 2.2: Capital Gains Overhang
This figure plots the value-weight capital gains overhang of the bottom, middle, and top capital-gains-
overhang-sorted quintile portfolios. The sorts are based on NYSE breakpoints. The sample period is January
1964 to December 2008.
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low the alpha in our CAPM regression to vary through time but we also consider time
variation in the regression’s market beta. Cochrane (2001) points out that a time-varying
CAPM beta only affects pricing to the extent that the beta is correlated with time-variation
in the market premium. Therefore, the second finding (the market’s tax-selling premium
forecasts the subsequent excess return on the market) indicates that our conditional CAPM
regressions should have a time-varying beta that is a function of the market’s forecasted
December dislocation and January rebound. As at the firm level, that predictable return
will depend on the market’s beginning-of-period capital gains overhang, the tax-selling
premium (which depends on the beginning-of-period tax and interest rates), and the par-
ticular month in question.
Table 2.7 summarizes the extent to which cross-sectional and time-series variation in
tax-selling premiums drive conditional alphas and betas for the three well-known factor
portfolios HML, SMB, UMD and our low-minus-high overhang portfolio, which we de-
note as TAX. Note that we attribute performance of the returns on the actual factors gen-
erated by Ken French (obtained from his web site). However, we can only proxy for the
capital gains overhang of French’s factors as not all of the stocks in the factor portfolios
have the necessary data our measure requires. In particular, while our firm-level overhang
measure requires five years of price and volume data, these strategies do not. Presum-
ably, our findings would be have been strengthened if instead, we had priced the return on
factors whose construction imposed a five-year data requirement as well.
The first regression of each panel in Table 2.7 first documents the extent of seasonality
in the CAPM alpha of the factors being considered. For TAX, HML, and SMB, a sig-
nificant portion of their average abnormal return occurs in January. For UMD, the strong
average returns outside of the turn of the year are partially offset by a very large negative
premium in January.
The second regression of each panel in Table 2.7 then demonstrates that variation in the
market’s tax-selling effect drives beta at the turn of the year. For the three factor portfolios
TAX, HML, and SMB, when the market’s forecasted tax-selling January rebound,−γ∗gM ,
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is relatively high, January betas are predictably relatively high as well.28 In each of these
cases, December betas are correspondingly relatively low, though only the SMB estimate
is statistically significant. As one might expect from the evidence in Table 2.1, we find the
opposite effect for the momentum portfolio. The January beta for the momentum portfolio
is predictably higher when the market’s tax-selling premium is relatively low. Since Table
2.6 shows that the market’s tax-selling premium forecasts the excess return on the market,
it is not surprising that controlling for this conditional beta effect reduces the absolute
magnitude of the alpha of these four trading strategies in January.
28For the sake of interpretability, we normalize the time-series γ ∗ gM so that the coefficients on RMRF
represent the average beta during the months in question and the coefficient on γ ∗ gM ∗ RMRF represent
the change in beta for a one standard deviation move in γ ∗ gM .
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Table 2.7: Portfolio Time-Series Regression Estimates (1954-2008)
We report the results from monthly regressions forecasting the CAPM alpha for four factor portfolios using
the portfolio-specific tax-selling capital gains overhang. RMRF,SMB,HML, and UMD are from Ken
French’s website. Our measurement of each factor’s capital gains overhang comes from portfolios that only
include stocks that have capital gains overhang data available. We interact RMRF with our measure of the
market’s capital gains overhang, gM , described in Table 2.6. Dummy variables corresponding to periods of
the year as well as our tax-selling premium variable, γ, are also included in the interactions. These dummy
variables as well as γ are defined in Table 2.2. γ ∗ gM is standardized for interpretability.
Panel A: TAX Panel B: HML
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept ∗ FN -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 0.002 0.002 0.003
(-14.32) (-14.70) (-10.32) (2.59) (2.55) (1.96)
Intercept ∗D -0.037 -0.032 -0.031 0.003 0.003 0.000
(-6.07) (-4.99) (-3.46) (1.00) (0.97) (0.06)
Intercept ∗ J 0.030 0.025 0.009 0.015 0.013 0.012
(4.95) (4.12) (0.96) (4.94) (4.35) (2.71)
γ ∗ g ∗ FN -0.036 0.019
(-0.28) (0.30)
γ ∗ g ∗D 0.038 -0.158
(0.11) (-0.88)
γ ∗ g ∗ J -1.124 -0.055
(-2.37) (-0.23)
RMRF ∗ FN 0.284 0.285 -0.165 -0.165
(6.35) (6.37) (-7.38) (-7.37)
RMRF ∗D 0.004 0.002 -0.159 -0.149
(0.02) (0.01) (-1.77) (-1.64)
RMRF ∗ J 0.261 0.224 -0.142 -0.144
(2.08) (1.77) (-2.27) (-2.28)
γ ∗ gM ∗RMRF ∗ FN -0.025 -0.026 0.022 0.023
(-1.03) (-1.05) (1.84) (1.86)
γ ∗ gM ∗RMRF ∗D -0.395 -0.387 -0.086 -0.120
(-2.41) (-2.14) (-1.05) (-1.32)
γ ∗ gM ∗RMRF ∗ J 0.382 0.268 0.090 0.084
(6.08) (3.38) (2.87) (2.13)
RMRF 0.297 -0.163
(7.15) (-8.07)
R2 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.12 0.13 0.13
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Table 2.7 (Continued)
Panel C: SMB Panel D: UMD
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept ∗ FN 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.008 0.008
(0.11) (0.00) (0.85) (5.57) (5.53) (3.73)
Intercept ∗D 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.020 0.017 0.014
(0.47) (0.90) (1.54) (4.02) (3.28) (1.95)
Intercept ∗ J 0.021 0.019 0.007 -0.016 -0.014 -0.006
(5.70) (5.16) (1.23) (-3.33) (-2.86) (-0.82)
γ ∗ g ∗ FN 0.090 -0.010
(1.17) (-0.10)
γ ∗ g ∗D 0.272 -0.152
(1.27) (-0.52)
γ ∗ g ∗ J -0.837 0.555
(-2.95) (1.43)
RMRF ∗ FN 0.127 0.125 -0.067 -0.067
(4.75) (4.69) (-1.85) (-1.84)
RMRF ∗D 0.015 -0.003 0.042 0.052
(0.14) (-0.03) (0.28) (0.35)
RMRF ∗ J 0.056 0.028 -0.019 -0.001
(0.74) (0.37) (-0.19) (-0.01)
γ ∗ gM ∗RMRF ∗ FN 0.032 0.034 0.074 0.074
(2.20) (2.30) (3.75) (3.73)
γ ∗ gM ∗RMRF ∗D -0.177 -0.119 0.356 0.324
(-1.80) (-1.11) (2.66) (2.20)
γ ∗ gM ∗RMRF ∗ J 0.162 0.077 -0.207 -0.151
(4.31) (1.64) (-4.05) (-2.33)
RMRF 0.114 -0.091
(4.64) (-2.70)
R2 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.12
Figure 2.3 uses higher-frequency estimates of the beta of the components of the TAX
bet to confirm that the link between the market risk of the TAX bet and the market’s fore-
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casted tax-selling January rebound return is particularly present in the days surrounding
the turn of the year. Specifically, Figure 2.3 graphs five-day rolling betas throughout De-
cember and January for low, middle, and high overhang quintile portfolios.29 When the
market has a relatively high forecasted January rebound because of both a large capital loss
in December and high tax and interest rates, low overhang stocks covary much more with
the market in the days subsequent to the turn of the year than do high overhang stocks.
Similarly, Figure 2.3 confirms that the predictability in daily returns and selling pres-
sure depends on the market’s expected January rebound return. Figure 2.3 shows that
patterns in both daily returns and selling pressure are stronger when the tax-selling effect
in the market return is stronger. Specifically, when the market’s expected January rebound
return, −γ ∗ gM , is large, low overhang stocks display much higher selling pressure in De-
cember and more strongly outperform high overhang stocks in January.30 Again these
results are more concentrated on the days very close to the turn of the year.
The third regression of each panel in Table 2.7 not only controls for time-varying beta
but also attributes a portion of the remaining conditional alpha to our strategy-specific tax
selling premium variable. We find that though January alphas remain economically and
29We compute betas for the capital gains overhang quintile portfolios as follows. Trading days are num-
bered (between -20 and +20) around the turn of each year such that 0 is the last trading day in December
and +1 is the first trading day in January. Betas are then computed versus the CRSP value-weighted market
portfolio for each trading day. Thus, the day(0) beta accounts for the covariance between quintile portfolio
returns and market returns on the last trading day of each year. This procedure yields a series of 41 trading
day betas for each quintile portfolio. We then use these series to compute trailing five-day moving averages
for each quintile portfolio.
Note that Figure 2.3 plots the daily moving average betas conditional on the market’s tax-selling alpha.
Thus, the procedure described above is slightly modified so that the trading day betas are computed sepa-
rately for years with positive versus negative expected January market rebound return. Our split compares
positive versus negative rather than simply high versus low values of the January rebound return to be con-
sistent with the corresponding regression (3) of Table 2.7 Panel A.
30The difference between the cumulative January return for the low overhang portfolio and the high over-
hang portfolio is 4.00% during years of a low expected January rebound return for the market and 8.72%
during years of a high expected January rebound return for the market. Each of these differences is statis-
tically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the difference between these cumulative returns of 4.72% is
significant at the 5% level (t-statistic of 2.09).
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Figure 2.3: January Returns of TAX factor
This figure plots the realized January returns on our TAX factor over the course of the sample. To form
TAX, each month we sort all NYSE stocks on our overhang measure and calculate 20th and 80th percentile
breakpoints. We then buy all NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks that are below the NYSE 20th percentile
and sell all NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks that are above the NYSE 80th percentile. The positions in the
long and short sides are value-weight. In each bin, we plot next to the realized January return, our forecast
of the expected January rebound based on the product of i) our tax-selling premium variable, γ, defined
in Table 2.2 and ii) the net overhang for the TAX factor, gTAX That forecast comes from the regression,
TAXJAN,t = a0 + a1γt−1gTAX,t−1 + εJAN,t. The estimate of a0 is 0.00192 (t-statistic of 0.14), the
estimate of a1 is -1.99 (t-statistic of -3.52), and the adjusted R2 is 17.7%.
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statistically significant, they are reduced significantly in the case of SMB and UMD. The
January alpha for SMB is reduced by 44%, while the January alpha for UMD is reduced
by 37%. Interestingly, for two of the three factors, SMB and UMD, the non-tax alpha from
February to November becomes statistically insignificant. However, the point estimate of
the HML non-tax alpha from February to November actually increases, though by less
than 13%.
In summary, Table 2.7 shows that a portion of the risk and abnormal return of the
Fama-French/Carhart non-market factors can be linked to our tax-selling premium, as the
tax-selling effect is strong in both market and factor portfolios. These findings have
important implications for those researchers examining economic stories describing time-
variation in the properties of these factors.31
2.5 Conclusion
Our framework implies that temporary distortion in stock prices may arise because of
the taxation of capital gains. In particular, we exploit the tradeoff a rational investor faces
when realizing tax losses (gains) this tax year instead of next tax year in the presence of
temporary downward (upward) price pressure. Optimal tax selling can generate stock
return overreaction at the end of the tax year and a corresponding reversal at the beginning
of the subsequent tax year. The magnitude of these predictable returns is not only a
function of a stock’s tax basis but also a function of interest rates and capital gains tax
rates, which together bound the temporary distortion. The vast amount of literature on
tax-selling at the turn of the year ignores time-series variation in the effect. The two
31For example, Chordia and Shivakumar (2004) argue that returns on momentum strategies can be ex-
plained once they are adjusted for the predictability of stock returns based on macroeconomic variables.
These variables include the interest rate which is an important component of our tax-selling premium.
Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) forecast returns on momentum strategies with the state of the market,
which they define as whether the past three-year return on the market is positive or negative. That defini-
tion is clearly related to our measure of market overhang, gM , that drives seasonal patterns in risk for the
momentum factor.
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previous papers (Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004))
that do examine time-series variation in the effect only look at variation resulting from the
tax rate. The interest rate channel that we identify generates significantly more variation
in the predicted magnitude of the effect than the tax rate channel (in fact, more than twice
as much).
A variety of empirical evidence confirms this prediction. We document patterns in
the cross-section of average returns at the turn of the tax year that are consistent with
our story. Our main tests use U.S. data, but additional tests using U.K. data provide an
important out-of-sample confirmation, as the U.K. tax and calendar year end differ. We
also identify trading patterns that are consistent with tax-motivated selling driving these
temporary movements in stock prices. Stocks with low capital gains overhang have more
selling pressure in individuals’ trades at the turn of the tax year than stocks with high
capital gains overhang, and this imbalance also varies with the same function of interest
rates and capital gains tax rates. Moreover, in the actual trades of investors using a large
discount brokerage, the tendency to harvest losses in December rather than in January also
varies with this bound. Finally, we find that these effects are also present in aggregate
returns. As a consequence, performance attribution at the turn of the year is not only
affected by the firm-level tradeoff, but also by distortion in measuring risk arising from
this tax-selling based common factor.
Interestingly, our emphasis on the importance of the interest rate also explains why
recent returns to strategies exploiting that phenomenon have been low. These low returns
are not due to savvy investors eliminating the effect, but instead are explained by the rather
low interest rates in the recent data. As interest rates rise, our formulation predicts that
the January effect should return.
Chapter 3
Inflation Risk in Corporate Bonds
3.1 Introduction
Corporate bonds in the developed world overwhelmingly carry fixed nominal face val-
ues and thus their real face values fluctuate with inflation. Given that corporate debt is
largely nominal, firms can be driven into default by either a decrease in real cash flows
or an increase in real liabilities. The literature has argued that real firm cash flow risk is
priced into corporate bond spreads. We find that inflation risk plays at least as large a role
in explaining variation in credit spreads.
The nominal nature of corporate liabilities leaves firms exposed to risk of debt defla-
tion (Fisher (1933)) with potentially important macroeconomic feedback effects (Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). We argue that credit spreads price the
time-varying risk of debt deflation even in developed countries with moderate inflation
environments.
Inflation risk could increase credit spreads in two ways. First, more volatile inflation
increases the ex ante probability that firms will default due to high real liabilities. Second,
when inflation and real cash flows are highly correlated, low real cash flows and high real
liabilities tend to hit firms at the same time, increasing default rates and real investor losses.
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Higher credit spreads reflect higher expected credit losses and the greater likelihood that
losses will occur in high marginal utility states.
There has been a close historical relationship between firms’ cost of debt finance and
inflation uncertainty in the United States, as shown in Figure 3.1.1 Both inflation uncer-
tainty and credit spreads were high in the 1970s and 1980s and decreased dramatically
during the 1990s. Our empirical results confirm this relationship in a panel of six de-
veloped countries, controlling for proxies for business conditions, real uncertainty and
time-varying risk aversion.
We formally derive new, testable implications of the impact of time-varying inflation
risk on credit spreads in a model with stochastic productivity and optimal but infrequent
capital structure choice. In simulated data, inflation risk explains a substantial fraction of
the variation in credit spreads, controlling for real uncertainty. Simulated credit spreads
increase by 26 basis points (bps) if the annualized standard deviation of inflation shocks
increases by 1 percentage point and by 20 bps if the inflation-stock return correlation
increases by 100 percentage points.
Three key features in our model generate large, dynamic responses of credit spreads to
inflation risk. First, we model both the size of inflation shocks and their correlation with
real outcomes as varying over time independently of real activity.
Second, we model nominal corporate bonds with long-term maturities and persistent
expected inflation, consistent with U.S. and international evidence (Ball and Cecchetti
(1990), Stock and Watson (2007)).2 Combined, these two assumptions imply that small
permanent shocks to inflation can have large effects on real liabilities. For instance, if log
1Figure 3.1 shows the Moody’s BAA over AAA credit spread and a smoothed dispersion of GDP deflator
forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Survey dispersion has been shown to be related to
subsequent inflation volatility (Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), Bomberger (1996)). Patton and Timmer-
mann (2010) show that inflation and growth forecasts are more dispersed when credit spreads are higher and
interpret this as evidence that forecasters’ beliefs are more dispersed during downturns.
2Our model takes as given the fact that most corporate bonds are nominal, implicitly assuming that
switching to inflation-indexed debt is too costly in developed country inflation environments. We find an
average ratio of floating rate to long-term debt of 28% for U.S. Compustat firms.
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Figure 3.1: Credit Spreads and Inflation Uncertainty in the U.S.
Quarterly BAA minus AAA corporate bond spread from Moody’s. Inflation uncertainty is the smoothed
difference between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile of one quarter ahead GDP Price Index inflation
forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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inflation permanently decreases from 3 percent per annum to 1 percent, the real face value
of a 10 year nominal bond at maturity increases by 22 percent.
Third, firms in our model refinance infrequently. This assumption is empirically well-
founded and helps to generate a realistic level of credit spreads. When firms can adjust
leverage, they choose optimally following a textbook tradeoff theory (Gourio (2011)).
When inflation risk raises the cost of debt finance, young firms in our overlapping gener-
ations model reduce leverage but old firms are unable to respond. Credit spreads of old
firms therefore display a substantially stronger initial response to inflation risk than do
those of new firms.
We provide new evidence that corporate bond investors price the risk of debt deflation
in a panel of corporate bond spread indices from Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States over four decades. A one standard deviation move
in inflation volatility is associated with an economically meaningful increase in credit
spreads of 16 bps, while a one standard deviation move in the inflation-stock correlation
is associated with a 13 bps increase in spreads. These movements are large relative to
average credit spreads of 100 bps.
Controlling for other influences on credit spreads, such as business cycle variables,
strengthens our results. Our proxies for inflation risk explain as much variation in credit
spreads as do equity volatility and the dividend-price ratio, our proxies for real uncertainty
and risk aversion. The empirical impact of inflation risk is especially large when real
stock returns are low or when inflation shocks are low. Firms also appear to change their
financing behavior in response to inflation risk. Consistent with theoretical predictions,
firms reduce leverage and increase the share of floating rate debt when inflation is more
uncertain.
Our empirical findings are consistent with financial markets perceiving an important
persistent component in inflation, which makes the long-run price level highly uncertain
and generates substantial inflation risk in long-run nominal assets. Our empirical results
are all the more striking given that the countries in our sample are developed countries
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with relatively moderate inflation experiences. The same mechanism should be even more
relevant in emerging markets with more volatile inflation.
While high inflation has been a major fear of central bankers and investors in developed
economies over the past forty years, a new concern has emerged recently: the danger of
a deflationary collapse in aggregate demand. The impact of deflationary fears on firms’
borrowing costs becomes especially relevant if investors believe that policymakers will
be unable to counteract deflation should there be another recession. Our estimates as of
October 2011 suggest that 35 bps of the 126 bps U.S. credit spread can be attributed to the
currently high inflation-stock correlation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief literature review,
Section 3.2 introduces the model. We derive firms’ optimal default behavior as a function
of leverage, real shocks and inflation shocks. Section 3.3 argues that inflation risk should
be quantitatively important for credit spreads in a calibrated version of the model. Section
3.4 tests the empirical predictions from the model in an international panel of credit spread
indices, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1.1 Literature Review
This paper builds naturally on Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2011) and Pflueger
and Viceira (2011) who show that inflation risk is priced into default free government
bonds. Time variation in inflation volatility was first modeled by Engle (1982). There is
also substantial evidence from the bond market that the cyclicality of inflation has changed
over time (Li (2002), Baele, Bekaert, and Inghelbrecht (2009), David and Veronesi (2009),
Viceira (2010), Wright (2010), Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2011)).
This paper also speaks to a large literature on the empirical determinants of corporate
bond spreads by showing that inflation risk can help explain variation in credit spreads.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Campbell and Taksler (2003) show
that aggregate and idiosyncratic equity volatility are priced into corporate bond spreads.
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We add to previous structural models of credit risk such as Merton (1974), and Longstaff
and Schwartz (1995) by allowing the risk of inflation to vary over time. We also contribute
to the wide literature on asset pricing models with optimal leverage and default by arguing
that firms should adjust their capital structure in response to time-varying inflation risk
(Leland and Toft (1996), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Hackbarth, Miao, and Morel-
lec (2006), Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2009), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev
(2010a), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010b), Gomes and Schmid (2010), Gourio
(2011)). Our analysis of inflation risk and firm capital structure has analogies to house-
holds’ optimal mortgage choice under inflation risk (Campbell and Cocco (2003), Koijen,
van Hemert, and van Nieuwerburgh (2009)) but differs in that all assets are priced by the
same representative investor.
This paper is closely related to recent models of monetary policy when firms’ liabilities
are nominal (Bhamra, Fisher, and Kuehn (2011), De Fiore and Tristani (2011)). Our model
highlights inflation volatility and inflation cyclicality as driving credit risk and has directly
testable predictions. Transition dynamics in our model increase the quantitative impact of
inflation risk on credit spreads.
3.2 A Dynamic Model of Inflation Risk in Corporate Bonds
In this section, we motivate and describe the formal model. We assume for simplicity
that all corporate bond issuance is long-term and nominal. In reality firms might adjust
to changing inflation risk by issuing inflation-indexed corporate debt or by shortening
their maturity structure, even though this adjustment is likely to come at a cost. Such
costs could include rollover risk (He and Xiong (2010), Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer
(2010)), short-term variability in real payments (Campbell and Cocco (2003)) or liquidity
premia, such as those documented for government inflation-indexed bonds (DAmico, Kim,
and Wei (2008), Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and Lustig (2010), Pflueger and Viceira (2011)).
We implicitly assume that in a developed economy inflation environment these costs are
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prohibitive and firms choose to issue only nominal long-term debt.
3.2.1 Intuition: Contingent Claim Payoff Profiles
We illustrate our basic predictions by comparing the real payoff profiles of a nominal
default-free and a nominal corporate bond in Figure 3.2. Black and Scholes (1973) and
Merton (1974) show that owning a corporate bond is equivalent to owning a default-free
bond and selling a put on the company’s underlying assets.3
Figures 3.2(A) and 3.2(B) show that when inflation is more uncertain we predict higher
credit spreads to reflect the increased payoff gap between corporate and default-free bonds.
Figure 3.2(B) shows real conditional expected payoffs, averaged over different inflation
levels, when inflation is uncertain but uncorrelated with real assets. When inflation is
uncertain the default probability is nonzero for any underlying real asset value, and hence
the payoff gap increases relative to the case with no inflation uncertainty.
Comparing Figures 3.2(C) and 3.2(D) shows that when inflation is procyclical, credit
spreads should be higher. In Figure 3.2(C), inflation is high in booms, low in recessions,
and perfectly correlated with real assets. The default-free nominal bond pays out especially
well during recessions. The firm is more likely to default and it defaults on higher real
face values, increasing expected losses for corporate bond investors. The gap between
default-free and corporate bonds is especially large when real asset values are low, making
corporate bond losses even riskier for risk-averse investors and potentially adding a risk
premium component to corporate bond spreads.
3For simplicity in Figure 3.2 both the defaultable and default-free bonds are zero coupon with a fixed
and equal nominal face value. The representative firm defaults when the real asset value falls below the real
face value of liabilities and in default bond holders become the residual claimants on the firm’s assets.
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Figure 3.2: Contingent Claim Payoff Profiles
Expected real payoffs of nominal default-free and nominal corporate bonds. Expected real payoffs are
conditional on the underlying real asset value and averaged over inflation realizations. Inflation volatility
is set to zero in Panel A. Inflation is uncorrelated with real asset values in Panel B. Inflation shocks are
perfectly positively correlated with asset values in Panel C and perfectly negatively correlated with asset
values in Panel D.
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3.2.2 Timing of Cohort t
We model overlapping generations of firms, with each firm producing for two periods.
Firms cannot adjust their capital structure in the intermediate period, so leverage is sticky.4
Figure 3.3 illustrates the timing for a firm that enters at the end of period t. At the end
of period t the firm chooses its face value of nominal two-period debt B$t and purchases
capital Kyt+1, which will be available for production at time t+ 1. The firm’s newly issued
corporate bonds have two periods remaining to maturity.
Figure 3.3: Timeline of Firm Cohort t
In period t + 1, aggregate productivity and inflation shocks are realized. Each firm
experiences an idiosyncratic shock to its capital stock and produces. The firm is unable to
adjust its capital structure. The firm’s seasoned corporate bonds have one period remaining
to maturity.
In period t + 2, firms again receive shocks and produce. At the end of period t + 2,
equity holders decide whether to default. Equity and debt holders receive payments.
4For empirical evidence on sticky leverage see Baker and Wurgler (2002), Welch (2004) and Leary and
Roberts (2005).
Chapter 3: Inflation Risk in Corporate Bonds 90
3.2.3 Production
Firms produce according to a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital and labor
inputs. At time t, firm i with capital Kit and labor N
i
t produces output Y
i
t
Y it =
(
ztN
i
t
)1−α (
Kit
)α (3.1)
Total factor productivity (TFP) zt is independently and identically distributed around
trend growth
zt+1 = exp (µt) exp
(
εTFPt+1 −
1
2
σ2
)
(3.2)
εTFPt+1
iid∼ N (0, σ2) (3.3)
We calibrate one time period to correspond to 5 years, which is close to business cycle
frequency, so independent TFP shocks are a reasonable approximation. TFP trend µ is
also the equilibrium trend growth rate for output and consumption in the economy.
Firm i chooses its labor input optimally to maximize single period operating revenue,
taking the aggregate wage rate Wt as given.
N it = arg max
N it
 Y it −WtN it︸ ︷︷ ︸
Operating Revenue
 (3.4)
We assume that the aggregate supply of labor is fixed at 1, abstracting from unemploy-
ment. In equilibrium, the aggregate wage adjusts to ensure clearing of the labor market.
We define aggregate output, capital, labor and investment at time t by integrating over
all firms
Yt =
∫
i
Y it di, Kt =
∫
i
Kitdi, Nt =
∫
i
N itdi, It =
∫
i
I itdi (3.5)
Capital depreciates at a constant rate δ: Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt. We impose the resource
constraint that total output is equal to the sum of aggregate consumption and investment
Yt = Ct + It (3.6)
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Solving for the equilibrium hiring policy, total output at time t is given by Yt =
z1−αt K
α
t . Young and old firms are heterogenous in their capital stock. The constant re-
turns to scale production technology implies that the return on capital from time t to time
t+ 1 is identical across firms and equal to
RKt+1 =
[
α
(
zt+1
Kt+1
)1−α
+ (1− δ)
]
(3.7)
From (4.2) the expected level and the volatility of real returns on capital are endoge-
nously higher when the capital stock Kt+1 is low relative to trend.
3.2.4 Inflation
The economy is subject to inflation surprises, whose relationship with productivity
shocks can change over time. Let Pt the price level at time t and pit log inflation from time
t− 1 to time t with
pit = log (Pt/Pt−1) (3.8)
Consistent with U.S. and international empirical evidence (e.g. Stock and Watson
(2007), Ball and Cecchetti (1990)), we model expected log inflation as following a random
walk. The dynamics of expected inflation resemble a backward-looking Phillips curve,
consistent with empirical evidence (Fuhrer (1997)). Inflation persistence implies that un-
certainty about the price level increases with the time horizon, so inflation risk should be
larger for longer maturity bonds.5
pit+1 = pit + ε
pi
t+1 (3.9)
εpit+1
∣∣σpit+1 ∼ N (0, (σpit+1)2) (3.10)
Corr
(
εpit+1, ε
TFP
t+1
∣∣ ρpit+1) = ρpit+1 (3.11)
5It is important for our quantitative results that expected inflation is persistent. The assumption of an
exact random walk is primarily for analytical tractability.
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Higher σpit implies more uncertainty about the price level. When ρ
pi
t is positive, the
relationship between inflation and real activity is upward sloping similarly to an upward-
sloping Phillips curve. When ρpit is negative, the Phillips curve is unstable potentially due
to supply shocks or to shifting inflation expectations.
We model time variation in σpit and ρ
pi
t in the simplest possible manner by assuming
that they follow two-state Markov switching processes, independent of each other and of
all other shocks in the economy. Inflation uncertainty σpit and inflation cyclicality ρ
pi
t each
take a low or a high value
σpit ∈
{
σpi,L, σpi,H
}
(3.12)
ρpit ∈
{
ρpi,L, ρpi,H
}
(3.13)
We write the probabilities of going from state σpi,X to σpi,Y and of going from state ρpi,X to
ρpi,Y as
p
(
σpi,X → σpi,Y ) (3.14)
p
(
ρpi,X → ρpi,Y ) (3.15)
3.2.5 Default Decision
A firm’s default decision depends on its initial level of debt, aggregate real shocks,
aggregate nominal shocks and idiosyncratic real shocks. Corporate debt promises a fixed
nominal payment after two periods, when the firm pays a liquidating dividend.
We denote logs by small letters throughout. All firms in cohort t are identical ex ante
and choose the same initial log leverage ratio lt where b$t is the log nominal face value of
debt
lt = b
$
t − 2pit − kyt+1 (3.16)
Surprise inflation decreases the log real liabilities of an old firm at time t + 2. The
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inflation shock in period t+ 1 enters twice because of inflation persistence.
breal,oldt+2 = lt + k
y
t+1 − 2εpit+1 − εpit+2 (3.17)
Firm i in cohort t experiences identical and independent idiosyncratic shocks to log
capital at times t + 1 and t + 2. We denote by ai,idt+2 the sum of time t + 1 and t + 2
idiosyncratic shocks to firm i. Constant returns to scale production technology and firms’
inability to make any capital structure decisions in the intermediate period imply that only
the combined idiosyncratic shock ai,idt+2 affects the real firm value at time t+ 2. We assume
ai,idt+2 ∼ N
(
−1
2
(
σid
)2
,
(
σid
)2)
(3.18)
The aggregate level of capital is unaffected by idiosyncratic shocks. Using (4.2) the log
real value of an old firm at the end of period t+ 2 equals
vi,oldt+2 = k
y
t+1 + r
K
t+1 + r
K
t+2 + a
i,id
t+2 (3.19)
Equity holders have the option to default on debt payments and to receive a zero liqui-
dating dividend. They optimally decide to default if and only if the real value of the firm
(4.7) is less than its real liabilities (3.17). 6 Conditional on aggregate shocks, firms with
the most adverse idiosyncratic shocks default
ai,idt+2 < lt − 2εpit+1 − εpit+2 − rKt+1 − rKt+2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Survival Threshold a∗t+2
(3.20)
Equation (3.20) formalizes the intuition developed in the introduction. Low inflation
shocks εpit+1 and ε
pi
t+2 increase the survival threshold a
∗
t+2 and the default rate. Low pro-
ductivity shocks at times t+ 1 and t+ 2 lower real returns on capital and also increase the
rate of defaults.
6The firm never finds it optimal to default in its intermediate period because no debt payments come due
during the intermediate period.
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3.2.6 Stochastic Discount Factor
There exists a representative consumer with expected power utility over consumption,
risk aversion γ, and discount rate β
Ut = Et
∞∑
s=t
exp (−β (s− t)) C
1−γ
s
1− γ (3.21)
The two-period stochastic discount factors used for pricing two-period real and nomi-
nal payoffs are respectively
Mt,t+2 = exp (−2β) (Ct+2/Ct)−γ (3.22)
M$t,t+2 = Mt,t+2/ exp
(
2pit + 2ε
pi
t+1 + ε
pi
t+2
)
(3.23)
3.2.7 Capital Structure Choice
Firms choose leverage according to a standard tradeoff view of capital structure. We
follow Gourio (2011) in assuming that firms receive benefits χ > 1 for each dollar of debt
issued. Equity holders of cohort t firms choose capital Kyt+1 and nominal liabilities B
$
t
subject to the budget constraint
Kyt+1 = St + χqtB
$
t (3.24)
St is the value of new equity at time t and qt is the price of two-period nominal bonds
at time t. For a higher benefit of debt χ, equity holders have a stronger incentive to raise
leverage.
Some authors have argued that tax benefits explain only a portion of observed lever-
age ratios (Graham (2000)), while others have argued that tax benefits are comparable
in magnitude to bankruptcy costs (Almeida and Philippon (2007)). We interpret χ as
including more general benefits and costs of debt, such as constraining managers from
empire-building and reducing informational asymmetries (Jensen and Meckling (1976),
Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), Jensen (1986)).
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The benefits of debt are counteracted by bankruptcy costs. We assume that debt in-
vestors only recover a constant fraction θ < 1 of firm value in bankruptcy, see also Leland
(1994). When the recovery rate θ is lower equity holders have an incentive to choose lower
leverage. An interior optimal leverage ratio exists if bankruptcy costs are sufficiently large
relative to debt benefits. We formally assume that θχ < 1 ((Gourio (2011)).
By imposing the resource constraint (3.6) we follow (Gourio (2011)) in implicitly as-
suming that bankruptcy costs and debt benefits are redistributive and do not have a direct
effect on output. This is a simplifying assumption and its effect in the model should be
small, as long as time variation in default rates and nominal leverage ratios is small.
Let the functionsH , h, and Ω give the default probability, marginal default probability,
and average defaulted firm value conditional on the survival threshold a∗t+2
H
(
a∗t+2
)
= P
(
ai,idt+2 < a
∗
t+2
)
(3.25)
h
(
a∗t+2
)
= H ′
(
a∗t+2
)
(3.26)
Ω
(
a∗t+2
)
= E
(
exp
(
ai,idt+2
)
I
(
ai,idt+2 < a
∗
t+2
))
(3.27)
where I denotes the indicator function. The price of a nominal long-term corporate
bond at time t then equals the expected discounted value of cash flows. A lower default
probability H
(
a∗t+2
)
and a higher expected recovery θ
Ω(a∗t+2)
exp(a∗t+2)
increase the ex ante price
of the bond.
qt = Et
M$t,t+2
1−H (a∗t+2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Default Rate
+ θ
Ω
(
a∗t+2
)
exp
(
a∗t+2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Recovery

 (3.28)
Equity holders equate the marginal benefit of raising another dollar of debt with the
increase in bankruptcy costs according to the first-order condition
0 = −χ (1− θ)Et
(
M$t,t+2h
(
a∗t+2
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Bankruptcy Cost
+ (χ− 1)Et
(
M$t,t+2
(
1−H (a∗t+2)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Benefit of Debt
(3.29)
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Firms choose the optimal level of capital, yielding the first-order condition
1 = Et
[
Mt,t+2R
K
t+1R
K
t+2Ft+2
]
(3.30)
Ft+2 = 1− (1− θχ) Ω
(
a∗t+2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bankruptcy Cost
+ (χ− 1) exp (a∗t+2) (1−H (a∗t+2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit of Debt
(3.31)
The Euler equation (4.11) says that the expected discounted return on capital, adjusted
for bankruptcy costs and benefits of debt by the factor Ft+2, equals 1.
Inflation affects the first-order conditions (4.13) and (4.11) through its impact on the
survival threshold a∗t+2. When inflation is more volatile or more procyclical the default
threshold becomes more volatile and marginal bankruptcy costs increase in (4.13). While
equity holders do not incur any bankruptcy costs upon default, debt investors require com-
pensation for bankruptcy costs ex ante, incentivizing firms to reduce leverage ratios.
3.3 Calibrated Model
3.3.1 Parameter Values and Model Moments
We present two model calibrations, which solve for the effects of inflation volatility
and inflation cyclicality individually. Model 1 focuses on stochastic inflation volatility
and holds the correlation between inflation shocks and TFP shocks constant at 0. Model
2 holds the volatility of inflation constant but assumes that the inflation-TFP correlation
varies.
We focus on moderate inflation volatility to highlight the relevance of inflation risk for
credit spreads even in a stable inflation environment. In Model 1 the standard deviation of
annual inflation expectation shocks switches between 0% and 2%. The higher volatility of
2% corresponds approximately to the U.S. experience in the early 1980s and is fifty percent
smaller than the U.K. inflation volatility during the late 1970s according to our empirical
estimates. To focus on the impact of inflation volatility we set the inflation-TFP correlation
to zero. Volatility states are persistent, consistent with a five year autoregressive coefficient
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for U.S. inflation volatility of 0.5. The volatility process spends about two-thirds of its time
in the low state.
In Model 2 we assume that the inflation-TFP correlation follows a symmetric pro-
cess, switching between −0.6 and 0.6, within the range of our empirical estimates for the
inflation-stock return correlation in developed countries.7 We study the impact of inflation
cyclicality with moderate inflation uncertainty of 1% p.a. The average duration for each
state is 15 years, consistent with three different regimes over a forty year period.
Parameter values are summarized in Table 3.1. We face a tradeoff in choosing the
length of the time period. Five year time periods imply that seasoned corporate bond du-
rations are slightly shorter than their empirical counterparts and that firm leverage and
investment are constant for ten year periods.8 We choose standard values for the capital
share, depreciation and the discount rate (Cooley and Prescott (1995)). We choose a risk
aversion of 10; the upper bound of plausible coefficients of risk aversion considered by
Mehra and Prescott (1985). As argued before in Figure 3.2 a high risk aversion is not cru-
cial for our results. We constrain trend growth to be equal to average U.S. real GDP growth
between 1970 and 2009. The recovery rate in bankruptcy equals 40%, consistent with the
empirical evidence in Altman (2006).9 The debt benefit parameter is a free parameter and
we choose χ = 1.4 to generate empirically plausible default rates. Almeida and Philippon
(2007) calculate that tax benefits account for approximately 16% of the debt value, so our
high benefits incorporate significant agency benefits of debt.
7See Table 3.4.
8Welch (2004) finds that the mechanistic effects of stock returns can explain about 40% of movements in
leverage ratios over a five-year horizon. Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that corporations are likely to raise
more equity when their market valuations are relatively higher and that these effects can explain leverage
ten years out.
9A recovery rate in the range of 40% to 50% is also consistent with the evidence in Cremers, Driessen,
and Maenhout (2008), Glover (2011) and Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009).
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Table 3.1: Model Parameters
* denotes parameters reported in per annum units. Annualized inflation volatility is the standard deviation
of a one year inflation shock. Given that the state at time t is X, p(X→ X) denotes the probability that the
state at time t+1 is also X.
General Parameters
Period Length 5 years
Discount Rate β 3%*
Risk Aversion γ 10
Capital Share α 0.33
Depreciation δ 8%*
Trend Growth µ 2.8%*
Volatility of TFP Shock σ 26%*
Recovery Rate θ 0.40
Tax Benefit of Debt χ 1.40
Idiosyncratic Volatility σid 17%*
Model 1: Time-Varying Inflation Volatility
Inflation-TFP Correlation ρpi 0.00
High Inflation Volatility σpi,H 2%*
Low Inflation Volatility σpi,L 0%*
Persistence of σpi,H p(σpi,H → σpi,H) 0.60
Persistence of σpi,L p(σpi,L → σpi,L) 0.80
Model 2: Time-Varying Inflation TFP Correlation
Inflation Volatility σpi 1%*
High Inflation-TFP Correlation ρpi,H 0.60
Low Inflation-TFP Correlation ρpi,L -0.60
Persistence of ρpi,H p(ρpi,H → ρpi,H) 0.70
Persistence of ρpi,L p(ρpi,L → ρpi,L) 0.70
Table 3.2 reports calibrated asset price moments together with empirical U.S. moments
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from 1970 to 2009.10 The high volatility of TFP shocks and idiosyncratic shocks generate
plausible levels of aggregate and idiosyncratic equity market volatility. We do not attempt
to explain the equity volatility puzzle (Shiller (1971), LeRoy and Porter (1981)), which can
be resolved if consumption and dividend growth contain a time-varying long-run compo-
nent (e.g. Bansal and Yaron (2004)) or if preferences induce persistent fluctuations in risk
premia (e.g. Campbell and Cochrane (1999)).
Table 3.2: Empirical and Model Moments
Empirical moments correspond to U.S. data from 1970 to 2009. Equity volatility is the standard deviation
of 10 year log nominal equity returns minus the 10 year log nominal government yield. Firm volatility is
the standard deviation of idiosyncratic 10 year log nominal stock returns of non-defaulted firms. The equity
premium is the average 10 year log nominal equity return minus the 10 year log nominal government yield
(adjusted for Jensen’s Inequality). Seasoned credit spreads are computed as the Moody’s BAA minus AAA
corporate bond index yield. The historical default probability for 10 year investment grade bonds is from
Almeida and Philippon (2007) for the U.S. between 1970 and 2001. Leverage is the aggregate book leverage
ratio computed as long-term debt plus short-term debt divided by total assets from Compustat.
Empirical Model 1 Model 2
U.S. 1970-2009 Time-Varying σpi Time-Varying ρpi
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 18.4% 18.5% 18.0%
Firm Volatility (% Ann.) 47.2% 29.3% 29.0%
Equity Premium (% Ann.) 2.90% 7.82% 7.83%
ygov,10t − rt 2.50% 2.80% 2.72%
ygov,10t − ygov,5t 0.25% 1.16% 1.08%
New Credit Spread 1.18% 1.23%
Seasoned Credit Spread 1.01% 1.64% 1.53%
Default Probability 0.52% 0.45% 0.40%
Leverage 25% 41% 40%
We interpret model leverage to include a broad range of liabilities, including pension li-
10We simulate 250 runs of length 100. Both model and empirical equity returns are defined as 10 year log
nominal equity returns in excess of the continuously compounded ten year nominal interest rate.
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abilities and leases, which lead model book leverage to differ from our empirical proxy for
book leverage. Pension obligations played a significant role for firms seeking bankruptcy
protection during the 2000s, illustrating their relevance for credit risk.11
We compare the average Moody’s BAA over AAA spread, which is based on sec-
ondary market prices rather than prices at issuance, to the model seasoned credit spread.
Recent papers have argued that structural models of credit risk can only explain a small
portion of empirical credit spreads while matching historically low default rates (Huang
and Huang (2002)). We obtain high credit spreads with plausible default rates due to
volatile TFP shocks and to high risk aversion. Leverage ratios of model seasoned firms
are heterogeneous across firms and credit spreads are convex in leverage ratios, so the
cross-section of firms further raises average credit spreads (Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebu-
laev (2010a), and (Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev 2010b)).
In the calibrated model, we can quantify how large a liquidity premium on inflation-
indexed debt is required so firms prefer issuing nominal debt over inflation-indexed debt.
Assume that the benefits from corporate inflation protected securities (CIPS) are less than
those on nominal corporate bonds χCIPS < χ. In annualized 10 year CIPS yields this
translates into a liquidity premium of logχ−logχ
CIPS
10
relative to annualized 10 year nominal
corporate bond yields.
The survival threshold for a deviating firm that decides to issue CIPS instead of nomi-
nal bonds does not depend on surprise inflation and it chooses optimal leverage according
to a first-order condition analogous to (4.13). The deviating firm takes the stochastic dis-
count factor Mt,t+2 and the aggregate return on capital rKt+1, r
K
t+2 as given. Equity investor
are unwilling to invest into the deviating firm if and only if the expected discounted return
on capital, adjusted for default costs and benefits of debt, is less than that for the aggregate
firm
Et
[
Mt+2R
K
t+1R
K
t+2F
CIPS
t+2
]
< Et
[
Mt+2R
K
t+1R
K
t+2Ft+2
]
(3.32)
11See Maynard (2005) for pension negotiations in United Air’s bankruptcy. Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)
argue that firms’ equity risk reflects the risk of a firm’s pension plan.
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where FCIPSt+2 is defined analogously to Ft+2,. When (3.32) holds, no firm decides to
issue inflation-indexed debt in equilibrium.
In Model 1, no firm switches to inflation-indexed debt if inflation-indexed bonds com-
mand a liquidity premium of at least 29 bps. The corresponding threshold in Model 2 is
22 bps. These bounds on liquidity premia are in line with estimated liquidity premia on 10
year U.S. Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (Pflueger and Viceira (2012)).
3.3.2 Model Implications for Credit Spreads
Figure 3.4 illustrates the relationship between credit risk, inflation risk, inflation shocks
and stock returns implied by the model. The asymmetric nature of credit risk suggests that
inflation risk should affect corporate bond spreads most strongly when credit risk is already
high, whether this is due to adverse real or nominal shocks. Throughout this section we
focus on seasoned credit spreads, which take into account non-optimal and heterogeneous
firm leverage ratios and correspond most closely to empirical secondary market prices of
corporate debt. We plot average seasoned credit spreads and default rates against stock
returns and inflation shocks when inflation volatility is time-varying (Panel A) and when
inflation cyclicality is time-varying (Panel B).12
As shown in Figure 3.4(A), default rates and credit spreads increase in periods with
high inflation volatility, especially when stock returns are low and when inflation is sur-
prisingly low. The intuition is that the put option in defaultable bonds is significantly larger
when inflation is volatile, similarly to the contingent claim payoff in Figure 3.2(B).
Figure 3.4(B) shows that when inflation is procyclical, simulated average defaults and
credit spreads are higher. Analogously to the contingent claim payoff plots in Figures
3.2(C) and 3.2(D), expected defaults are small for a large range of stock returns but in-
crease rapidly for negative stock returns. This increase is more pronounced for the pro-
cyclical inflation regime. Credit spreads in the procyclical inflation regime also decrease
12We simulate 500 runs of length 100.
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in the shock to inflation expectations. Intuitively, corporate bonds are especially exposed
to downside inflation risk.
Figure 3.5 shows dynamic responses of new and seasoned credit spreads, new book
leverage, and investment to a shock to inflation risk. 13 Seasoned credit spreads increase
substantially in response to a shock to either the inflation volatility or the inflation-TFP
correlation. Seasoned credit spreads subsequently mean-revert because firms are gradually
able to adjust their leverage ratios, counteracting the direct effect of the shock on seasoned
credit spreads. Endogenous choice of leverage also implies that new credit spreads do not
move with inflation risk. The investment to capital ratio does not react to an increase in
inflation risk because the increase in bankruptcy costs in the Euler equation (4.11) is small.
To better understand the quantitative impact of inflation risk on model credit spreads,
we run regressions on simulated data. Table 3.3 shows regressions of model seasoned
credit spreads onto inflation risk, real risk, inflation shocks, and real shocks. We choose
our variables to resemble empirical proxies as closely as possible. We include the model-
implied inflation-stock correlation, which is endogenous and closely related to the inflation-
TFP correlation, as a proxy for inflation risk in Table 3.3(B).14
13We average over 62,500 simulations of length ten with a full set of macroeconomic shocks in the back-
ground. In Panel A, inflation volatility jumps to the high value of 2% p.a. from its steady state distribution
in period 0. Inflation volatility mean reverts to its stochastic steady state in periods 1 through 7. Panel B is
constructed similarly.
14Empirical observations may be correlated over time and across countries, making it hard to map the
length of a simulated regression into an empirical number of observations. We report means and standard
deviations of regression slopes on simulated data of length 100. The simulation size corresponding approx-
imately to 40 years of independent bi-annual data from five countries. To ensure that regressors are never
perfectly collinear we add small measurement errors to the inflation shock and inflation risk variables. The
standard deviations of the model measurement errors are approximately 2% of the standard deviations of the
underlying parameters.
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Figure 3.4: Model Credit Spreads, Stock Returns and Inflation Shocks
Simulated average credit spreads and default rates versus stock returns and inflation shocks. In Panel A,
inflation volatility switches between 0% p.a. and 2% p.a., and inflation is uncorrelated with TFP shocks. In
Panel B, inflation volatility is constant at 1% p.a., and the inflation-TFP correlation switches between -0.6
and 0.6.
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Figure 3.5: Model Impulse Responses
In period 0 of Panel A, the inflation volatility jumps from its stochastic steady state to 2% p.a. and mean
reverts in subsequent periods. In Panel A, the inflation-TFP correlation is constant at zero. In period 0 of
Panel B, the inflation-TFP correlation jumps from its stochastic steady state to 0.6. In Panel B, inflation
volatility is constant at 1% p.a. Impulse responses are averaged over 62,500 simulations.
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Table 3.3: Model Credit Spread Regressions
Equity returns are one-period log seasoned equity returns. Inflation shocks are one-period changes in log
inflation expectations. Equity return volatility is the standard deviation of log real returns on seasoned
equity. The inflation-stock correlation is the correlation between log seasoned equity returns and shocks to
log inflation expectations. The dividend-price ratio is the expected return on seasoned equity. In Panel A,
inflation volatility switches between 0% p.a. and 2% p.a., and the inflation-TFP correlation is zero. In Panel
B, inflation volatility is constant at 1% p.a., and the inflation-TFP correlation switches between -0.6 and 0.6.
Panel A: Time-Varying Inflation Volatility (Model 1)
Equity Return (% Ann.) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation Shock (% Ann.) -0.11 -0.10 -0.11
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.08 0.02
(0.07) (0.07)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.17 0.29
(0.15) (0.14)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.26
(0.11)
Constant 2.39 2.26 1.06 1.29
(0.29) (0.14) (0.49) (0.50)
R2 0.27 0.76 0.83 0.86
Panel B: Time-Varying Inflation-TFP Correlation (Model 2)
Equity Return (% Ann.) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation Shock (% Ann.) -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
0.01 (0.01) (0.01)
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.11 0.05
(0.04) (0.06)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.12 0.24
(0.11) (0.14)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.20
(0.13)
Constant 2.25 2.18 0.83 1.22
(0.18) (0.12) (0.31) (0.41)
R2 0.31 0.72 0.80 0.81
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Table 3.3(A) shows that time-varying inflation volatility contributes to time variation in
model credit spreads. The equity return, the inflation shock, equity volatility, the dividend-
price ratio and inflation volatility enter with the expected signs. Since firms are unable
to adjust leverage in the intermediate period, lagged equity returns and inflation shocks
proxy for seasoned firms’ leverage ratios. They can jointly account for three fourths of
all variation in seasoned credit spreads. It is unsurprising that we can explain almost all
variation in seasoned credit spreads because the simulation generates model credit spreads
as a function of real and nominal shocks. At the same time we would not expect this result
to carry over to our empirical analysis, especially if empirical nominal and real shocks are
imperfectly measured.
The slope with respect to inflation volatility is positive and large. A one percentage
point increase in the standard deviation of annual inflation shocks on leads to an econom-
ically significant increase in credit spreads of 26 bps. When adding inflation volatility to
the model regression in Table 3.3(A), the R2 increases by three percentage points to 86%.
Inflation cyclicality also has a substantial effect on model credit spreads in Table
3.3(B). The credit spread increases by 20 bps as the inflation-stock return correlation in-
creases by 100 percentage points. The R2 increases by one additional percentage point.
Taken together, our model credit spreads are highly sensitive to inflation risk even for
moderate levels of inflation volatility. Increases in either inflation volatility or inflation
cyclicality induce substantial increases in seasoned credit spreads and lead firms to reduce
their leverage ratios. Endogenous adjustment in leverage implies that credit spreads mean
revert after a shock to inflation risk. The model predicts that the impact of inflation risk on
credit spreads is asymmetric and largest in periods of low stock returns and in periods of
negative shocks to inflation expectations.
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3.4 Empirical Tests
We test the model predictions in an international panel of credit spread indices. We
construct empirical credit spreads, inflation volatility and inflation-stock correlations for a
panel of six developed economies: Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the
U.S. Time-series and cross-country variation in inflation risk are substantial, allowing us
to test the predictions in this international context.
Our baseline regressions test the key prediction that corporate bond spreads should be
higher on average when inflation is more volatile or more procyclical, while controlling
for other factors that are likely to enter into credit spreads.
3.4.1 Data Description
We obtain corporate bond yield indices, government bond yield indices, GDP growth,
stock returns and CPI inflation from Global Financial Data (GFD).15 Corporate bond
spread indices with approximate durations between 5 and 15 years are the difference
between corporate bond yields and comparable duration government bond yields, both
continuously compounded.16
We use the Moody’s BAA over AAA corporate bond spread for the U.S. to control for
time-varying liquidity. Comparable data are not available internationally, but international
15According to GFD, the original sources for government bond yields are the Reserve Bank of Aus-
tralia, Bank of Canada, Deutsche Bundesbank, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, and Federal Reserve Bank.
The original inflation sources are the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Canada, German Statistis-
ches Bundesamt, Japanese Statistics Bureau, UK Central Statistical Office, and US Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. Stock returns correspond to the following equity indices: Australia ASX Accumulation Index, Canada
S&P/TSX-300 Total Return Index, Germany CDAX Total Return Index, Japan Topix Total Return Index,
United Kingdom FTSE All-Share Return Index, and United States S&P 500 Total Return Index. We are
extremely grateful to Yoichi Matsubayashi for providing us with Japanese corporate bond yield data.
16Durations are estimated from bond maturities assuming that bonds sell at par following Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), p. 408. The U.S. credit spread is computed as the Moody’s BAA over AAA
credit spread to adjust for liquidity and tax effects. For a description of the Moody’s credit spreads, see
http://credittrends.moodys.com/chartroom.asp?r=3. Table 4.9 in the Appendix lists further details on the
corporate bond data sources and durations.
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government bond markets may also not enjoy the extreme liquidity of U.S. Treasuries,
so the liquidity differential between government bonds and corporate bonds is likely to
be smaller. 17 Corporate bond spreads during the financial crisis plausibly also indicated
heightened credit risk, as evidenced by the fact that in 2009 5.4% of all Moody’s rated
corporate bond issuers defaulted (Moodys (2011)). Note that the structure of corporate
bond markets varies significantly across countries.18
We obtain empirical proxies for each country’s equity volatility, inflation volatility, and
inflation-stock correlation using rolling backward-looking three year windows of quarterly
real stock returns and inflation innovations. Unexpected inflation is the residual from a re-
gression of quarterly log inflation onto its own four lags and seasonal dummies. Quarterly
real stock return shocks are obtained as the residual from regressing quarterly real stock
returns onto their own first lag.
We interpret the time variation in our ability to forecast inflation as a measure of infla-
tion volatility. Stock and Watson (2008) argue that the performance of auto-regressions for
predicting inflation is inferior to other models and has varied over time. Since we require
an estimate of the time variation in inflation predictability but not of the best inflation fore-
cast, a simple and transparent model for inflation seems advantageous. Our main results
are very similar when we instead predict inflation using survey forecasts or a model of
17Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2009) study the BAA over AAA spread for the same reason.
Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) attribute 23 bps of the 10-year BBB spread to state and local taxes.
They also note that the number of dealer quoted AAA bonds is very small and therefore noisy. Longstaff,
Mithal, and Neis (2005) present evidence from Corporate Default Swaps that default risk accounts for the
majority of the corporate bond spread across all rating categories, while Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) argue
that the illiquidity premium in highly-rated U.S. bonds increased substantially during the recent financial
crisis. For a decomposition of interest rate swap spreads into liquidity and credit factors see Duffie and
Singleton (1997).
18Corporate bond markets in the countries covered have previously been described and studied by central
bank economists. For an analysis of the Japanese corporate bonds market, see Hattori, Koyama, and Yonetani
(2001), who argue that default risk of the individual issuer is the most important determinant of corporate
bond spreads in Japan after 1997. Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin (2001) provides an overview of the
Australian corporate bond market. Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) and De Bondt and Lichtenberger (2003)
study the transition of the Euro corporate bond market during the introduction of the Euro.
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the type suggested by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001). We use consumer prices to measure
inflation risk, but our main results are robust to using different inflation indices.
Ideally, our model calls for an empirical measure of long-run inflation risk that updates
quickly. Our empirical measures represent a compromise between shorter lags, smaller
measurement error and a smaller cyclical component of inflation risk. We might partly
reflect the risk of cyclical inflation fluctuations, acting similarly to measurement error and
biasing our coefficient estimates downward.
Our regressions control for lagged stock returns, GDP growth, unemployment and
lagged inflation surprises. We explicitly control for equal-weighted market leverage ratios
of non-financial Compustat firms over a shorter time period.19
We control for the volatility of a stock market index and for idiosyncratic stock return
volatility, when available. We follow Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) in decom-
posing individual daily stock returns into a market component, an industry component,
and a firm component. Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as the volatility of the firm
component over the past quarter, averaged over all individual stocks.20
In our model the dividend-price ratio helps to capture the time-varying risk of equity
returns, while in a model of time-varying risk aversion, such as in Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), it serves as a proxy for aggregate risk aversion. We therefore control for the
dividend-price ratio from Datastream.21
19Data for the U.S. and Canada are from Compustat North America and CRSP. Data for all other countries
are from Compustat Global. We divide annual book debt values from the previous year end by the sum of
the same book debt and quarterly market equity. Following Baker and Wurgler (2002), we define book debt
as the sum of total liabilities and preferred stock minus deferred taxes and convertible debt. When preferred
stock is missing, we use the redemption value of preferred stock. Corporate bond yield indices, such as the
Moody’s long-term yield indices, weight observations equally and therefore we control for equal-weighted
market leverage.
20We obtain U.S. stock returns from CRSP, Canadian stock returns from Datastream, and all other country
stock returns from Compustat Global. Industries are defined according to GIC classification codes.
21For a given MSCI index, the dividend yield is computed as the market-value weighted average divi-
dend yield of all of its constituents. The dividend yield for an individual stock is based on its most recent
annualized dividend rate (i.e., dividends per share) divided by the current share price.
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Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2011) have argued that the co-movement between
nominal government bond returns and stock returns reflects time-varying inflation risk.
If nominal long-term bond yields reflect long-term inflation expectations, the negative of
the bond-stock return correlation may give another, quickly updating, measure of infla-
tion cyclicality that focuses on the long-run component of inflation and that may be less
sensitive to measurement error. However, the volatility of nominal government bond re-
turns and the bond-stock correlation may also reflect real interest rate risk and, therefore
also serve as important controls. We construct high frequency measures of bond return
volatility and the bond-stock correlation from daily or weekly government bond and stock
returns over the past quarter, using the highest frequency available. 22
Figure 4.4 in the Appendix compares the bond-stock correlation for the U.S. and the
U.K. the breakeven-stock return correlation. Inflation risk, as captured by the breakeven
inflation-stock return correlation, moves very closely with the bond-stock return correla-
tion, supporting our interpretation of the bond-stock correlation as an additional measure
of inflation risk. At the same time breakeven inflation also contains an inflation risk pre-
mium and a liquidity premium (Pflueger and Viceira (2011)).
In addition to the leverage choice explicitly modeled, real firms may be able to adjust
their capital structure along numerous margins. We construct measures of aggregate book
leverage and the share of floating rate debt from Compustat and Compustat Global and
use the equity share in new financing from Baker and Wurgler (2000). 23 When firms
refinance infrequently, book leverage is less subject to market fluctuations than market
22Bond volatility and the bond-stock correlation report the annualized standard deviation of changes in
long-term nominal government bond yields and the correlation between changes in nominal government
bond yields and stock returns, respectively. These measures are also equal to the volatility of government
bond returns scaled by the bond duration and the negative of the correlation between government bond
returns and stock returns, where bond returns are approximated using changes in yields. Our choice of units
ensures that the inflation risk component in the bond volatility and the bond-stock correlation are comparable
to the inflation-derived measures of inflation risk.
23We set missing floating rate observations to zero to obtain aggregate floating rate shares consistent with
the literature (Chernenko and Faulkender (2011)). The time-series behavior of the floating rate share is
similar when instead excluding missing observations.
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leverage and we therefore use book leverage to capture firms’ target leverage ratio. We
compute aggregate book leverage ratios by summing book debt across all non-financial
firms and dividing by the sum of aggregated total assets.
We compute aggregate investment to capital ratios by summing capital expenditures
across all non-financial firms and divide by aggregated PP&E at the end of the previous
year, taking into account the reporting lag.24
3.4.2 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics in Table 3.4 reveal that both the volatility and the cyclicality of
inflation have varied substantially over time in each country.
Average annualized inflation volatility ranges from 100 bps for Germany to 161 bps
for the U.K. Inflation volatility displays significant time variation within each country with
standard deviations ranging from 42 bps to 70 bps. The highest inflation volatility in our
sample of 412 bps occurs in the U.K. during the 1970s.
The inflation-stock correlation, our measure of the slope of the Phillips curve, is nega-
tive or zero on average in every country. Its time variation within each country is substan-
tial, with within country standard deviations of around 0.30.
24Philippon (2009) and Polk and Sapienza (2009) construct similar investment variables.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics
Credit spreads are computed as yields on investment grade corporate bond indices in excess of duration-
matched nominal government bond yields, both continuously compounded. For the U.S. we show the
Moody’s BAA over AAA spread. Inflation volatility is the annualized standard deviation of three years of
quarterly inflation innovations. The inflation-stock correlation is computed using three years of quarterly
inflation and stock return innovations. Inflation innovations are residuals from regressing quarterly inflation
onto its own four lags and seasonal dummies. Stock return innovations are residuals from regressing the
quarterly real stock return onto its own first lag. Equity volatility is the annualized standard deviation of
quarterly real stock return innovations. Dividend-price ratios are from MSCI. Idiosyncratic volatility is
computed using one quarter of daily individual stock returns and GIC sector classifications and follows
the methodology of Campbell et. al. (2001). Compustat equal-weighted market leverage is computed as
total debt divided by total debt plus market value of equity. We approximate daily or weekly government
bond log returns using changes in continuously compounded yields. Government bond volatility is the
annualized standard deviation of daily or weekly nominal government bond returns over the past quarter
divided by bond duration. The bond-stock correlation is the negative of the correlation between daily
or weekly government bond returns and stock returns over the past quarter. All volatilities are standard
deviations.
Panel A: Long Sample Period Variables
Australia Canada Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
Start Date 1989.Q1 1969.Q4 1969.Q4 1973.Q1 1969.Q4 1969.Q4
End Date 2010.Q2 2010.Q4 2010.Q4 2010.Q2 2010.Q4 2010.Q4
Credit Spread (%) mean 0.93 1.02 0.63 0.33 1.26 1.01
std 0.57 0.42 0.65 0.28 0.91 0.42
min 0.05 0.44 -0.21 -0.42 0.15 0.50
max 2.57 3.39 3.99 1.06 5.87 3.17
Inflation Vol. (%, Ann.) mean 1.21 1.19 1.00 1.33 1.61 1.22
std 0.39 0.43 0.36 0.77 0.87 0.58
min 0.70 0.45 0.48 0.42 0.70 0.42
max 2.09 1.97 2.11 3.72 4.12 2.93
Inflation-Stock Correl. mean -0.18 -0.04 -0.15 0.00 -0.11 -0.27
std 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.34
min -0.61 -0.77 -0.83 -0.56 -0.70 -0.90
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
max 0.43 0.66 0.63 0.51 0.59 0.55
Equity Vol. (%, Ann.) mean 14.93 16.16 19.42 19.61 18.52 15.99
std 7.53 5.50 7.58 6.32 8.03 5.32
min 6.72 7.87 7.80 5.51 5.85 5.66
max 37.15 27.40 40.20 36.04 44.41 27.99
Div.-Price Ratio (%, Ann.) mean 3.85 2.96 3.39 1.30 4.26 3.12
std 0.87 1.00 1.12 0.66 1.24 1.32
min 2.82 0.99 1.67 0.43 2.11 1.14
max 6.95 5.67 6.20 2.86 10.46 6.14
Panel B: Short Sample Period Variables
Australia Canada Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
Start Date 1989.Q1 1989.Q1 1990.Q1 1989.Q1 1989.Q1 1989.Q1
End Date 2010.Q2 2010.Q2 2010.Q2 2010.Q2 2010.Q2 2010.Q2
Bond Vol. (%, Ann.) mean 0.80 0.66 0.54 0.49 0.66 0.72
std 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.22
min 0.42 0.28 0.28 0.19 0.30 0.40
max 1.62 1.32 0.97 1.18 1.42 1.54
Bond-Stock Correl. mean -0.04 0.00 -0.09 0.11 -0.03 -0.04
std 0.35 0.32 0.39 0.31 0.41 0.42
min -0.65 -0.62 -0.84 -0.69 -0.80 -0.77
max 0.78 0.68 0.72 0.64 0.72 0.77
Idiosync. Vol. (%, Ann.) mean 22.23 26.80 26.24 31.28 18.28 25.95
std 12.03 5.20 9.02 7.46 12.36 7.61
min 5.02 19.69 15.91 19.08 4.04 16.26
max 57.68 54.67 54.95 58.00 52.75 50.39
Leverage (%) mean 17.89 22.58 41.23 34.28 21.45 23.11
std 6.25 6.11 13.51 6.69 3.94 3.91
min 8.69 12.70 21.72 19.59 13.84 16.84
max 40.76 35.53 63.12 47.40 31.67 33.67
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Credit spreads average around 100 bps and have within country standard deviations
between 36 bps to 91 bps. Rare negative values in Japanese and German credit spreads
are most likely due to measurement error. The correlations of international credit spreads
with U.S. credit spreads range from -0.21 for Japan to 0.55 for the U.K. As shown in
Table 4.10 in the Appendix, international time series of credit spreads and inflation risk
are not perfectly correlated with U.S. time series, effectively increasing our number of
observations relative to an analysis of the U.S. time series.
Figure 3.6 plots time series of credit spreads and inflation volatility. The co-movement
between international credit spreads and inflation volatility over time is apparent for most
countries in our sample. Figure 3.6 also suggests a cross-sectional relationship between
inflation volatility and credit spreads. As noted in the introduction, U.S. inflation volatility
and credit spreads were both high in the 1970s and 1980s. We now see that both inflation
volatility and credit spreads were even more elevated in the U.K. during the same period.
Figure 3.7 documents visually the relationship between credit spreads and the inflation-
stock correlation in our international data. For ease of comparison the inflation-stock
correlation is scaled to have the same mean and standard deviation as credit spreads in
each country. The U.S. inflation-stock return correlation was mostly negative during the
1970s and 1980s, indicating that supply shocks and shifting inflation expectations moved
inflation and real outcomes in opposite directions. In contrast, the inflation-stock correla-
tion was positive during much of the 1990s and 2000s, potentially as a result of smaller
macroeconomic shocks or more stable monetary policy. In particular, two periods of high
inflation-stock return correlations during the early 2000s and during the financial crisis
coincided with high credit spreads. The co-movement between the inflation-stock re-
turn correlation and credit spreads is also visually apparent for other countries, even if
our estimate of the inflation-stock return correlation contains measurement error. For in-
stance, in Germany the inflation-stock correlation and credit spreads show very similar
low-frequency movements with decreases during the 1970s and 1980s and steep increases
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Figure 3.6: International Credit Spreads and Inflation Volatility
Quarterly credit spreads (bold) and inflation volatility (dashed) for Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the
U.K., and the U.S. Credit spreads are investment grade corporate bond index yields in excess of duration-
matched nominal government bond yields, except for the U.S. which is the Moody’s BAA minus AAA
spread. All yields are continuously compounded. Inflation volatility is computed using a 3 year backward-
looking window of quarterly inflation surprises. Both variables are shown in percentage units.
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during the 1990s and 2000s.25
Figure 3.7: International Credit Spreads and Inflation-Stock Correlation
Quarterly credit spreads (bold) and inflation-stock correlation (dashed) for Australia, Canada, Germany,
Japan, U.K., and U.S. Credit spreads are investment grade corporate bond index yields in excess of duration-
matched nominal government bond yields, except for the U.S. which is the Moody’s BAA-AAA spread. All
yields are continuously compounded. The inflation-stock correlation is computed using a 3-year backward-
looking window of quarterly inflation surprises and stock returns.
3.4.3 Testing for Inflation Risk in Credit Spreads
Our benchmark regressions in Table 3.5(A) provide evidence that credit spreads in-
crease in both inflation volatility and the inflation-stock correlation, while controlling for
proxies for real uncertainty, time-varying risk aversion, and the business cycle. Equity
volatility and the dividend-price ratio, our proxies for real uncertainty and time-varying
25Using bond-market derived measures Wright (2010) argues that the cyclicality of inflation has increased
since 1990 in most developed countries.
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risk aversion, both enter with the expected signs and jointly explain 12% of the variation
in credit spreads after controlling for country fixed effects. We find that inflation volatility
and the inflation-stock correlation jointly can explain as much variation in credit spreads
as can our proxies for real uncertainty and time-varying risk aversion, raising the residual
R2 to 27% (after taking out fixed effects).
Since inflation uncertainty might move over the business cycle and with changes in
inflation, it is important to control for proxies for real economic activity and shocks to in-
flation expectations. In the model, positive real returns and inflation surprises reduce real
leverage ratios and therefore reduce credit spreads. Column (4) shows our benchmark esti-
mate, which controls for lagged inflation shocks, stock returns, GDP growth and change in
unemployment. Adding controls to our regression increases the residual R2 by another ten
percentage points and improves the precision of the estimated slope on the inflation-stock
correlation.
The empirical estimates in Table 3.5 indicate a large effect of inflation volatility and
the inflation-stock correlation on credit spreads, consistent with the model. The empirical
slope coefficients on inflation volatility and the inflation-stock correlation are within two
standard deviations of the model slope coefficients in Table 3.4. The slope coefficient on
inflation volatility is especially close to the theoretical coefficient.
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Table 3.5: Credit Spreads and Inflation Risk (1969.Q4-2010.Q4)
Panel A includes the following countries: Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. Panel B includes
the U.S. only. Panel A reports Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors accounting for cross-country
correlation and 16 lags. We estimate time fixed effects by time demeaning all left-hand side and right-hand
side variables and again report Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors with 16 lags. Residual R-squareds
reflect explanatory power in excess of fixed effects. Panel B reports Newey-West standard errors with 16
lags in parentheses. Controls include quarterly and three year inflation innovations, stock returns, GDP
growth, and three year change in unemployment. Japan data starts in 1973.Q1. Variables are constructed as
described in Table 3.4. * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Panel A: International
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.02** 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.12** 0.07* 0.10* 0.18** 0.15* 0.12**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.22** 0.20** 0.34** 0.19** 0.24**
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.62** 0.42** 0.42** 0.30*
(0.22) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Residual R2 0.12 0.16 0.27 0.39 0.20 0.36
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No No Yes
Panel B: U.S.
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.14** 0.10* 0.11** 0.06 0.08*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.39** 0.38** 0.32** 0.38**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.11 0.14 0.30*
(0.10) (0.08) (0.13)
R2 0.22 0.47 0.48 0.66 0.69
Controls No No No Yes Yes
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No Yes
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A 50 bps move in inflation volatility, approximately to one standard deviation in the
U.S., is associated with a 16 bps increase in empirical credit spreads. A one standard
deviation move in the inflation-stock correlation (30 percentage points) is associated with
a 13 bps increase in credits spreads. The magnitudes are economically meaningful relative
to average credit spreads of around 100 bps.
The reported standard errors take into account potential cross-country correlation,
heteroskedasticity, and serial autocorrelation. We compute standard errors according to
Driscoll and Kraay (1998)s extension of Newey and West (1987) with 16 lags.26
Our benchmark estimates might reflect both time-series and cross-country variation in
inflation risk. Adding time fixed effects to the benchmark regression confirms our previous
visual impression that cross-country variation helps in estimating the empirical relation-
ship between credit spreads and inflation risk. The slope coefficients onto inflation volatil-
ity and the inflation-stock return correlation remain similar in magnitude and significant.27
This finding also helps to alleviate concerns that the results might be driven by any global
omitted variable, such as global real interest rate risk or global growth risk.
Excluding the financial crisis, the coefficients on inflation volatility and the inflation-
stock correlation decrease in magnitude, but inflation risk remains economically and statis-
tically significant in the pre-crisis subsample. From our theoretical analysis, we would ex-
pect that inflation risk should have especially large effects on credit spreads during crises,
but it appears that the empirical relationship between credit spreads and inflation risk is
not solely driven by the most recent financial crisis.
We also report estimates for the U.S. time series, which might be especially familiar
to readers.28 Table 3.5(B) shows that credit spreads are clearly related to inflation risk in
26Hoechle (2007) provides a Stata routine.
27We estimate the time fixed effects regression by first time demeaning all left-hand side and right-hand
side variables. We again report Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors with 16 lags.
28Table 4.11 in the Appendix shows that all results in Table 3.5 are robust to computing the U.S. credit
spread with respect to a duration-matched government bond yield.
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the U.S., although the smaller sample size decreases the statistical power of the tests. The
regression R2 increases from 22% to 48% as we add inflation volatility and the inflation-
stock correlation as explanatory variables to our proxies for real risk and time-varying
risk aversion. The slope on inflation volatility is large, significant, and comparable to the
slope in the international regression. The inflation-stock correlation enters positively but is
only significant for the pre-crisis subsample. While both U.S. credit spreads and the U.S.
inflation-stock correlation were high during the financial crisis, the inflation-stock corre-
lation remained high after the financial crisis. It therefore did not capture the significant
decline in U.S. credit spreads in 2010.
The sensitivities of credit risk with respect to real growth shocks and inflation shocks
play crucial roles in our proposed mechanism. Table 3.6 spells out the coefficient esti-
mates on the proxies for real and nominal shocks, that are included as controls in Table
3.5. Quarterly inflation shocks consistently enter negatively, providing support for the
model mechanism. Magnitudes are comparable to the slope of credit spreads onto infla-
tion shocks in the model. Three year inflation shocks enter negatively in the U.S. but
not internationally, potentially due to the comovement between the level of inflation and
long-run inflation uncertainty (Ball and Cecchetti, 1990). As shown in Figure 4.5 in the
Appendix, the relationship between U.S. inflation shocks and credit spreads is clearest
during the recent financial crisis, when a rapid fall in consumer prices coincided with high
credit spreads. However, column (4) in Table 3.6 indicates that U.S. credit spreads also
have an inverse relationship with quarterly inflation shocks during the pre-crisis period.
The coefficients on real growth variables need to be interpreted with caution because of
collinearity between different real activity variables, but quarterly GDP growth enters con-
sistently with a negative sign.
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Table 3.6: Inflation and Growth Controls (1969.Q4-2010.Q4)
This table reports the coefficient estimates on control variables in Table 3.5(A), columns (4) and (6), and
Table 3.5(B), columns (4) and (5). * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. All
variables are as described in Table 3.4.
International International U.S. U.S.
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Quarterly Inflation Shock -0.06* -0.02 -0.14** -0.08*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
3 Year Inflation Shock 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Quarterly Real Stock Return -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3 Year Real Stock Return -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Quarterly GDP Growth -0.43 -0.11 -0.59* -0.34*
(0.24) (0.12) (0.23) (0.13)
3 Year GDP Growth -0.06** -0.05** 0.10* 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
3 Year Change Unemployment -0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.06*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Excluding 2008-2010 No Yes No Yes
Our proposed mechanism implies that the impact of inflation risk on credit spreads
should be especially strong when either real stock returns or inflation surprises are low.
Figure 3.8 explores these predictions using a non-parametric approach and provides an
empirical analogue to the theoretical relationships in Figure 3.4.
We construct the left panel in Figure 3.8(A) by splitting observations in each country
into quintiles of real stock returns and into equal-sized subsamples for high and low infla-
tion volatility. We sort by three year real stock returns for consistency with the construction
of the inflation risk variables. Normalizing credit spreads in the middle real stock return
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Figure 3.8: Empirical Credit Spreads, Stock Returns and Inflation Shocks
Empirical credit spreads versus real stock returns and inflation shocks averaged across Australia, Canada,
Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. for different inflation risk regimes. In Panel A, credit spreads across
countries are averaged for both low and high inflation volatility regimes within quintiles of 3 year real stock
returns and 3 year inflation shocks. In Panel B, credit spreads across countries are averaged for both low
and high inflation-stock correlation regimes within quintiles of 3 year real stock returns and 3 year inflation
shocks. Low and high inflation risk regimes are defined relative to median values within each country.
Credit spreads are normalized to zero in the middle quintile for both inflation risk regimes. A horizontal line
is shown at 0 bps.
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quintile to zero focuses on the comparison between credit spread slopes across inflation
risk regimes. The panel averages credit spreads across all countries within each inflation
risk regime and quintile. The other panels are constructed similarly, instead sorting by the
inflation-stock correlation and the three year inflation shock.
The empirical relationships between credit spreads, stock returns and inflation shocks
in Figure 3.8 bear striking resemblance to the theoretical relationships in Figure 3.4. The
left panel in Figure 3.8(A) shows that credit spreads disproportionately increase with in-
flation volatility when real stock returns are low. The slope of credit spreads is identical
across high and low inflation volatility regimes for the top four quintiles of stock returns.
However, the gap between credit spreads in the high and low inflation volatility regimes
widens to 20 bps in the lowest stock return quintile, indicating a larger put option in de-
faultable bonds when inflation uncertainty is greater.
The right panel of Figure 3.8(A) similarly suggests that the impact of inflation volatility
on credit spreads is larger when inflation is surprisingly low, even if the largest difference
in credit spreads obtains in the second-lowest quintile of inflation shocks rather than the
lowest.
Figure 3.8(B) shows that inflation cyclicality also impacts credit spreads most strongly
when real stock returns and inflation shocks are low. The gap between credit spreads
in high and low inflation-stock correlation regimes widens to 40 bps in the lowest stock
return quintile. Finally, credit spreads in the high inflation-stock correlation regime are
higher in the lowest inflation shock quintile than in the middle inflation shock quintile by
30 bps, even if the volatility of the average credit spreads across quintiles suggest that
these averages may be estimated noisily.
The empirical magnitudes in Figure 3.8 are large compared to our benchmark empir-
ical results. However, they are smaller than the theoretical magnitudes shown in Figure
3.4. Besides measurement error, one potential reason is that in Figure 3.8 we average the
above median and below median inflation risk regimes. For instance in Figure 3.8(A) the
average inflation volatility increases by only 0.73 percentage points from the low to the
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high inflation volatility regimes, while in Figure 3.4(A) we are able to look at the extremes
in inflation volatility directly and the inflation volatility differential is 2 percentage points.
3.4.4 Robustness of Benchmark Results
Table 3.7 shows that our benchmark results are robust to including idiosyncratic equity
volatility, market leverage, the return volatility of nominal government bonds, and the
bond-stock correlation, available over a shorter sample period starting in 1989.
Table 3.7: Credit Spread Regressions with Additional Controls (1989.Q1-2010.Q4)
Panel A includes the following countries: Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. Panel
B includes the U.S. only. Panel A reports Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors accounting for cross-
country correlation and 16 lags. We estimate time fixed effects by time-demeaning all left-hand side and
right-hand side variables and again report Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors with 16 lags. Residual
R-squareds reflect explanatory power in excess of fixed effects. Panel B reports Newey-West standard errors
with 16 lags in parentheses. Controls include quarterly and three year inflation innovations, stock returns,
GDP growth, and three year change in unemployment. Germany data starts in 1990.Q1. Variables are
constructed as described in Table 3.4. * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Panel A: International
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Idiosyncratic Volatility (% Ann.) 0.03** 0.02** 0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.38* 0.30* 0.33** 0.29** 0.25** 0.09**
(0.19) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.02)
Leverage (%) -0.02* -0.02* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01** -0.01**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.43** 0.33** 0.33** 0.11 0.12**
(0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.50** 0.32** 0.26** 0.16* 0.13**
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Bond Volatility (% Ann.) 0.31 0.25 0.31 -0.03
(0.16) (0.15) (0.18) (0.04)
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Table 3.7 (Continued)
Bond-Stock Correlation 0.74** 0.69** 0.44* 0.36**
(0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.06)
Residual R2 0.28 0.41 0.54 0.57 0.21 0.40
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No No Yes
Panel B: U.S.
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Idiosyncratic Volatility (% Ann.) 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.20 0.08 0.10 0.05 -0.07**
(0.30) (0.15) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02)
Leverage (%) -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02** 0.03**
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.51** 0.40** 0.48** 0.30**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.07 -0.03 -0.17 -0.03
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04)
Bond Volatility (% Ann.) 0.53** 0.39** 0.18*
(0.16) (0.10) (0.08)
Bond-Stock Correlation 0.12 0.02 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.02)
R2 0.17 0.73 0.80 0.90 0.74
Controls No No No Yes Yes
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No Yes
The bond-stock correlation enters positively and significantly with a large regression
coefficient, offering additional evidence for the strong relevance of inflation risk for corpo-
rate bond spreads. The bond volatility enters positively but is only marginally significant.
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The residual R2 increases by fourteen percentage points to 54% when adding these two
explanatory variables. At the same time the coefficients on inflation volatility remain sig-
nificant and show small decreases in magnitude, indicating that inflation risk is priced into
corporate bonds above and beyond real interest rate risk.
Controlling for time fixed effects helps us to isolate further the inflation risk component
from a global real interest rate risk component in the bond market derived variables. If
financial markets are highly integrated across the six developed countries in our sample,
real interest rate risk should be equated across countries.29 The coefficient on the bond-
stock correlation remains large and significant with country fixed effects, suggesting that
the bond-stock correlation contains a significant country-specific inflation risk component,
which is priced into corporate bond spreads across countries. Adding time fixed effects
renders the inflation volatility and the inflation-stock correlation insignificant, reflecting
the limited cross-country variation in these variables over the shorter time period.
In the Appendix we report additional tests. The main results in Table 3.5 also hold
in changes and we find that empirical changes in credit spreads are negatively related
to lagged inflation risk. Credit spreads fully mean revert over a horizon of five years,
consistent with the model.
Further robustness checks, including individual country regressions, different inflation
indices and empirical proxies for inflation shocks, HP filtered explanatory variables, and
different measures for real uncertainty are reported in the Appendix.
3.4.5 Implications for Capital Structure
If investors demand compensation for bearing credit risk associated with inflation,
firms should adjust their capital structure accordingly. The financing choice of firms in
our model is highly simplified, but in reality firms can reduce their exposure to fluctua-
29For instance, Wright (2010) uses an assumption along these lines in his analysis of international interest
rate risk premia.
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tions in real liabilities along multiple dimensions.
Issuing equity instead of debt reduces leverage and the inflation exposure of firms’
liabilities. Indeed, we see in Figure 3.9(B) that the share of equity issuance was especially
high during periods of volatile inflation in the 1970s and 1980s.
The issuance of floating-rate debt offers firms the possibility of indexing interest pay-
ments to nominal interest rates, even if face values are still fixed in nominal terms, and
therefore also helps to reduce inflation risk of firms’ liabilities. The floating-rate share of
long-term debt among U.S. Compustat firms, shown in Figure 3.9(A), appears related to
inflation uncertainty. It peaked during the 1970s, came down during the 1980s and 1990s
and increased subsequently.30
Formally testing the relationship between aggregate book leverage and inflation risk
yields evidence consistent with firms adjusting their book leverage downwards when in-
flation is more volatile. In contrast to market leverage, book leverage should be less ex-
posed to mechanical effects of stock returns and therefore give a more reliable measure of
firms’ intended leverage ratio. Leverage data are annual, with the U.S. time series available
starting in 1970 and international data available starting in 1994.
Table 3.8(A) shows a significant negative relationship between leverage and inflation
volatility. The results look similar for the longer U.S. time series and for the interna-
tional panel. We control for three year stock returns, inflation surprises, GDP growth and
change in unemployment, as before. A one standard deviation move in inflation volatility
is associated with a 1.5 percentage point decrease in leverage. The slope of leverage onto
inflation volatility is larger than in the model but imprecisely estimated. We find no rela-
tionship between leverage and the inflation-stock correlation, which is consistent with the
relative magnitudes in the model in Figure 3.5.
30Only 60% of Compustat firms report floating-rate debt, so the floating rate debt share may be subject to
time-varying reporting bias.
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Figure 3.9: Capital Structure and Inflation Uncertainty in the U.S.
Floating rate debt as a share of long-term debt aggregated over all non-financial firms from Compustat (1974-
2009). Missing floating rate values are set to zero. Equity share (1971-2007) in new issues is from Baker and
Wurgler (2000). Inflation uncertainty is the difference between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile of
one quarter ahead GDP Price Index inflation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Inflation
uncertainty is Hodrick Prescott filtered with smoothing parameter 1,600 and scaled to have the same mean
and standard deviation as the floating rate share (or equity share).
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Table 3.8: Leverage and Investment Regressions
Aggregate book leverage from Compustat and Compustat Global is computed by summing book debt across
all non-financial firms and dividing by the sum of aggregated total assets. Aggregate investment to capital is
computed by summing capital expenditures across all non-financial firms and dividing by aggregated PP&E
at the end of the previous year. International regressions include the following countries: Canada, Germany,
Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. International data is annual 1994-2009. U.S. data is annual 1970-2009. Driscoll
and Kraay (1998) standard errors adjusted for cross-country correlation with 4 lags in parentheses. U.S.
regressions report Newey-West standard errors with 4 lags. Residual R-squareds reflect explanatory power
in excess of fixed effects. Variables are constructed as described in Table 3.4. * and ** denote significance
at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Book Leverage (%) International 1994-2009 U.S. 1970-2009
Lag Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) -2.26** -2.54** -3.86** -3.04**
(0.65) (0.35) (0.76) (0.82)
Lag Inflation-Stock Correlation 2.83* 2.26 0.83 1.02
(1.01) (1.57) (1.60) (1.87)
Lag Change T-bill (%) -0.27 -0.22
(0.27) (0.39)
Residual R2 0.12 0.18 0.39 0.53
Controls No Yes No Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Panel B: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment / Capital (%) International 1994-2009 U.S. 1970-2009
Lag Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) -2.66** -0.40 -0.43 1.28
(0.83) (0.67) (1.03) (0.82)
Lag Inflation-Stock Correlation -1.98** -1.17 -1.99 -0.11
(0.59) (0.65) (1.64) (0.87)
Lag Stock Market Q 0.03 6.82**
(0.61) (1.13)
Residual R2 0.28 0.64 0.05 0.76
Controls No Yes No Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
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While our calibrated model predicts no adjustment in investment to inflation risk, in-
vestment is important for macroeconomic outcomes and we therefore explore the empirical
relationship between investment and inflation risk. Fischer and Modigliani (1978) suggest
that inflation uncertainty might lead to shortening of financial contracts and reduce invest-
ment. We find no robust relationship between inflation risk and investment in Table 3.8(B),
consistent with our model.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper argues both theoretically and empirically that uncertainty about the long-
run price level and the relationship of inflation with the business cycle are major macroe-
conomic determinants of corporate bond spreads. Using data on international corporate
bond spreads, we provide new evidence that corporate bond investors price the risk of debt
deflation.
In a real business cycle model with time-varying inflation risk, inflation persistence
generates large effects of inflation risk on credit spreads. Firms reduce their leverage
ratios when inflation risk increases, so credit spreads mean revert after a shock to inflation
risk.
As of October 2011, the BAA minus AAA U.S. credit spread was 126 bps, or 25
basis points spread above our sample average, suggesting that investors were reluctant
to hold corporate bonds. The corporate bond spread seems especially high given that
equity valuations were high relative to their historical average.31 We can rationalize this
discrepancy, if one believes that policymakers will be unable to counteract deflation should
another recession arrive. Our measures of inflation cyclicality were close to all-time highs,
and our benchmark estimates attribute about 35 of the 126 bps credit spread to the inflation-
stock correlation.
31The S&P500 index dividend-price ratio was about three-fourths of a standard deviation below its sample
average.
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Our results suggest fruitful avenues for further research. This paper suggests that in-
vestors attach an economically meaningful price to financial distress associated with de-
flation, highlighting the importance of better understanding the macroeconomic and mon-
etary policy determinants. A decomposition of time-varying inflation risk into macroeco-
nomic shocks, such as cost push shocks and shocks to aggregate demand, and time-varying
monetary policy, could be of particular interest to central banks around the world.
Given the strong aggregate empirical results in this paper it seems promising to study
the impact of time-varying inflation risk on the cross-section of firms’ optimal capital
structure.
Finally, our analysis suggests that corporate bond spreads may be useful measures of
investors’ deflationary concerns and for gauging central banks’ credibility in counteracting
deflation. This is particularly relevant given recent renewed concerns about a deflationary
drop in aggregate demand and about ineffectiveness of traditional monetary policy at the
zero lower bound.
Chapter 4
Appendices
4.1 Appendix to Chapter 1: Intraday Stock Volatility and
Retail Trading Activity
4.1.1 Simulated RVR
The hypothetical RVR distributions reported in Table 1.1 are generated from the
following Monte Carlo simulation procedure. I assume 20 trading days, 1,000 steps per
trading day, zero drift, and normally distributed shocks. First, I draw 20,000 shocks to gen-
erate the sequence of intraday stock price movements. Second, I store the day return and
range return for each of these 20 trading days. Third, I compute the ratio of the variance of
day returns to the variance of range returns. I repeat these steps 10,000 times which yields
a distribution of RVR values. Finally, I record RVR values at different percentiles of this
distribution.
It should be noted that assuming zero drift and normally distributed shocks are actu-
ally quite conservative assumptions. A greater drift or fatter-tailed shocks would in fact
correspond to lower simulated values of RVR, which would effectively make the empirical
distribution of RVR look even higher in magnitude. The intuition for why these alternative
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assumptions would reduce hypothetical RVR values is as follows. With a higher drift or
with more extreme shocks, day returns and range returns are more likely to approach one
another.
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Table 4.1: Decile RVR Abnormal Returns (1992 - 2010)
This table reports abnormal returns of monthly RVR decile portfolios for the period June 1992 through
December 2010. At the end of each month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of RVR
computed over that month. The ranked stocks are then assigned to one of ten decile portfolios, which are
constructed either value-weighted (Panel A) or equal-weighted (Panel B). Excess returns are simply monthly
returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. 3-factor alphas correspond to alphas from the Fama
and French (1993) model. 4-factor alphas incrementally control for the momentum factor following Carhart
(1997). 5-factor alphas further control for the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Returns and
alphas are shown in monthly percent, with t-statistics shown below in brackets.
Panel A: Value-weighted returns
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 L/S
Excess return 0.25 0.32 0.54 0.31 0.32 0.55 0.73 0.67 0.74 0.85 0.60
[0.7] [1.0] [1.7] [1.0] [1.0] [1.7] [2.3] [2.1] [2.3] [2.7] [2.3]
3-factor alpha -0.24 -0.17 0.07 -0.19 -0.18 0.05 0.24 0.19 0.26 0.39 0.64
-[1.2] -[1.2] [0.6] -[1.9] -[1.6] [0.4] [2.4] [1.6] [2.2] [2.8] [2.4]
4-factor alpha -0.34 -0.17 0.04 -0.23 -0.21 0.10 0.27 0.18 0.26 0.37 0.70
-[1.8] -[1.2] [0.3] -[2.2] -[1.9] [0.9] [2.7] [1.5] [2.1] [2.7] [2.7]
5-factor alpha -0.25 -0.13 0.05 -0.22 -0.22 0.12 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.38 0.63
-[1.3] -[0.9] [0.4] -[2.1] -[1.9] [1.1] [2.3] [1.3] [2.0] [2.7] [2.4]
Panel B: Equal-weighted returns
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 L/S
Excess return 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.62 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.92 0.88 1.09 0.55
[1.6] [1.4] [1.6] [1.6] [1.7] [1.9] [2.0] [2.3] [2.1] [2.6] [2.4]
3-factor alpha 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.21 0.44 0.43
[0.1] -[0.5] -[0.2] -[0.1] [0.3] [0.7] [0.9] [1.6] [1.2] [2.2] [2.0]
4-factor alpha -0.26 -0.25 -0.17 -0.15 -0.06 0.04 0.09 0.23 0.18 0.46 0.72
-[2.5] -[2.6] -[1.9] -[2.1] -[0.9] [0.4] [1.2] [3.0] [2.1] [3.8] [4.3]
5-factor alpha -0.24 -0.27 -0.19 -0.16 -0.08 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.17 0.45 0.69
-[2.4] -[2.8] -[2.1] -[2.1] -[1.1] [0.6] [1.0] [2.8] [1.9] [3.6] [4.1]
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Table 4.2: Residual RVR Abnormal Returns (1992 - 2010)
This table reports abnormal returns of monthly quintile spread portfolios formed on residual RVR for the
period June 1992 through December 2010. At the end of each month, stocks are ranked in ascending order
on the basis of residual RVR computed over that month. The ranked stocks are then assigned to one of
five quintile portfolios. Abnormal returns are calculated based on the four-factor model of Carhart (1997).
Residual RVR is the residual from regressing RVR onto log size, log book-to-market, past twelve-month
return (excluding the recent month), past one-month return, stock return volatility, and turnover. Alphas are
shown in monthly percent, with t-statistics shown below in brackets.
Panel A: Value-weighted returns
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Excess return 0.62 0.44 0.46 0.71 0.72 0.09
[1.7] [1.3] [1.5] [2.3] [2.5] [0.4]
3-factor alpha 0.02 -0.14 -0.09 0.19 0.20 0.18
[0.1] -[1.5] -[1.2] [2.3] [2.1] [0.9]
4-factor alpha 0.06 -0.14 -0.09 0.17 0.22 0.15
[0.5] -[1.4] -[1.2] [2.0] [2.2] [0.8]
5-factor alpha 0.07 -0.11 -0.08 0.17 0.24 0.17
[0.5] -[1.1] -[1.0] [1.9] [2.4] [0.8]
Panel B: Equal-weighted returns
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 L/S
Excess return 0.70 0.72 0.77 0.87 1.01 0.32
[1.8] [1.9] [2.0] [2.4] [2.7] [2.8]
3-factor alpha -0.14 -0.13 -0.08 0.07 0.21 0.35
-[1.6] -[1.8] -[1.1] [0.8] [2.1] [3.0]
4-factor alpha -0.08 -0.05 0.01 0.17 0.34 0.41
-[0.9] -[0.7] [0.1] [2.4] [3.9] [3.7]
5-factor alpha -0.09 -0.07 0.00 0.14 0.34 0.43
-[1.0] -[1.1] [0.0] [2.0] [3.8] [3.7]
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Figure 4.1: RVR and Residual RVR Returns
This figure plots cumulative returns for quintile spread portfolios formed on RVR and residual RVR. Resid-
ual RVR is the residual from regressing RVR onto log size, log book-to-market, past twelve-month return
(excluding the recent month), past one-month return, stock return volatility, and turnover.
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4.2 Appendix to Chapter 2: How Tax and Interest Rates
Drive Stock Returns at the Turn of the Tax Year
4.2.1 Alternative Specifications of the Tax-selling Premium
In this section, we analyze the behavior of our proposed variable γ and its relation to
interest rates and capital gains tax rates in the US data. The analysis in the main body of
the paper is based on the one-year Fama-Bliss interest rate, but we also considered other
proxies for interest rates. These alternatives are auto loans, personal loans, and credit card
loans. Data are from G.19 Consumer Credit from Federal Reserve Statistical Release.
Auto loans are 48-month new auto loans provided by commercial banks. Personal loans
are 24-month personal loans provided by commercial banks. The last data item is credit
card loans from credit card companies. The data items can be found in the table on terms
of credit at commercial banks and finance companies from the Federal Reserve website.
Data are seasonally unadjusted.
Interest rate, capital gains tax rate and the resulting γ are plotted in Figure 4.2 using the
one-year Fama-Bliss interest rate. Figure 4.3 plots the resulting γ′s for each of four alter-
native interest proxies that also include credit risk. All five proxies for γ appear persistent
but stationary. Generally speaking, the significant common variation in the five prox-
ies for γ over this period suggests a possibly large time-series variation in the incentives
for tax-motivated selling. One advantage of the Fama-Bliss proxy is that this is the only
proxy with the desired constant one-year horizon. Nevertheless, all versions are highly
correlated. The alternative to the Fama-Bliss γ with the lowest correlation is the credit
card γ, but correlation remains high at 0.73. A noticeable difference is seen in 2008 when
the Fama-Bliss γ is at its lowest level, but all the other measures remain relatively stable
relative to the previous year or even show an increase as in the case of Auto Financing.
In 2008, one might expect (and in actuality there was) a wide cross-sectional variation in
interest rates among individuals as there was a wide range of credit worthiness.
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Figure 4.2: Time-series of the tax-selling premium, the interest rate, and the capital gains tax rate at the turn
of the year
This figure shows the evolution of the tax-selling premium (γ) and its two components over the period 1954-
2008. These components are the marginal seller’s interest rate, proxied by the one-year Fama-Bliss interest
rate, and the marginal seller’s tax rate, proxied by the maximum capital gains tax rate.
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Figure 4.3: Time-series of the tax-selling premium, the interest rate, and the capital gains tax rate at the turn
of the year
This figure shows the evolution of the tax-selling premium (γ) and its two components over the period 1954-
2008. These components are the marginal seller’s interest rate, proxied by the one-year Fama-Bliss interest
rate, and the marginal seller’s tax rate, proxied by the maximum capital gains tax rate.
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We find that most of the time-series variation in γ is due to changes in interest rates,
although capital gains tax rates also explain part of variation. Table 4.3 also provides re-
gression analysis of the relation between γ and its components. The linear model explains
97% of the variation in γ. A variance decomposition analysis based on this regression
shows that interest rates explain 51% of the total variation in γ, showing interest rates
are more important than tax rates in explaining the variation in γ. Table 4.3 also reports
descriptive statistics for our tax-selling variable, γ, as well as for its two components. In-
terest rates had significant variation during this time period. The maximum capital gains
tax rate varies from 20% to almost 40% over this period. While not shown, most of the
time-variation in the U.K. version of γ is also due to changes in interest rates since the
U.K. capital gains tax rate changes only once in our sample.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Macro Variables (1954-2003)
We compute the tax-selling premium, γ = τ (1−B)(1−Bτ) , using the highest long-term capital gains tax rate, τ ,
from the IRS and the one-year interest rate, r, from the Fama-Bliss dataset to compute a one-year discount
factor, B. As the tax rate changes at most once a year, we report below sample characteristics of γ and its
components as well as regression output using values as of the end of December of each year. Therefore the
sample consists of 55 years of data from 1954 to 2008. T-statistics are in parentheses. Panel A shows simple
descriptive statistics. Panel B estimates the linear relation between interest rates and capital gains tax rates.
Panel C shows that a linear approximation explains 95% of the variance in γ. Panel D shows that interest
rates explain most of the variation in γ.
Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean StdDev Minimum Maximum
r 55 0.055 0.028 0.004 0.129
τ 55 0.261 0.061 0.157 0.399
γ 55 0.019 0.013 0.001 0.060
Regression: r = a+ bτ + e
Intercept τ R2
Coefficient 0.029 0.102 0.04
t-statistic (1.82) (1.72)
Regression: γ = a+ br + cτ + e
Intercept r τ R2
Coefficient -0.026 0.299 0.110 0.95
t-statistic (-14.93) (19.56) (15.86)
Variance Decomposition of γ = a+ br + cτ + e
R2 = b2 V ar(r)V ar(γ) +c
2 V ar(τ)
V ar(γ) +2bc
Cov(r,τ)
V ar(γ)
0.95 0.42 0.28 0.25
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4.2.2 Estimated Taxes and Tax-loss Selling
In this section, we analyze whether the interest rate channel remains the important
driver of time variation in turn-of-the-year mispricing linked to tax-loss selling once quar-
terly estimated tax payments are taken into account. The typical tax payer prepays the
majority of their tax through a wage withholding system where tax is automatically sub-
tracted from gross income by an employer. For income which is not subject to withholding
such as gains from the sale of assets, taxpayers are required to make quarterly estimated
tax payments. These estimated tax payments are due on April 15, June 15, September
15, and January 15. The analysis in the main body of the paper ignores these quarterly
payments. If a significant number of investors must pay estimated taxes, there are at least
two concerns.
The first concern follows directly from the fact that the last quarterly estimated tax
payment for the current tax year (year t) is due January 15 of year t+1 and the first es-
timated tax payment for the subsequent tax year (year t+1) is due April 15 of year t+1.
Thus it may be the case that deferring a sale from December of year t to January of year
t+1 only moves the tax consequences arising from the sale from January 15 to April 15.
This deferral of only three months is significantly less than the 12 months assumed in the
analysis in the paper.
However, a careful examination of the tax code indicates that this concern is mitigated
by the fact that estimated tax payments for each quarter are not necessarily tied directly to
income in that quarter. Instead, the general rule determining the minimum year t+1 quar-
terly estimated tax payment is that it must be the smaller of 22.5% of whatever year t+1’s
tax turns out to be or 25% of the tax paid in year t (see page 48 of IRS Publication 505).1
The ability to tie the subsequent year t+1’s estimated tax payments to the previous year t’s
tax is commonly called the safe harbor rule. For those investors who take advantage of the
1Taxpayers with adjusted gross income more than $150,000 ($75,000 if married filing a separate return)
compare 22.5% of this years tax to 27.5% of last year’s tax in order to calculate the minimum estimated tax
payment.
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safe harbor rule, the estimated tax payment due in April as well as the three subsequent
estimated tax payments are completely insensitive to the increase in tax owed for year t+1
by the deferred sale. Any additional tax on that sale is only due on April 15th of year t+2.
Of course, if it is not optimal for a taxpayer to take advantage of the safe harbor rule,
quarterly estimated tax payments will depend on the tax consequences of the sale. How-
ever, the first quarterly estimated tax payment in April would only increase by 22.5% of
the tax increase (as 67.5% will be spread evenly over the three subsequent quarterly esti-
mated tax payments and 10% will be due in April of year t+2). As a consequence, though
estimated tax payments are paid quarterly, the effective discounting will still be at a longer
horizon than quarterly and thus the benefit of deferring the sale still significant.
Table 4.4 measures the effective discounting horizon when delaying a sale from De-
cember year t to January year t+1 under the current quarterly estimated tax payment sys-
tem. We study the four cases that arise when the investor does or does not qualify for the
safe harbor rule in tax years t and t+1. Case 1 of Table 4.4 involves a safe harbor for year
t as well as a safe harbor for year t+1. Selling a winner in January of year t+1 would not
make the investor pay more estimated taxes in year t+1 due to the safe harbor.2 Instead, the
investor would pay capital gains tax in the following year’s tax return, therefore April 15th
at t+2 (15 months and 15 days later) without a penalty. Assuming that selling in December
of year t implies a payment in April 15th at t+1, the relevant discount horizon is then 12
months (15.5 months – 3.5 months). In Case 1, one could realize an unlimited amount of
capital gains at the beginning of year t+1 but pay taxes on those gains more than a year
later.
Case 2 of Table 4.4 involves safe harbor for year t but no safe harbor for year t+1. The
investor pays 90% of any increase to current year’s taxes spread evenly to the next four tax
quarters and the remaining 10% is paid on April 15th of year t+2. The average discount
2All else equal, estimated taxes for year t+1 will increase if the investor realizes the gain in December
of year t. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore this consequence of the decision to defer sale of the stock to
January of t+1. Note, however, that this consequence further increases the benefit of delaying capital gains
and accelerating capital losses at the turn of the year.
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horizon is thus 5.03 months. As the investor sells more and more capital gains, he or she
would eventually move back to Case 1 with the relevant discounting becoming again 12
months.
Case 3 of Table 4.4 involves no safe harbor for year t but safe harbor for year t+1. This
case corresponds to an effective discounting period longer than that assumed in the main
analysis as the investor compares a tax payment of 90% in January 15th of year t+1 and
10% in April 15th of year t+1 to a 100% payment in April 15th of year t+2. In this case,
the relevant discounting horizon is 14.7 months.3 Finally, case 4 of Table 4.4 involves
no safe harbor for year t as well as no safe harbor for year t+1. In this case, the relevant
discounting period is 7.73 months.
3Again, we ignore the consequences on estimated taxes for t+1. However, again this consequence further
increases the benefit of delaying capital gains and accelerating capital losses at the turn of the year.
Chapter 4: Appendices 145
Table 4.4: Safe Harbor Case
We show the relevant discount horizon for an investor who is deciding whether to realize a capital gain/loss
before or after the turn of the year from t to t + 1. Our analysis studies the four possible cases that arise
depending upon whether the investor can take advantage of the safe harbor rule in year t and t+ 1.
Safe Harbor Rule Sell Stock in Sell Stock in Relevant
applies in tax year December of year t January of year t+ 1 Discount
t t+ 1 tax due at Month tax due at Month Horizon
100% 3.5 100% 15.5
Case 1 Yes Yes 3.5 15.5 12
100% 3.5 22.5% 3.5
22.5% 6.5
22.5% 8.5
22.5% 12.5
10% 15.5
Case 2 Yes No 3.5 8.525 5.025
90% 0.5 100% 15.5
10% 3.5
Case 3 No Yes 0.8 15.5 14.7
90% 0.5 22.5% 3.5
10% 3.5 22.5% 6.5
22.5% 8.5
22.5% 12.5
10% 15.5
Case 4 No No 0.8 8.525 7.725
Taken together, these cases indicate that even if the marginal investor is paying quar-
terly estimated taxes, in two of the four typical cases, the effective discounting horizon
is a year or more and in no case is the effective discounting horizon three months. Thus
we conclude that it is not obviously the case that the presence of quarterly estimated taxes
invalidates our annual approach. Nevertheless, we re-estimated our main results using a
quarterly discount rate instead of an annual discount rate. We found that the statistical
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significance of our results remains effectively the same. However, the absolute magnitude
of the coefficients on the relevant December and January dummies are now implausibly
high. We conclude that an annual rather than a quarterly discounting horizon is a more
plausible description of the data.
The second concern is that the deferral around the other estimated tax quarters should
matter as well, not just the deferral at the end of the year. This concern seems unlikely
however, as the discussion above makes it clear that estimated tax payments for each
quarter are not necessarily tied directly to income in that quarter. If an investor is using
the safe harbor rule, then the quarterly timing of the sale is clearly irrelevant. Moreover,
even if it is not optimal for the investor to use the safe harbor rule, estimated tax payments
are made based on the annual estimated tax.
There are two caveats to that conclusion. Firstly, estimated tax payments do not have
to start until the taxpayer has income on which he or she will owe income tax. As a con-
sequence, an investor can delay paying estimated tax by delaying his or her initial capital
gains realization. Secondly, the IRS does recognize that some investors may not receive
income evenly throughout the year and, as a consequence, allows investors the option to
vary their estimated tax payments with their realized income. This approach to determin-
ing estimated taxes is dubbed the annualized income installment method (AIIM) by the
IRS. Note that AIIM is not a requirement to match estimated tax payments to realized
income but is instead only an option. As a consequence, this method will typically only be
used for those investors who both expect to have a significant increase in income near the
end of the tax year and who, relatively speaking, paid a lot of tax last year. Investors who
expect to have a predictable decrease in income near the end of the year are generally bet-
ter off not using the annualized income installment method. Additionally, our impression
is that in practice this method is not used nearly as much as the general rule above.4
4There exist ways in which a tax-savvy investor can minimize the present value of his or her taxes more
effectively than through AIIM. For example, an investor who only has capital gains realizations as income
can skip a year between those capital gains realizations, never pay estimated tax, realize unlimited amounts
of capital gains, yet never be subject to penalty.
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Despite the fact that many investors pay equal installments for their estimated tax
(whether due to a safe harbor or not), we re-estimated our main results introducing dum-
mies for turn-of-the-tax-quarter. We found no evidence of a turn-of-the-tax-quarter effect.
To increase power, we would ideally exploit variation in the rules concerning estimated
tax payments. We were unable to find good documentation as to how rules concerning
estimated taxes have varied over time. However, even if the rules have not changed, the
relative importance of the safe harbor aspect of the estimated tax payment rules should
vary over time with economic conditions. However, we did not find that the regression
coefficients when interacted with a dummy (equal to 1 if the current year has any month
classified as a NBER recession and the previous year did not) showed any evidence of a
turn-of-the-tax-quarter effect.
4.2.3 Anticipated Changes in Captial Gains Tax Rates
We also analyzed whether incorporating anticipated tax rate changes at the turn of
the year affect our conclusions. In some cases, investors knew with near certainty at the
end of December what the capital gains tax rate would be in January. If that is the case
then it is straightforward to show that our tax-selling premium, γ = τ (1−B)
(1−Bτ) , becomes
γ = (τt−τt+1B)
(1−Bτt+1) . We reestimated Table 2.2 from the main paper using this two-tax-rate
formulation The major tax rate changes which were retroactive were the years 1976, 1997,
and 2003. For those three major tax rate changes we continue to use the one-rate formu-
lation. Of course, it is possible that even retroactive tax rates were anticipated so we also
used the two-tax-rate formula in every case. Ultimately, we found no evidence of that
anticipated tax rate changes affected our conclusions.
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4.3 Appendix to Chapter 3: Inflation Risk in Corporate
Bonds
A.1 Optimal Choice of Labor
From the firm’s single period optimization we obtain the first-order condition with
respect to labor
(1− α) z1−αt
(
Kit
N it
)α
= Wt (4.1)
The capital to labor ratio is constant across firms and equal to Kt. Substituting back into
operating revenue gives firm i′s one-period equilibrium revenue as αKit
(
zt
Kt
)1−α
. The
expression for the equilibrium return on capital follows as
RKt+1 =
[
α
(
zt+1
Kt+1
)1−α
+ (1− δ)
]
(4.2)
A.2 First-Order Conditions
The time t+ 2 real cash flow of a corporate bond issued by firm i at time t is(
1− I
{
ai,idt+2 < a
∗
t+2
})
exp
(
2pit + 2εpit+1 + ε
pi
t+2
) + θKyt+1
B$t
RKt+1R
K
t+2 exp
(
ai,idt+2
)
I
{
ai,idt+2 < a
∗
t+2
}
(4.3)
The time t price of the bond is given by the expected stochastic discounted value of real
cash flows
qt = Et
[
M$t,t+2
(
1−H (a∗t+2))]
+θEt
[
Mt,t+2
Kyt+1
B$t
RKt+1R
K
t+2Ω
(
a∗t+2
)]
(4.4)
The expression for the survival threshold then implies
qt = Et
M$t,t+2
1−H (a∗t+2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Default Rate
+ θ
Ω
(
a∗t+2
)
exp
(
a∗t+2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Recovery

 (4.5)
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Equity holders maximize
Et
[
Mt,t+2 max
(
V i,oldt+2 −B$t exp
(−2pit − 2εpit+1 − εpit+2) , 0)]− St (4.6)
subject to
vi,oldt+2 = k
y
t+1 + r
K
t+1 + r
K
t+2 + a
i,id
t+2 (4.7)
Kyt+1 = St + χqtB
$
t (4.8)
Given constant returns to scale and no equity issuance costs, the net equity value (4.6)
will equal zero in equilibrium, reflecting free entry. Substituting (4.7), (4.8), and (4.5) into
(4.6) we can rewrite the firm’s problem as maximizing
exp (2pit)K
y
t+1LtEt
[
M$t,t+2
(
exp
(−a∗t+2)+ (χ− 1) (1−H (a∗t+2))
+ (χθ − 1) Ω (a∗t+2) exp (−a∗t+2)
)]
−Kyt+1
(4.9)
Differentiating (4.9) with respect to Kyt+1 while holding constant the initial leverage
ratio Lt gives:
0 = exp (2pit)LtEt
[
M$t,t+2
(
exp
(−a∗t+2)+ (χ− 1) (1−H (a∗t+2))
+ (χθ − 1) Ω (a∗t+2) exp (−a∗t+2)
)]
− 1 (4.10)
Using a∗t+2 = lt − 2εpit+1 − εpit+2 − rKt+1 − rKt+2 for the survival threshold gives the
first-order condition for capital with Ft+2 as in the main text
1 = Et
[
Mt,t+2R
K
t+1R
K
t+2Ft+2
]
(4.11)
Differentiating (4.9) with respect to Lt while holding constant the level of capital K
y
t+1
gives:
0 =
(
1 +
∂
∂a∗t+2
)
Et
[(
M$t,t+2
(
exp
(−a∗t+2)+ (χ− 1) (1−H (a∗t+2))
+ (χθ − 1) Ω (a∗t+2) exp (−a∗t+2)
))]
(4.12)
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Using ∂
∂a∗t+2
Ω
(
a∗t+2
)
= exp
(
a∗t+2
)
h
(
a∗t+2
)
gives the first-order condition with respect
to leverage
0 = −χ (1− θ)Et
(
M$t,t+2h
(
a∗t+2
))
+ (χ− 1)Et
(
M$t,t+2
(
1−H (a∗t+2))) (4.13)
A.3 Numerical Solution Method
Define rescaled variables relative to trend productivity exp (µt)
K˜t =
Kt
exp (µt)
, C˜t =
Ct
exp (µt)
, Y˜t =
Yt
exp (µt)
, z˜t =
zt
exp (µt)
We denote logs by lower case letters. Since z˜t is identically and independently dis-
tributed, our only state variable is end of period total wealth W˜ = Y˜ + (1− δ) K˜. We
use projection methods to solve for the two policy functions for leverage and consump-
tion (Aruoba, Fernandez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramirez (2006)). A recursive equilibrium
has to satisfy the two first-order conditions (4.13) and (4.11) with the additional dynam-
ics K˜t+1 =
(
W˜t − C˜t
)
exp (−µ). We define ER (w˜) as the expected two-period return
on capital in a model with zero inflation volatility. We then solve for both log detrended
consumption c˜ and scaled leverage L/ER as polynomials of degree two in log detrended
wealth w˜ by minimizing the errors of the first-order conditions along a grid of 19 nodes for
w˜. Intuitively, the survival threshold is related to the ratio of leverage over the two-period
return on capital and the scaling makes the survival threshold well-behaved.
4.3.1 Additional Empirical Results
Tables 4.1 through 4.15 report additional detailed data sources, summary statistics and
robustness checks. Table 4.1 shows details of the corporate bond data. Table 4.2 shows
cross-country correlations of credit spreads, inflation volatility and the inflation-stock cor-
relation and the cross-correlation between inflation volatility and the inflation-stock cor-
relation. Table 4.3 shows that the benchmark empirical results are remarkably consis-
tent across countries. Table 4.4 shows that the benchmark empirical results hold up in a
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Swamy (1970) random coefficients model. Table 4.5 shows inter-quantile regressions and
suggests that the impact of inflation risk on credit spreads is larger for periods with high
credit spreads. Table 4.5 supports our graphical findings that the impact of inflation risk
on credit spreads are asymmetric. Table 4.6 shows that our benchmark empirical results
become slightly stronger if we calculate the U.S. credit spread as the BAA over govern-
ment spread instead of subtracting the AAA corporate bond yield. This is intuitive if AAA
bond yields contain a small credit risk component. Table 4.7 shows that our main em-
pirical results hold up if we control for GDP volatility instead of equity volatility. Table
4.8 shows that our results are robust to smoothing our proxies for inflation volatility and
the inflation-stock correlation. Table 4.9 shows that the empirical results with additional
controls in Table 3.7 in the main text are robust to smoothing our proxies for equity mar-
ket volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, bond volatility, the bond-stock correlation, inflation
volatility and the inflation-stock correlation. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 suggest that in particular
the low frequency movements in inflation risk are priced into corporate bond spreads. Ta-
bles 4.10 and 4.11 show that empirical results are robust to alternate inflation forecasting
models and alternate inflation indices. Tables 4.12 and 4.13 show that the main empirical
results hold up in changes. Moreover, high inflation volatility and inflation-stock correla-
tion predict a decrease in credit spreads. Comparing the magnitude of the coefficients in
Table 4.12 to the benchmark results in Table 3.5 in the main text shows that credit spreads
fully mean revert after a period of 5 years.
To better understand the contribution of the changing composition of the credit spread
index, we would ideally like to run similar regressions using credit returns. In Table 4.14
we find that corporate bond excess returns are negatively related to changes in inflation
volatility and to changes in the inflation-stock correlation over 3-5 horizons. Inflation
volatility does not predict returns on U.S. corporate bonds in excess of government bond
returns. There is some evidence that the inflation-stock correlation predicts corporate bond
excess returns, indicating that the impact of the inflation-stock correlation on credit spreads
contains a risk-premium component.
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Table 4.15 sorts each country’s observations into high medium and low inflation volatil-
ity and inflation-stock correlation. Credit spreads increase from low to high inflation
volatility and from low to high inflation-stock correlation. Credit spreads tend to be high-
est when both inflation volatility and the inflation-stock correlation are high, suggesting
that inflation volatility and inflation cyclicality interact to increase corporate bond spreads.
Table 4.5: International Corporate Bond Spread Data Sources
This table reports details on the underlying international corporate bond spread data. Assumptions for cor-
porate bond maturities are based on data descriptions provided by the listed data sources. Government bond
maturities are taken as given from Global Financial Data. Time-varying corporate and government bond
durations are approximated based on the loglinear methodology of Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay (1997).
This table reports average durations.
Corp. Bond Corp. Corp. Govt. Govt.
Country Data Source Maturity Duration Maturity Duration Sample
Australia Economist; Telstra 10 6.9 10 7.3 1983.Q3 - 2010.Q4
Canada Bank of Canada; Datastream 20 10.4 15 9.6 1960.Q1 - 2010.Q4
Germany Bundesbank 6 5.1 6 5.2 1967.Q1 - 2010.Q4
Japan Nikkei Corp. Bond Index 10 8.2 10 8.3 1973.Q1 - 2010.Q4
U.K. Financial Times; Economist 15 8.7 10 7.3 1960.Q1 - 2010.Q4
U.S. Moody’s BAA, AAA 25 11.4 N/A N/A 1960.Q1 - 2010.Q4
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Table 4.6: Correlation Among Key Variables (1969.Q4-2010.Q4)
This table reports correlations among credit spreads, inflation volatility, and inflation-stock correlation across
countries.
Panel A: Credit Spread
Canada Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
Canada 1.00
Germany 0.65 1.00
Japan 0.03 0.06 1.00
U.K. 0.69 0.56 0.10 1.00
U.S. 0.41 0.40 -0.21 0.55 1.00
Panel B: Inflation Volatility
Canada Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
Canada 1.00
Germany 0.36 1.00
Japan 0.18 0.36 1.00
U.K. 0.26 0.25 0.58 1.00
U.S. 0.50 0.09 0.07 0.46 1.00
Panel C: Inflation-Stock Correlation
Canada Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
Canada 1.00
Germany 0.33 1.00
Japan 0.38 0.14 1.00
U.K. 0.33 0.37 0.21 1.00
U.S. 0.40 0.42 0.18 0.16 1.00
Panel D: Inflation Volatility vs. Inflation-Stock Correlation
Canada Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
Canada -0.11 0.09 -0.20 -0.19 0.11
Germany 0.45 -0.08 -0.07 -0.14 0.10
Japan 0.07 -0.19 -0.37 -0.22 0.06
U.K. 0.17 -0.18 0.33 0.35 0.34
U.S. -0.13 -0.24 -0.29 -0.19 0.16
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Table 4.7: Individual Country Credit Spreads and Inflation Risk (1969.Q4-2010.Q4)
Newey-West standard errors with 16 lags in parentheses. Controls include quarterly and three year infla-
tion innovations, stock returns, GDP growth, and three year change in unemployment. Japan data starts in
1973.Q1. Variables are constructed as described in Table 3.4. * and ** denote significance at the 1% and
5% levels, respectively.
Credit Spread (%) Canada Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.03** 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.07 0.18** -0.15** 0.37** 0.06
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.14) (0.03)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.63** 0.58** -0.02 -0.01 0.32**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.22) (0.05)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.57** 0.72** 0.37** 1.19** 0.14
(0.09) (0.20) (0.10) (0.37) (0.08)
R2 0.74 0.73 0.48 0.54 0.66
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.8: Credit Spread Regressions with Random Coefficients (1969.Q4-2010.Q4)
This table reports quarterly regressions of credit spreads onto explanatory variables estimated using the
random coefficients regression model. Bootstrap standard errors are computed with 200 replications. * and
** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Japan data starts 1973.Q1. Standard errors are
not corrected for time-series correlation.
Combined Country-Specific
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) Canada Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
Equity Vol. (% Ann.) 0.02** 0.01* 0.02** 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Div.-Price Ratio (%) 0.12** 0.07** 0.10** 0.04 0.16 -0.03 0.20 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Inflation Vol. (% Ann.) 0.26** 0.19 0.46 -0.06 0.25 -0.02 0.39
(0.08) (0.11)
Inflation-Stock Correl. 0.63** 0.45 1.13 0.37 1.10 0.42
(0.21)
Constant 0.14 0.00 0.04 -0.11 0.00 -0.10 0.26 0.94
(0.15) (0.10) (0.08)
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Table 4.9: Inter-Quantile Regressions
This table reports inter-quantile credit spread regressions. Variables are constructed as described in Table
3.4. * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Standard errors are not corrected for
time-series correlation.
Credit Spread (%) 75th - 25th 50th - 25th 75th - 50th
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.02** 0.01** 0.01*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.14** 0.04 0.11**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.25** 0.12** 0.12*
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.27** 0.11* 0.16*
(0.08) (0.04) (0.06)
Constant -(0.22) -(0.05) -(0.17)
(0.12) (0.07) (0.13)
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Table 4.10: U.S. BAA Over Government Spread (1969.Q4-2010.Q4)
Data and standard errors as in Table 3.5 in the main text. In this table, the U.S. credit spread is computed as
the BAA over government spread instead of the BAA over AAA spread.
Panel A: International
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.03** 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.08* 0.03 0.06 0.13** 0.11 0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.25** 0.22** 0.32** 0.20** 0.20**
(0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.66** 0.49** 0.45** 0.37**
(0.22) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13)
Residual R2 0.26 0.30 0.39 0.47 0.18 0.49
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No No Yes
Panel B: U.S.
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.03* 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 -0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.43** 0.38** 0.24 0.27*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.41 0.52** 0.70**
(0.21) (0.14) (0.18)
R2 0.07 0.23 0.28 0.58 0.52
Controls No No No Yes Yes
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No Yes
Chapter 4: Appendices 158
Table 4.11: Controlling for GDP Volatility (1969.Q4-2010.Q4)
Data and standard errors as in Table 3.5 in the main text. In this table, real uncertainty is measured by the
annualized standard deviation of quarterly GDP growth over the past three years.
Panel A: International
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.13** 0.15 0.08*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.03)
GDP Volatility (% Ann.) 0.24** 0.16 0.12 0.11* 0.12 0.14*
(0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.19* 0.15 0.28** 0.15* 0.22**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.61** 0.39** 0.48** 0.31*
(0.20) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Residual R2 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.35 0.17 0.31
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No No Yes
Panel B: U.S.
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
GDP Volatility (% Ann.) 0.32** 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.11
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.33** 0.32** 0.30** 0.36**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.09 0.11 0.26**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
R2 0.36 0.49 0.49 0.66 0.70
Controls No No No Yes Yes
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No Yes
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Table 4.12: Smoothed Inflation Risk (1969.Q4-2010.Q4)
Data and standard errors are as in Table 3.5 in the main text. In this table inflation volatility and the inflation-
stock correlation are smoothed through an HP filter with smoothing parameter 500 to smooth out quarter by
quarter movements.
Panel A: International
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.03* 0.02* 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.12** 0.07* 0.13** 0.18** 0.16* 0.13**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.22** 0.15* 0.26* 0.15 0.24*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.92** 0.63** 0.70** 0.47*
(0.30) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Residual R2 0.11 0.14 0.27 0.36 0.20 0.37
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No No Yes
Panel B: U.S.
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.14** 0.11* 0.12** 0.05 0.06
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.38** 0.35** 0.25** 0.40**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.15 0.31 0.97**
(0.21) (0.21) (0.26)
R2 0.20 0.41 0.42 0.64 0.73
Controls No No No Yes Yes
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No Yes
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Table 4.13: Credit Spread Regressions with Add’l. Controls Smoothed (1989.Q1-2010.Q4)
Data and standard errors are as in Table 3.8 in the main text. In this table, market volatility, idiosyn-
cratic volatility, bond volatility, bond-stock correlation, inflation volatility, and inflation-stock correlation
are smoothed through an HP filter with smoothing parameter 500 to smooth out quarter by quarter move-
ments.
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3)
Market Volatility (% Ann.) 0.01 -0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Idiosyncratic Volatility (% Ann.) 0.01* -0.00 0.01*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.37** 0.23* 0.37**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Leverage (%) -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.33** -0.12 0.33**
(0.12) (0.21) (0.12)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.24** 0.06 0.24**
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Bond Volatility (% Ann.) 0.59 0.39 0.59
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46)
Bond-Stock Correlation 1.41** 1.52* 1.41**
(0.52) (0.66) (0.52)
R2
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No
Excluding 2008-2010 No No Yes
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Table 4.14: International CPI and PPI Inflation (1969.Q4-2010.Q4)
This table reports quarterly regressions of credit spreads onto explanatory variables for the following coun-
tries: Canada, Germany, Japan, U.K., and U.S. Inflation shocks are computed as inflation minus rolling
four-quarter inflation following Atkeson and Ohanian (2001). These shocks are then used to compute altern-
tative measures of inflation volatility and inflation-stock correlation. Inflation in Panel A is based on CPI
data, and inflation in Panel B is based on PPI data.
Panel A: International CPI Inflation
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* 0.02 0.02* 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.11** 0.08** 0.11* 0.16** 0.15 0.11**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.14* 0.12* 0.19** 0.07 0.14**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.52* 0.37** 0.40** 0.24**
(0.22) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Residual R2 0.12 0.15 0.23 0.33 0.18 0.32
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No No Yes
Panel B: International PPI Inflation
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.15** 0.20* 0.12**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.13** 0.13** 0.12** 0.08** 0.09**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.23* 0.17 0.04 0.25*
(0.11) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11)
Residual R2 0.11 0.29 0.30 0.36 0.15 0.30
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No No Yes
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Table 4.15: U.S. CPI and PPI Inflation (1969.Q4-2010.Q4)
These regressions are analogous to Table 4.14 for the U.S. time series. Regressions are run using Newey-
West standard errors with 16 lags. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: U.S. CPI Inflation
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.14** 0.13** 0.13** 0.07 0.08
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.31** 0.31** 0.23** 0.28**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.02 0.14 0.26
(0.09) (0.07) (0.15)
R2 0.22 0.47 0.47 0.63 0.66
Controls No No No Yes Yes
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No Yes
Panel B: U.S. PPI Inflation
Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.14** 0.17** 0.17** 0.10* 0.12**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.08** 0.08** 0.04 0.12**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.14 0.21* 0.40**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
R2 0.20 0.38 0.39 0.60 0.61
Controls No No No Yes Yes
Excluding 2008-2010 No No No No Yes
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Table 4.16: U.S. Credit Spread Changes (1969.Q4-2010.Q4)
These regressions are analogous to Table 3.9 in the main text for the U.S. time series. Standard errors
are Newey-West with 16+n lags in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Panel A: Credit Spread Changes onto Contemporaneous Changes
∆ Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Horizon (Quarters) 1 4 12 20
∆ Equity Volatility (% Ann.) -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
∆ Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.38** 0.15 0.09 0.28**
(0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.06)
∆ Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.61** 0.50** 0.31** 0.40**
(0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
∆ Inflation-Stock Correlation 0.11 0.10 0.18* 0.23**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
R2 0.33 0.45 0.58 0.68
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Credit Spread Changes onto Lagged Variables
∆ Credit Spread (%) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Horizon (Quarters) 1 4 12 20
Lag Equity Volatility (% Ann.) -0.00 -0.02* -0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lag Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.01 -0.09 -0.19** -0.21*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10)
Lag Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) -0.04 -0.00 0.09 -0.58**
(0.03) (0.07) (0.24) (0.22)
Lag Inflation-Stock Correlation -0.07 -0.16 -0.22 -0.36
(0.06) (0.13) (0.21) (0.23)
R2 0.18 0.44 0.35 0.48
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.17: U.S. Credit Return Regressions
Corporate bond returns and government bond returns are from Ibbotson return indices. Equity returns are
in excess of long-term bond returns. Newey-West standard errors with 16 lags in parentheses. Controls
include quarterly and three year inflation innovations, stock returns, GDP growth, and three year change in
unemployment. Variables are constructed as described in Table 3.4. * and ** denote significance at the 1%
and 5% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Contemporaneous Changes
retcorpt,t+n − retgovt,t+n (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Horizon (in quarters) 1 1 1 4 12 20
∆ Equity Volatility (% Ann.) -0.16 -0.11 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.03
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
∆ Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) -2.70* -1.08 -1.05 -5.36** -4.84**
(1.07) (1.58) (1.84) (1.27) (1.11)
∆ Inflation-Stock Correlation -0.99 0.44 -0.47 -3.94** -3.97*
(1.33) (0.85) (1.46) (1.46) (1.81)
rett,t+ngov (%) -0.17** -0.08 -0.16 -0.31
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.16)
rett,t+ncorp (%) 0.03** 0.08 -0.10 -0.24
(0.01) (0.06) (0.11) (0.17)
Constant -0.15 -0.11 0.18 0.54 2.61** 5.23**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.74) (0.63) (1.62)
Panel B: Return Predictive Regressions
retcorpt,t+n − retgovt,t+n (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Horizon (in quarters) 1 1 1 4 12 20
Lag Equity Volatility (% Ann.) 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.07 -0.03 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Lag Dividend-Price Ratio (% Ann.) 0.1 0.10 0.14 0.29 -0.16 -0.20
(0.09) (0.14) (0.21) (0.38) (0.32) (0.36)
Lag Inflation Volatility (% Ann.) 0.44 0.07 -0.14 -0.09 -0.34
(0.48) (0.40) (0.45) (0.78) (1.17)
Lag Inflation-Stock Correlation 1.96 2.43* 1.46* -0.69 -0.40
(1.19) (1.01) (0.68) (0.62) (0.54)
R2 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.02
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.18: Decomposition of Inflation Risk Regimes
Credit spreads are averaged within categories of low, medium and high inflation volatility as well as inflation-
stock correlation regimes. Low, medium and high inflation risk regimes are defined according to the bottom,
middle and top third of the distribution, respectively. The right-hand table reports the relative frequency, or
time spent, in each regime.
Credit Spread (%) Time Spent (% of Obs.)
Inflation Volatility Inflation Volatility
Low Med High Low Med High
Australia Low 0.61 1.05 0.98 11% 9% 2%
Med 0.61 0.75 1.09 5% 7% 11%
High 0.87 1.19 1.37 7% 7% 9%
Canada Low 0.68 0.94 1.16 7% 10% 16%
Med 0.80 0.94 0.88 13% 13% 7%
High 0.93 1.00 1.56 13% 10% 10%
Germany Low 0.38 0.40 0.29 5% 13% 15%
Med 0.56 0.60 0.62 15% 10% 9%
High 0.98 1.48 0.36 13% 11% 9%
Japan Low 0.20 0.07 0.57 9% 10% 14%
Med 0.29 0.34 0.03 13% 10% 10%
High 0.27 0.44 0.40 11% 13% 9%
U.K. Low 0.60 1.00 1.85 10% 18% 5%
Med 1.00 0.92 1.48 16% 9% 8%
High 0.98 1.58 1.96 7% 6% 21%
U.S. Low 0.74 0.87 1.14 9% 13% 12%
Med 0.83 0.95 1.42 8% 10% 16%
High 0.73 1.07 1.53 16% 11% 6%
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Figure 4.4 shows the close comovement between the bond-stock correlation and the
breakeven-stock correlation in the U.S. and in the U.K. Figure 4.5 shows the inverse rela-
tionship between quarterly inflation shocks and credit spreads in the U.S.
Figure 4.6 shows that the U.S. Phillips curve was steeper whenever the 3 year lagged
inflation stock correlation was higher. It also shows that inflation shocks were larger in
magnitude when the three year lagged inflation volatility was higher.
Figure 4.7 investigates the relationship between inflation risk regimes and defaults for
the U.S. Unfortunately data availability is limited and the evidence is consequently noisy.
The bottom left panel shows evidence consistent with theory. Defaults are downward slop-
ing in stock returns when inflation is procyclical but upward sloping in stock returns when
inflation is countercyclical. In particular, default rates were low in the 1970s when inflation
was countercyclical but they were high during the early 2000s, which were characterized
by procyclical inflation.
4.3.2 Computation of Asset Prices
Our simulations require the computation of asset prices along a three-dimensional grid
for w˜, the leverage ratio of seasoned firms, and the inflation risk regime. We compute asset
prices along a dense grid of size 70 × 35 × 2. This grid covers seasoned leverage ratios
from 0.1 to 1.9 and the full solution range for w˜. In our simulations, we compute asset
prices by interpolating linearly over this grid.
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Figure 4.4: Breakeven-Stock Correlation
Breakeven inflation correlation computed from daily changes in breakeven and daily log stock returns.
Breakeven is the difference between continuously compounded zero coupon nominal and inflation-indexed
government yields. 10 year yields from Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2010) and 15 year U.K. yields from
Anderson and Sleath (2001).
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Figure 4.5: U.S. Credit Spreads and Inflation Shocks
Three year changes in the Moody’s BAA over AAA credit spreads and quarterly inflation shocks extracted.
Bond Prices and Credit Spreads
We compute prices of 10 year and 5 year default free bonds according to
qgov,10t = exp (−2 (β + γµ+ pit))Et
[(
C˜t+2
C˜t
)−γ
exp
(−2εpit+t − εpit+2)
]
(4.14)
qgov,5t = exp (− (β + γµ+ pit))Et
[(
C˜t+1
C˜t
)−γ
exp
(−εpit+t)
]
(4.15)
The price of new 10 year corporate bonds is given by
qcorp,newt = exp (−2 (β + γµ+ pit))
×Et
(C˜t+2
C˜t
)−γ 1−H(a∗t+2) + θ Ω(a∗t+2)exp(a∗t+2)
exp
(
2εpit+t + ε
pi
t+2
)
 (4.16)
New corporate bonds issued by cohort t − 1 firms become seasoned corporate bonds
at time t. The calculation of seasoned 5 year corporate bond yields is complicated by firm
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Figure 4.6: U.S. Stock Return Phillips Curve and Lagged Inflation Risk
3 year inflation surprises are computed as the sum of 12 lags of quarterly inflation surprises. Quarterly
inflation surprises are residuals from regressing quarterly log inflation onto its own 12 lags and seasonal
dummies. In Panel A (Panel B) we split the sample according to whether the 12 month lagged inflation-
stock correlation (or inflation volatility) is in the highest 25% and lowest 25% of realized values. Linear
trend lines are shown for subsamples in Panel A.
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Figure 4.7: Defaults, Stock Returns and Inflation Shocks
Three year averages of annual default rates from Moody’s (2011). Annual issuer-weighted default rates
reflect all investment grade and speculative grade defaults. High and low inflation risk correspond to the
upper and lower thirds of the empirical distribution of inflation volatility or the inflation-stock correlation.
Inflation volatility greater than 1.41% p.a. is considered high and less than 0.95% p.a. is considered low. An
inflation-stock correlation greater than -0.19 is considered high and less than -0.43 is considered low.
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heterogeneity induced by idiosyncratic firm shocks. We denote the combined idiosyncratic
shock to firm i in cohort t − 1 by ai,idt+1. We think of it as the sum of two independent and
identically distributed shocks revealed in periods t and t+ 1
ai,idt+1 = a
i,1
t + a
i,2
t+1 (4.17)
ai,1t , a
i,2
t+1
ind∼ N
(
−1
4
(
σid
)2
,
1
2
(
σid
)2)
(4.18)
For a given idiosyncratic shock ai,1t , firm i defaults at time t+ 1 if and only if
ai,2t+1 < a
∗
t+1 − ai,1t (4.19)
The time t price of a seasoned bond issued by firm i then is
qi,seast = exp (− (β + γµ+ pit))
×Et
(C˜t+1
C˜t
)−γ 1−G(a∗t+1, ai,1t ) + θW (a∗t+1,ai,1t )exp(a∗t+1)
exp (εpit+t)
 (4.20)
The functions G and W are defined as the conditional analogues of the functions H
and Ω
G (x) = P
[
ai,idt+1 < x
∣∣∣ ai,1t ] (4.21)
W (x) = E
[
exp
(
ai,idt+1
)
I
(
ai,idt+1 < x
)∣∣∣ ai,1t ] (4.22)
We compute the new corporate bond spread at time t as
spreadnewt = −
1
10
log qcorp,newt +
1
10
log qgov,10t
We compute the average seasoned corporate bond spread by numerically integrating
over the density of the idiosyncratic shock ai,1t .
spreadseast =
∫ (
−1
5
log qi,seast +
1
5
log qgov,5t
)
dF
(
ai,1t
)
(4.23)
We approximate the integral in (4.23) using the Gauss-Hermite methodology with 7
nodes.
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Book Leverage and Investment to Capital
In Figure 3.5 in the main text we show impulse responses for new book leverage and
the investment to capital ratio. We obtain new book leverage by discounting the nominal
face value of debt by the long-term nominal risk free rate
Lbookt = Lt exp (2pit) q
gov,10
t (4.24)
The investment to capital ratio is computed as
(I/K)t =
W˜t − C˜t − (1− δ) K˜t
W˜t − C˜t
(4.25)
Idiosyncratic Equity Volatility
In Table 3.2 in the main text we report the idiosyncratic volatility of ten year equity
returns conditional on not defaulting. The time t real cash flow to equity holders of firm i
in cohort t− 2 conditional on not defaulting is
Kyt−1R
K
t−1R
K
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Return on Capital
 exp(aid,it )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Idiosyncratic Shock
− exp (a∗t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Debt Payment
 (4.26)
The idiosyncratic volatility of log real stock returns conditional on not defaulting is there-
fore given by
σFirmt =
1√
10
V ar
[
log
(
exp
(
aid,it
)
− exp (a∗t )
)∣∣∣ aid,it ≥ a∗t , a∗t] (4.27)
Dividend-Price Ratio, Equity Volatility, and Inflation-Stock Correlation
In Table 3.3 in the main text we show regressions that include the model dividend-price
ratio, model equity volatility and the model inflation-stock correlation. Since the left-hand
side of our regression has seasoned credit spreads, we focus on the moments of seasoned
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equity returns on the right-hand side. The real equity dividend at time t+ 1 averaged over
all cohort t− 1 firms is given by
Kyt R
K
t R
K
t+1
(
1− exp (a∗t+1) (1−H (a∗t+1))− Ω (a∗t+1)) (4.28)
The time t price of seasoned equity is therefore equal to
Sseast = exp (− (β + γµ))×Kyt RKt
×Et
[(
C˜t+1
C˜t
)−γ
RKt+1
(
1− exp (a∗t+1) (1−H (a∗t+1))− Ω (a∗t+1))
]
(4.29)
Log seasoned real equity returns from time t to time t+ 1 are then equal to
req,seast+1 = r
K
t+1 + log
(
1− exp (a∗t+1) (1−H (a∗t+1))− Ω (a∗t+1))− (sseast − kyt ) (4.30)
where sseast is the log seasoned equity price at time t. We compute the seasoned dividend-
price ratio as the expected log return on seasoned equity
DP seast = Et
[
req,seast+1
]
(4.31)
Seasoned equity volatility is the backward-looking annualized standard deviation of
log real seasoned stock returns conditional on the inflation risk regime
σeq,seast =
√
Var
[
rseas,eqt |σpit , ρpit , w˜t−1, Loldt−1
]
√
5
(4.32)
The inflation-stock correlation is the backward-looking correlation between shocks to
log inflation expectations and log seasoned real stock returns conditional on the inflation
risk regime
ρeq,pit = Corr
[
rseas,eqt , ε
pi
t |σpit , ρpit , w˜t−1, Loldt−1
]
(4.33)
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